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BOLIVAR.

THE LIBERATOR OF COLOMBIA.

MEMOIRS

OF

SIMON BOLIVAR,

PRESIDENT LIBERATOR

OF

THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA;

AND OF

HIS PRINCIPAL GENERALS;

COMPRISING

A SECRET HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION, AND THE EVENTS WHICH PRECEDED IT, FROM 1807 TO THE PRESENT TIME.

BY

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EX-CHIEF OF THE STAFF OF THE PRESIDENT LIBERATOR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

THE author of these Memoirs has been constantly attached to the cause of liberty in both hemispheres. He served in France during the whole time of the French revolution, and was, after the year 1800, attached to the staff of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Attracted by the sacred cause of the Spanish Americans, he proceeded to Carthagena, where the government offered him service, and conferred on him the highest military rank in its power to grant, that of *Gefe de Brigada* (Chief of Brigade.) He had the fortune to be commander-in-chief of the forts of Boca Chica. What other service he rendered in Colombia, will be related in the course of these Memoirs.

He, as one of the chieftains of the Republic, had a good opportunity of being well

informed of facts, whether secret or open, and of contemplating at leisure the disposition and talents of the chiefs, who were his daily companions, and many of them his subordinates. He particularly studied the character of General Bolivar, with whom he lived on terms of great intimacy.

On leaving this service, some friends suggested to him the idea of writing a history of Colombia, as he had been an eye witness of so many interesting facts. He complied with this suggestion; but, not satisfied with his own observations, he consulted many of the most distinguished leaders of both parties, (Spaniards and Patriots,) opportunities for which were frequently offered to him during his long residence in Hayti, Curaçao, and St. Thomas's; and accordingly he derived from them information upon certain facts, with which he had not been personally acquainted. He afterwards diligently and faithfully compared the various statements, and adopted what seemed to him to be the plain intermediate result. He thinks, therefore, he has *approached* as nearly as possible to a correct and impartial relation of facts. He has,

besides, kept up an active correspondence, collected the bulletins, the proclamations, the manifestoes, and memoirs, both of Spaniards and Patriots, and compared them with each other; and lastly, he commenced, and has continued to make, short notes, after consulting distinguished and well-informed gentlemen, who have furnished him with information.

He has been occupied in pursuing this subject more than five years; and as these Memoirs, now respectfully submitted to the public, contain a great many facts hitherto unpublished, the author hopes they will not prove to be without some interest to the reader.

GENEVA COLLEGE, NEW YORK,
February 4th, 1829.

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STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF COLOMBIA.

Geographical Divisions and former Government of the Countries at present comprehended within the limit of Colombia—Revolution from 1810 to the present time—Extent of Territory—Number of Inhabitants—Debt and Revenue—Forts and Fortifications—Seaports—Judicial Administration—Form of Government—Slavery—Indians—Common Schools, Colleges, Universities—Roads — Rivers — Mines — Diseases — Burial Places — Poor Houses and Beggars—The Clergy—Executive Influence, Provincial Officers—Obstacles to the Establishment of a regular efficient free Government, and to Improvements and Prosperity in Colombia.

THE Spaniards gave the name *Costa* or *Tierra Firma* to those provinces which now form the territory of the Colombian republic. By *Tierra Firma Del Oriente* was understood the captain-generalship of *Venezuela*. By *Tierra Firma Del Occidente* was understood the viceroyalty of *New Grenada*. Under the name *Tierra Firma* were included the provinces of *Veragua* in North America, and of *Panama* and *Darien* on the Isthmus.

Venezuela was governed in the name of the king of Spain, by a captain-general, who presided in the *Real Audiencia*, or great council, in civil matters. This officer was invested with great powers, and ac-

countable only to the king, through the council of the Indies. He decided in the last instance on all legislative, judicial, and military affairs. The ecclesiastical concerns were regulated and conducted by a tribunal, composed wholly of ecclesiastics, in which the archbishop of Caracas presided. The captain-general had no authority to interfere in any manner whatever with this tribunal.

The time of the captain-general's remaining in power was limited to a period of from four to six years. Very few of these governors returned poor to Spain.

The captain-generalship of Venezuela was divided into eight provinces, and in 1809 consisted of Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, Barinas, Maracaybo, Coro, Guayana, and the island of Margarita.

The ancient vice-royalty of *New Grenada* was governed by a viceroy, who presided over the real Audiencia, and was accountable to the king alone, through the council of the Indies, in which the king was supposed to preside.

New Grenada, in 1809, stood divided into three audiencias and twenty-two provinces.

Under the *Audiencia of Panama*, were the provinces of Veragua and Panama.

Under that of *Santa Fé de Bogotá*, were the provinces Coro, Sinu, Carthagena, Santa Martha, Mariquita, Santa Fé, Antioquia, Neyva, Popayan, Pamplona, Tunja, and Socorro.

Under the *Audiencia of Quito*, were the provinces of Quito, Quijos, Maynas, Atacames, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Loja, and Jaen De Bracamoros.

No intercourse was held between Venezuela and New Grenada. A traveller wishing to pass from one to the other was obliged to submit to all those tiresome and humiliating formalities required on entering Spain. The government and laws were quite different in the two countries, as were the character, habits, manners, and customs of the inhabitants.

The Spanish colonial system is so generally understood, that it would be superfluous to speak of it here. But the following particulars of the *Philippine Company* are little known. This was a society of merchants and other wealthy individuals of the province of Biscay in Spain, who purchased of the king the privilege of importing and exporting, to and from his colonies, merchandize of every description, and of fixing the prices of all kinds of produce and merchandize. On the Main, neither the captain-general nor the viceroy could alter any price fixed by the company. Capital punishments were ordained against every one who traded with the inhabitants without being authorized by the company. The natives were forced to sell their produce at the price fixed. The company had armed vessels, called *Guarda Costas*, employed to prevent the intercourse with any vessel or individual not authorized by the company. Their net profit was about three hundred per cent; and this mode of conducting their trade may alone serve to show the wretched condition of the Main, as it is termed.

The following are the principal revolutions and changes of government on the Main, from April 19th, 1810, until December 1819, when Venezuela and New

Grenada united under one government, which took the name of the republic of Colombia.

In Venezuela the Spanish government was changed by a revolution which took place at Caracas 19th of April 1810, when the captain-general Emparan and the Real Audiencia were arrested, and a provisional Junta was formed under the name of "Junta established for the preservation of the rights of His Majesty, King Ferdinand VII."

On the 2d of March 1811, the congress of Venezuela opened their sessions at Caracas. It was composed of the deputies of the following provinces: Margarita, Caracas, Merida, Cumana, Barcelona, Barinas, and Truxillo. By an act of July 5th, 1811, congress declared the republic of Venezuela free and independent of Spain. On the 21st of December of the same year, it sanctioned a constitution which bound the provinces together by a federal act, like that of the United States of America. But these several provinces being exposed both to internal faction and invasion from without, were scarcely able separately to bear the expense incurred for their own preservation; so that the expenses of the general government and the support of the army and navy fell chiefly upon Caracas. Congress was in a prosperous state when the dreadful earthquake, together with the loss of Porto Cabello, and the capitulation of Vittoria, between General Miranda and Monteverde, ruined the government and destroyed the congress and republic of Venezuela, (July 1812). The country was left to anarchy, and subjected to the power of the sword.

On the 14th of August, 1814, General Simon Bolivar entered the city of Caracas as conqueror, and assumed the title of "*Dictator Liberator of the West of Venezuela,*" and established an arbitrary military government. General San Iago Marinno had done the same before, in the provinces of Cumana, Barcelona, &c. under the title of "*Dictator Liberator of the Provinces East of Caracas,*"

The 17th of July, 1814, the Spaniards again entered the city of Caracas. In consequence of the battle of La Puerta, where the two dictators were beaten by Boves, the Spaniards soon afterwards took possession of the provinces which the two dictators and their troops had evacuated. In the night of the 24th and 25th of August, the dictators embarked at Cumana.

Venezuela became again subject to the bayonet, and each military chieftain governed despotically the territory occupied by his troops.

May 5th, 1816, Simon Bolivar, with an armed force, again entered the territory of Venezuela (the island of Margarita,) and assumed the title of "*Supreme Chief, Captain-General of the forces of Venezuela and New Grenada.*" &c. &c.

On the 6th of July in the same year he lost that title and the possession of Venezuela, when he suddenly embarked at Ocumare for the Dutch island of Buen Ayre.

On the 31st December, 1816, General Bolivar landed again at Barcelona, and re-assumed the title of "*Supreme Chief, Liberator of the Republic of Venezuela, Captain-General,*" &c. &c. He had been recalled through the powerful influence of Admiral

Louis Brion; but upon the express condition that he should, upon his arrival, assemble a congress at Barcelona. He not only neglected to do so, but persecuted the members of the congress at Cariaco, May, 1817.

In consequence of General Bolivar's very unfortunate campaign in 1818, against Morillo, the general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants of Angostura with that campaign, his manner of government (which was the same as under his dictatorship at Caracas), and the strong representations of Brion, Zea, Manuel Torres, Doctor Roscio, Doctor Carli, and other patriots, the supreme chief was compelled, at last, to assemble a congress at the city of Angostura, under the name of the Congress of the Republic of Venezuela. Bolivar was chosen president of the republic; and we shall see, in the proper place, in what his power consisted.

New Grenada was, during that time, the theatre of various commotions and changes. A junta was established at Bogotá,* the 20th of July, 1810, in which the viceroy presided. Soon after the same junta deposed and arrested their president, and exiled most of the members of the Real Audiencia, as the junta at Caracas had done, April 19th, 1810.

The junta, in their manifesto, declared that they no longer recognized the authority of the Spanish regency, and they invited the twenty-two provinces to send their deputies to Bogotá, in order to fix, in a general assembly, the form of this new government;

* The name of Santa Fé de Bogotá was, from that year, changed to *Bogotá*, and its province called *Cundinamarca*.

but only *during the time of the captivity of their beloved and adored King Ferdinand VII.*

The deputies of the provinces of Tunja, Pamplona, Neyva, Carthagena, and Antiochia, assembled at the city of Bogotá, where they concluded, November 27th, 1811, a federal treaty, in sixty-eight articles, by which congress united the legislative and executive powers. But the inhabitants of the province of Cundinamarca disapproved these articles of union, and convoked a general assembly of the deputies of such of the twenty-two provinces as had not met at Bogotá. This assembly took the name *El Collegio Electoral Constituente.* They proposed a project of a constitution, which was approved in general assembly, April 17th, 1812. This project, in twelve great parts, treated of a limited monarchical government.

Francisco Narinno, president of the junta in the province of Cundinamarca, revolted against congress. This body not confiding in the favourable opinion of the citizens of Bogotá, suddenly resolved to leave that capital and establish the seat of government in the little town of Tunja. This change was the origin of a civil war, which began between the leaders of congress and the partizans of Narinno, in 1812.

After many troubles and much bloodshed, the congress at Tunja, decreed, September 10th, 1814, that an executive power should be established, consisting of three members, and called the *Executive Council.*

In November, 1814, General Bolivar arrived at Tunja, and was promoted to the rank of captain-general of Venezuela and New Grenada, and instructed to put an end to these troubles by force of

arms. He marched with a strong body of troops against Bogotá, which he subjected without bloodshed, the city having no fortifications and very few troops.

Congress again returned to Bogotá, but was soon after compelled to dissolve and fly, in consequence of the siege of Carthagena, by General Bolivar himself, in the beginning of 1815. By this siege he lost his army, the congress, the strong fortress of Carthagena, and the independence of New Grenada.

From that time the provinces of New Grenada were left in a state of anarchy, each military leader ruling the territory occupied by his troops as he pleased. When General Bolivar reconquered New Grenada in 1819, he established at Bogotá a provisional government, nearly the same as his dictatorship in Venezuela in 1813 and 14.

After all these commotions and changes, New Grenada and Venezuela were at last united under one government by a decree of the congress at Angostura, called the *Fundamental Law,* dated "city of St. Thomas Angostura, in the province of Guayana, December 11th, 1819*. This new government assumed the title of the *Republic of Colombia.* The fundamental law was a provisional and unlimited treaty of union between the inhabitants of both New Grenada and Venezuela. It was sanctioned by the general congress convened at the city Del Rosario De Cucuta, 12th July, 1820.†

The government of Colombia was declared to be a

* See Appendix. Document No. 1.

† See Appendix. Document No. 2.

central, and not a federal government. Such is the late constitution of Colombia.

In the debates upon the subject, the deputies of Venezuela advocated a central government. Those of New Grenada contended for a federal union. The first opinion was that of General Bolivar, who, in his private conversations at Aux Cayes, Barcelona, and Angostura, told his friends that a central government would give much more force and promptitude in the execution of the laws. His enemies accuse him of having been in favour of a central government, only to secure to himself the power which he would have lost by a federal union. We shall see, in the course of this work, how far this accusation was just. In order that neither party might be deprived of an opportunity of expressing their mature opinions on this point, an article was inserted in the constitution,* in these words:—"After an experiment of ten or more years shall have discovered all the inconveniences or advantages of the present constitution, the congress shall convoke a grand convention of Colombia, authorized to examine (revise) it, or to reform it altogether."†

The territory of the republic of Colombia extends from the mouth of the Orinoco river to the northern frontiers of Peru and Brazil, or to the province of Meynas on the limits of the Amazon.

Baron Humboldt says, in his "Historical Account of a Voyage to the Equinoxial Regions of the New

* Article 191.

† In conformity to this article, the general assembly was convoked in Colombia, at the end of 1827.

Continent," that the republic of Colombia is, with Mexico and Guatimala, the only state in Spanish America which occupies coasts opposite to Europe and Asia. The distance from Cape Paria to the eastern extremity of the province of Veragua is computed at 400 maritime leagues; from Cape Burica to the mouth of the river Tumbez, 260. The sea-shore which the Colombian republic possesses on the sea of the Antilles and on the Pacific Ocean is equal in length to the coast from Cadiz to Dantzic, and from Ceuta to Jaffa.

Mr. Bouchon, in his American Atlas, asserts that the republic of Colombia contains 91,952 square leagues;* others say 126,000; and the same author affirmed its population, in 1823, to be 2,785,000 inhabitants, which I think too many, considering that war and emigration have been so long operating against these countries, and that the government has done so little to encourage the settlement of foreigners.

By another calculation, the population, at the commencement of 1822, was as follows:—

	Whites.	*Coloured.*	*Total.*
In Venezuela,	80,000	480,000	560,000
In New Grenada,	110,000	900,000	1,010,000
	190,000	1,380,000	1,570,000

These calculations, differing so widely, were made within the space of one year; but it is to be noted

* The second article in the *fundamental law* says, the republic contains 115,000 square leagues.

that a *census* was never taken under the Spanish government. Each priest had his register, in which he inserted christenings, marriages, and burials, and nothing else; and these were not published. The present government of Colombia has not yet taken a census.

The finances of Colombia are in a very low state, the expenditure far exceeding the revenue. The national debt is greatly increasing, and the interest of the English loan is not punctually paid, as will be shown by documents. By a law of congress, dated Bogotá, June 23d, 1824, the territory of Colombia is divided into 12 departments, 49 provinces, and 218 cantons.

The seat of government has been fixed, provisionally, at the city of Bogotá, of which the inhabitants of Quito and Caracas are very jealous. The new city of Bolivar, which, in conformity to article 7th of the fundamental law of Colombia, is to be found in a central place, has not yet been established, probably for want of the necessary funds.

The city of Bogotá contained, in 1806, about 80,000 inhabitants; now it has not 50,000. Caracas, the same year, had 36,000, and has now less than 25,000.

The fortresses in Colombia are Carthagena, and the four forts of Boca Chica, to protect the entry of its port, 12 miles from Carthagena, Santa Martha, and Porto Cabello. The cities of Maracaybo, Coro, Laguaira, Cumăna, Barcelona, Guayaquil and Pompatar, are in part fortified, having forts to protect their harbours. All these are seaports. The city of

Angostura is fortified, but is not a seaport, being situated on the river Orinoco, about 80 leagues from its mouth.

There are other seaports protected by small forts, batteries, or redoubts, as Carupano, Ocumare, Guiria, Juan Griego, &c. In the interior, the cities of Quito, Pastos, San Fernando de Apure, San Carlos, &c. have forts or batteries; but the cities of Bogotá and Caracas, situated in the interior, are not fortified. All the merchandise sent to Bogotá, must be embarked on the Magdalena river for Honda, where it is loaded upon mules, and, crossing a large chain of the Cordilleras, arrives at the beautiful valley of Bogotá in three or four days. Goods destined for Caracas are transported with more facility; they are carried by land from Laguaira or Porto Cabello.

Bogotá is not protected by forts on any side. Caracas is protected on the sea side by Laguaira and Porto Cabello, and on the land side by the fort of La Cabrera, which lies in a very narrow defile, enclosed on one side by the fine lake of Valencia, and on the other by a high chain of mountains.

The port and fortress of Carthagena are protected by the four forts of Boca Chica.

The twelve departments of Colombia are divided into provinces, cantons, or counties and parishes.

Each department has an intendant, entrusted with its administration; the president of the republic appoints him for the term of three years. There are, besides, two or three deputy-assessors, lawyers, a secretary-general, and other officers of the intendancy. Each department has a commander of the

land forces, a major-general, a staff and its officers, besides the commandants of the different places, of the engineers, of the artillery, the inspectors of the artillery, infantry, cavalry, &c.

Each province, except that where the intendant resides, who at the same time is governor, has a governor, and a deputy governor-assessor. They hold their offices for three years. The last are generally lawyers, and decide the civil causes. Each province has a secretary-general of the province and his clerks, a commander of the place, a director of the custom-house, and other officers.

Each province being divided into cantons and parishes, every one of them has its cabildos, or municipal officers, elected for one year, but without any salary.

For the twelve departments of Colombia, there are above 200 political judges, who have no fixed salary; or, if any, it is a trifle, which is not sufficient for their support.*

In each canton is a notary, who receives no salary.

The coasts of Colombia are divided into four maritime departments, viz. :—

The 1st department, including the coasts of Guayana, Cumana, Barcelona, and the island of Margarita:

2d. Those of Caracas, Coro, and Maracaybo:

* A *juez politico* is entrusted with the decision of small civil causes.—(See the Report of the secretary of the interior, T. M. Restrepo, made to the congress of Colombia, assembled on the 23d of April, 1823.)

3d. Those of Rio Hacha, Santa Martha, and Carthagena:

4th. The territory of Arato, as far as that of the Aragua.

A commandant-general, an auditor of the marine, and other officers, are entrusted with the administration in each of the four departments. The president of the republic appoints them all.

The popular representative government of Colombia has been superseded by the formal military despotism under Simon Bolivar, who assumes the title of "*Supreme Chief of the Republic of Colombia.*" Many of the laws passed by the congress during the existence of the popular government still remain in force.

Slavery has been abolished by an act of congress; but the act is limited, extending its benefit only to those who have borne arms or are able to pay 200 dollars to their masters.

The civilized aborigines are in a wretched condition. Under the Spanish dominion they were the slaves of the priests or the alcaldes. Both were their tyrants, forcing them to cultivate a certain portion of land in common. This disheartened the labourer, and is one cause of the low state of agriculture. These slaves merely vegetated, and were so miserable, that it was with the greatest difficulty they paid their yearly tax, of from six to nine dollars, which the law imposed upon each male from 18 to 50 years of age.

October 4th, 1821, congress decreed that all these taxes should be abolished, and the Indians should have the same rights and privileges with the other

citizens of Colombia; that they should no longer be obliged to work in common; that each should have his own lot of ground, and cultivate it as he pleased; and that this partition should be made within five years.

By the law of March 14th, 1822, it was provided that, in each of the seminaries established in the cities of Bogotá, Caracas, and Quito, four young Indians should be admitted to the course of studies there pursued, and that two young Indians should, in the same way, be admitted into each of the colleges of the four other departments. The want of funds obliged them to limit the number. Each of these Indians receives a pension of ten dollars a month. Those who distinguish themselves are to be clergymen, or to be appointed to government offices.

Besides these christian Indians, there are in Colombia various tribes of savage, heathen Indians. These inhabit Goagira and its environs, and also the coasts of the rivers Orinoco, Meta, Amazon, and other rivers, which water the large valleys in the east part of the republic. They are known under the name of *Indios bravos*.

The inhabitants of the valleys of Casanare, Tuy, Apure, Araure, Cumana, Barcelona, &c. were christian Indians, known under the name of *Llaneros*. They are ferocious and cruel, but have rendered the greatest services to the republic.

Public instruction is very much neglected, government not having the means of paying good teachers, and the inhabitants of the counties and parishes being too poor to bear the expense of educating their

children. Moreover, there is a want of teachers sufficiently able and enlightened, and of good elementary schoolbooks.

Article XV. of the law of the 2d of August, 1821, concerning the *Primary Schools*, authorises the executive to establish *Normal Schools* in the principal cities of Colombia. These are established at Bogotá, Caracas, and Carthagena. But the absolute want of funds and elementary books, and the prejudices against this plan, united with the great influence of the priests, who are generally attached to old Spanish methods, confine this system of instruction to prayer-books and catechisms, too abstract for the entertainment or the conception of children. There were primary schools for females; but as government had not the necessary means, it was obliged, by the law of July 28th, 1821, to establish these schools in the convents of the nuns. These, however, having represented themselves to be in want of a great hall, and destitute of means to construct it, very few have been yet established. We may easily conceive how miserable all these schools must be, since we know how narrow and prejudiced were the minds of all those who were educated by friars and monks in the convents of both sexes, under the Spanish government on the Main. Such are at present, generally, the instructors of the rising generation. What must be the result of such an education!

The famous professor Lancaster, after having spent some years on the Main, for the purpose of bringing into use there his highly approved method of teaching, was obliged to leave the country, displeased, dis-

gusted, and ruined, as he has stated in his letters and memoirs, by which we learn, that the twenty thousand dollars granted by Bolivar have never been paid. The colleges and universities are, like the primary schools, in their infancy—in a vegetating state; not for want of the best intentions in congress, but absolutely for want of the necessary means.

The congress, when assembled at Cucuta, ordained, by a law of June 28th, 1821, that a public college should be established in each province of Colombia. There are such colleges in the provinces of Tunja, Ibagua, Medellin, Popayan, Loja, &c.; and, besides, government has preserved the old colleges, so that the cities of Quito, Bogotá, and Caracas, have two, and the provinces of Popayan and Merida, one each. But all suffer for want of funds to maintain them and to pay good professors.

In Bogotá there is a school of Anatomy for the use of the students.

Colombia has four universities—at Quito, Bogotá, Caracas, and Merida. That in Bogotá is exclusively for students in theology; the three others, for students in the other branches. Bogotá and Caracas have libraries for the use of the students of the colleges and universities; but they are not extensive, and are composed chiefly of old theological works, and therefore not conducive to science. Arts, sciences and literature, are all in the same state of infancy, and cannot flourish until the schools shall be in a better condition.

The country of Colombia has chains of large and high mountains, known under the name of Cordilleras de los Andes, which have more than an hundred

branches extending through the whole republic, so that very many of the roads are laid over mountains, impassable by carriages. Over a distance of 80 or 90 miles, therefore, travellers must pass on horses or mules, or by water: mules are safer than horses. In the rainy season many roads are so overflowed with water that it is dangerous to pass them: the intercourse with the interior is then greatly obstructed. There are no turnpikes, and few bridges or ferries in Colombia. Rivers must be crossed by swimming or in small canoes. Here, as every where else, the want of means and hands opposes the necessary establishment of high roads, bridges, &c. and hinders and embarrasses commerce exceedingly. The chains of mountains have in them many dens, affording shelter for bands of robbers, who, under the name of Guerillas, infest, particularly in the present times, the departments of Venezuela, Julia, Boyaca and others. Travellers and mails go well armed and escortod.

The two largest rivers in Colombia are the Orinoco and the Magdalena: both these are navigable for ships. Others may be navigated by small craft. The principal of them are the Catatumbo or Zulia, forming, with some others, the large lake of Maracaybo; the Atrato, the Cruces, Arauca, Patia, Esmeraldas, and many others. Congress intended to unite several of them, by means of canals cut from one to another.

On the Magdalena and Orinoco rivers, steam boats are now used for the transport of passengers and merchandize. On the first they go from Santa Martha to Mompox, where the passengers land; and, with horses or mules, cross large mountains, before they

can arrive at the extensive plain of Bogotá, the present seat of the Colombian government. On the Orinoco, they go from one of its seven principal branches, which pours its waters into the Atlantic, to the city of Angostura.

The provinces of Antiochia, Choco, Popayan, and some parts of Neyva and Pamplona, furnish gold in grains. Others produce silver, iron, copper, &c.

Among the maladies which reign in Colombia are the yellow fever, black vomit, and dysentery; but these prevail only at certain seasons, and sometimes the first two do not appear in the course of whole years. Another very grievous and contagious malady, known by the name of *el mal de la elefancia* (leprosy), exists on the Main. The inhabitants believe that this disease is incurable, and that it is communicated by touching, or inhaling the breath of, a leprous person. These unfortunate persons are consumed by sores and ulcers, which produce poignant pains, and destroy the sufferer as soon as the vital parts of his body are infected. The eating of too much fresh and salt pork, the filthy manner of living, and the burning sun, are probably the principal causes of this malady. The Spanish government had established, in the island of Boca Chica, in the province of Carthagena, a hospital for lepers, where a great many of both sexes were treated. To prevent any communication from without, they were guarded by a cordon of troops, and capital punishment was ordained for attempting to force the guard, or transgressing the limits prescribed. When Carthagena was declared a republic, its government preserved this institution the more carefully, as

this province had, in proportion to its population, a greater number of leprous persons than any other province in New Grenada. Whilst I commanded the forts of Boca Chica, I frequently visited this hospital, then immediately under my direction. It was a painful—a horrid duty, to visit these miserable beings, among whom I found promising youths of both sexes, whose parents were wealthy and powerful. It was dreadful to see them secluded by force from home and society for ever, to perish, by long and excruciating pains, in misery and despair. I did all I could do to alleviate their condition; but the low state of the funds would not enable me to do what I wished, and what was requisite for them.

The province next to Carthagena in number of lepers is Socorro. In 1820, the government of Cundinamarca directed that a hospital should be erected for leprous persons in the little town of Curo, where such persons of the province of Socorro, Pamplona, Tunja, Casanare, Bogotá, Neyva, and Margarita, should be assembled and cured; but the funds assigned were so deficient, in proportion to the great number of lepers, that this disease continues to make great ravages in these seven provinces, as well as in that of Carthagena. Leprosy exists in the provinces of Panama, Choco, Guayana, &c. but not to so great a degree as in the eight former provinces.

Another less dangerous disease attacks many of the inhabitants of Colombia. It is the *wen*, a large swelling under the throat; it is not mortal, but particularly unsightly in females. It obstructs respiration, and renders children imbecile and stupid. This dis-

ease is often to be found in the temperate valleys; but the inhabitants of the Cordillera mountains, and those of the plains bordering on the rivers Magdalena, Meta, Apure, Orinoco, &c. are not exempted. This malady is making daily progress, and will, it is feared, spread throughout the whole country. Various projects have been devised for checking it; but the want of funds for the payment of professors and practitioners, and for the building of hospitals, has been the principal obstacle to so beneficial an enterprise.

Vaccination is introduced into families, and the greatest care is taken in the cities of Bogotá, Quito, and Caracas, to preserve active virus, to be sent into the provinces where the small-pox makes its appearance; but it is not carried to all the provinces, for want of funds. The civil and military hospitals are, for the same reason, in a miserable condition.

Many small cities and villages have their cemeteries at some distance from them; whilst at Bogotá and other great cities the dead are buried in churches and churchyards in the centre of the population.

Houses of refuge for the poor are established in the cities of Bogotá, Quito, and Caracas, where beggars and vagabonds are kept at work for their maintenance. Government has established a fourth house of this kind in the city of Pamplona, which abounds with poor; but all are in a wretched state for want of money; and beggars are met with in the streets of almost every city, town, and village in Colombia. But few die for want of food, the soil being very fertile, and the population small in proportion to the extent of territory. The mass of the people subsist

chiefly upon bananas, rice, fruit, and roots, which grow with little or no culture; and as they remain a great part of the day in their hammocks, or stretched upon mats, this scanty food is sufficient, at least, to prevent their starving with hunger.

The clergy are very numerous in proportion to the people, over whose minds they hold a powerful influence. The highest ecclesiastical dignity is that of archbishop. There are two; one resides at Bogotá, the other at Caracas. It has been said that a third was to be established at Quito. The treaty with the pope, and the declaration which precedes the constitution of Colombia, *that the catholic religion is, and shall be, the religion of the state*, are sufficient proofs of the influence of the clergy. There are ten bishops —at Quito, Cuenca, Maynas, Panama, Carthagena, Santa Martha, Merida, Guayana, Medellin, and Antioquia. The *religious and regular orders* in Colombia are divided into three provinces—Venezuela, Bogotá, and Quito. These provinces administer and govern themselves independently of each other. The superior, or central power acknowledged by each, under the Spanish government, was the vicar of the order, residing at Madrid, who was himself the immediate dependent of the generalissimo at Rome. The impolicy of continuing this communication with Madrid, a capital inimical to independence, was suggested to congress, together with a plan for rendering these regular orders altogether independent of Spain, by giving them a central place in the territory of Colombia, whence they might afterwards communicate directly with the Holy Father; and this has been

done. The first congress of the republic of Colombia, which assembled at the city of Rosario de Cucuta, in 1820, ordered the suppression of all the convents which contained not, at least, eight monks, and destined their monasteries and other dependent buildings, with their property and revenue, to the education of youth in public schools. In consequence of this order, about three hundred monasteries of both sexes have been sequestrated.

The establishment of a congress of the republic, a measure essential to the freedom of the country, proves an expansion of intellect and information, which, a few years ago, could scarcely have been contemplated. But it is to be feared, that the immense extent of territory may greatly weaken, if not annul, the guarantee by government, of liberty and individual security and peace. In many instances, a department has one chief, who unites in himself the civil and military authority, under the title of Intendant. But in some, there is a general, who commands the troops in the department, but who, by law, is subject to the intendant. Now, in some departments, envy and jealousy are found to exist between the two, having a pernicious influence upon the common welfare. This has been the case in the department of Venezuela, whilst Charles Soublette was intendant there in 1821, 2, and 3. General Paez, who commanded the troops in the department, held Soublette in such contempt, that he often refused to receive orders from him, and to obey any except those which came directly from the president, Bolivar, or the vice-president, Gen. Santander. Paez came

one day from Valencia to Caracas for money to pay his troops. He went directly, without permitting himself to be announced, into the cabinet of the intendant, and demanded from Soublette an order on the treasury for a certain sum. Soublette answered, in a hesitating manner, that he would grant the request with great pleasure, but that the little cash in the treasury was devoted to very important purposes, and would be called for in two days. Paez turned upon his heel, shut the door with violence, walked to the treasurer, and ordered him to hand the sum required; and, in spite of his remonstrances, forced him to do so, and rode off with the money. The rivalry between Soublette and Paez actually prevented the effect of the combined military operations, and left Morales the power of making such progress after the battle of Carabobo, when every one thought the war would be quickly ended. Soublette's administration lost the provinces of Coro and Maracaybo, and, as well-informed men have assured me, was the cause of Morales increasing his power, and of his staying so long in Maracaybo. I am also informed, and I think it probable, that the cowardice and incapacity of Soublette were what rendered ineffectual the blockade and seige of Porto Cabello.

There is in truth no check—I mean no constitutional check—upon the power of the intendant. These intendants are generally military chieftains, used to the exercise of absolute power, which men under arms absolutely require, but which men, as citizens, as absolutely forbid. The intendants are under the immediate orders of the president; they are named

and installed by him. He changes, and removes them; and knows beforehand whether congress will approve or disapprove. The president liberator is therefore the *only* power by and through whom all is done.*

It is true that, by the representative system, the voice of every alien is heard in the hall of the legislative body, which gives him an appearance of guaranteé for his individual liberty. But the most important point is, that the responsibility of agents to their principals be well assured; and above all, that of the most powerful and influential agent, namely, the executive; because this power is the soul of the legislative body, and is placed between that and the people.

Experience has shown that the influence of the executive power is able to subdue, to absorb, every other power, legislative and judicial. But Colombia, having decided against a federal system, as too weak for her present circumstances,† has now no other

* The President Bolivar published, under the date of Bogotá, 24th of November, 1826, a decree with the following title: "Decree uniting in the departments, and the provinces, the military command in the same person entrusted with the civil authority." He begins with the following introduction: "As it is convenient to the consolidation and the honour of the republic, to avoid expenses in the present state of the public revenues, which are not sufficient to cover those of the administration of the republic; and being desirous to put an end to the differences which fetter the public service, the good administration, &c. I decree, article 1st, that in all the departments where government judges are necessary, the military and civil power shall be united in the person of the latter," &c. See Appendix No. 4.

† This was the objection of general Bolivar, strongly expressed

chance but to pursue the course she has marked out for herself.

The central government gives undoubtedly more strength and energy to the executive. But is it likely to render the people more prosperous and free; especially when we contemplate the union of such complicated and often jarring elements? The character of the Venezuelan, and his manners, customs, and habits, differ altogether from those of the Grenadan; and the laws of one country are at variance with those of the other.* The jealousy and hatred existing between the inhabitants of the two countries have already been the source of great troubles in Colombia. They were, indeed, the cause of the revolution at Valencia, Caracas, &c. in 1826, under general Paez. With a federal constitution, both Venezuela and New Grenada would have been enabled to establish laws better adapted to their situation, and to the character and habits of the people of each country. With such a constitution, following the brilliant example of the United States, they might have formed a consistent, and perfect federative union.

when the articles of the fundamental law of the republic were discussed at Angostura, and when many of the deputies inclined to adopt the federal system. Some insist that Bolivar's opposition sprung from his fear of losing his supremacy under such a constitution. It is certain that he has retained it to the present time. He is again dictator, by his own decree, of Bogotá, 23d of November, 1826, under the plausible pretext of the civil war, and the danger of a Spanish invasion. See Appendix No. 5.

* See section II. of the character and manners of the inhabitants of Colombia.

To trace out the several steps, and the manner of proceeding in the two governments, would afford new and interesting matter to an impartial and enlightened observer, and there may be difficulty in deciding between them. The most dangerous part of the system adopted by Colombia is, that it combines local with general agencies, thus accumulating excessive power in the hands of a single man. The federal system is free from this danger.

France is now under this concentrated government, and so is Colombia. Both may be kept in subjection by the concentration, unless some change take place in the charter of the former and in the constitution of the latter.

The influence and power of the clergy are far too great in Colombia. They are members of congress. They hold places in all the public offices; in the departments, provinces, counties and parishes, in the municipalities, as cabildos, and as officers in the army and navy; while they are also priests of the parishes. They are paid in preference to others. By means of tithes and other contributions, they lead a very comfortable life, while the people are poor and miserable. The catholic religion is that of the state, and the public worship of any other is strictly prohibited. Advocates of religious toleration are not wanting; but no actual step has been taken towards so beneficial a measure.

The prohibition of all religions except the catholic is not only impolitic—it is pernicious. It is a phenomenon in the history of states, that such an article should be found in the constitution of a people who

declare themselves the friends of freedom. This fact alone is sufficient to excite well-grounded fears for the success of sound and rational liberty in Colombia.

The jealous, envious, suspicious, selfish, and ambitious character of the greater part of their chiefs, will be a great obstacle to the freedom and prosperity of the inhabitants. Observe their early education, their very limited knowledge, their vanity, their prejudices against foreigners, their habits of oppression increased by 15 years of war, their propensity to act according to their own arbitrary notions and passions, and it will be seen that this picture is not overcharged. I speak of the majority of these chiefs; and there are not many exceptions.

The finances are so low that none of the public officers are regularly paid. In some parts of the republic there have been, and are still, great complaints and dissatisfaction with regard to heavy taxes and the multiplicity of contributions.* The famous *Alcavala*, against which so many complaints were made in America, during the Spanish dominion, was abo-

* The president liberator says, in his decree, dated Bogotá, 24th of November, 1826, signed by him and the Secretary of the interior, Joseph M. Restrepo: "As the revenues on land or grounds in the different counties of the republic are not sufficient for the ordinary expenses, and *as it is not convenient at the present moment to overburden the citizens with new taxes, which provoke complaints from every quarter; I decree,*" etc. See Appendix No. 6.

The following will also show the very low state of the finances. The president liberator says, in a decree, dated as above: "The public revenues being insufficient to cover the expenses, so that public credit has lowered, and *is in the greatest danger of being lost entirely*, I decree," etc.

lished, so lately as the end of 1827, in Colombia. The paper money, the *vales*, the patents, the direct and indirect taxes, the heavy duties at the custom houses, and elsewhere, were so multiplied as to have become a heavy burden to the people of Colombia.

And in what consists the present system of finance and customs in Colombia, called the Revenga System?* Both decrees were published during the stay

* These decrees were 1st, " Of the management and government of the intendences, and other public offices, in the direction and the administration of the revenues in the four departments of Maturin, Venezuela, Orinoco, and Zulia. Caracas, March 8th, 1827." Signed, Simon Bolivar and T. Rafael Revenga, Secretary of State and General of His Excellency the President Liberator. Article 172 says: " Every one, of an industrious class, is liable to pay a tax of alcavala, in proportion to the patent granted him to trade, or to exercise any other occupation. And the principal administrators, their subalterns or deputies, are to collect these taxes upon the following tariff." Here follows a list of the different classes, called *industria*, divided into 33 branches, which were liable to the patent. The banker, the merchant and the commissionary, for instance, paid a patent of 400 dollars each, which has been increased to 600, and lately (December 1827) to 1000 dollars a year; the apothecaries, 200 dollars; the lawyers, physicians, and surgeons, 36 dollars. The owners of houses pay half a month's portion of the rent received each year. Those who inhabit their own houses with their families are liable to pay five per cent. more than the sum at which the rent of the house *may be estimated*, if that exceeds 120 dollars. This expression, *que se estime que genaria*, is very vague, and subjects all owners of houses to the arbitrary decision of any officer the government appoints to estimate them. (See an extract of this long decree, in Appendix under No. 10.) The title of the 2d decree is, " Of the management and government of the maritime custom houses." Caracas, March 9th, 1827. Signed, Simon Bolivar and Revenga, as above. See Appendix No. 11.

To this decree is annexed the tariff of the entry duties to which

of General Bolivar in Venezuela, at the beginning of 1827, and were attributed to Mr. Revenga.

The president liberator has ordered all duties to be collected one year in advance, and such has been the urgency of this collection that, by his decree, dated Bogotá, Nov. 23d, 1826, he enjoins that these taxes be wholly collected in December of the same year.*

The administration, in all branches, is in frightful disorder; the natural consequence of the entire want of money. Thence it results that the officers, excepting those of the treasury, are not paid, and most of them, in order to subsist with their families, stoop to fraud, corruption, and smuggling.†

This want of means prevents the payment of the navy and land troops, and hinders the execution of all combined operations. A great part of the soldiers were known only by their chacos and muskets; all were in a pitiful condition. The officers themselves

merchandise imported into the seaports is liable—in alphabetical order. On perusing this decree, of which its contents render it impracticable to give an abstract, the reader will be convinced how commerce and industry are liable to suffer by such regulations.

* This decree is entitled, "Decree to urge the execution of the law of May 22d, 1826, in regard to the public credit." See Appendix No. 7.

† The liberator commences his decree to repress frauds in the public revenues, dated Bogotá, 23d of November, 1826, by saying, "As frauds exist in the public revenues, and are so *common and scandalous*, and as it is necessary to put an end to a disorder which relaxes morality, and diminishes so considerably the revenues of the treasury, I have judged it convenient to decree," &c. See No. 9, in the Appendix.

are badly clothed; they seldom wear epaulettes, and some of them neither shoes nor boots, and they very seldom have any money.

In 1822, 23, when Soublette was intendant of the department of Venezuela, hundreds of officers were seen begging from house to house, in the streets of Caracas and Laguaira.

The name of battalion or regiment is often given to a collection of armed men that cannot possibly number 200 fit for action. The (so called) armies of Colombia are neither well instructed, drilled, nor disciplined. The service is performed with great carelessness, and desertions to the interior are frequent,—the natural consequences of the neglect with which the soldiers are treated.

The military rules and ordinances in Colombia are those of the Spaniards. They are in use both in the navy and among the land troops. Their custom-house duties are heavy and arbitrary, neither inspiring confidence, nor affording encouragement to commerce and industry.

By the ancient colonial system, which was powerfully supported by the clergy, the Spanish crown, fearing that the Americans might come to feel their strength and know their rights, took great care to prevent the growth of industry and knowledge in both Spanish Americas. Their excessive ignorance, (the growth of the Spanish system,) will greatly retard the welfare and prosperity of Colombia.

The apathy of the people, resulting from the climate and from a slavery of 300 years, united with this ignorance, will render a speedy introduction of indus-

try, knowledge, and liberal feeling among them, very difficult. These blessings may, perhaps, not be attained until two or three generations shall have passed away.

Education, public and private, is extremely defective, where not totally neglected. Nothing is well learned or thoroughly understood. All studies have been very limited, and intercourse with foreigners strictly prohibited.

Agriculture, the only road to a flourishing and profitable commerce, is in the same low state with every other source of profit or comfort.

The scarcity of hands, the apathy of the people, and the discouragement to foreigners who would settle in the country, operating conjointly with a government which permits the military to commit daily depredations upon the peaceable inhabitants, are great checks to industry, and to every effort towards prosperity.

The fertility of the soil is so great as to produce yearly two harvests; but, at present, both harvests afford not half so much as one whilst under the Spanish dominion. The army, which contains many thousand slaves, absorbs the labouring classes. The chiefs neglecting the order, comfort, and discipline of the soldiers, think only of increasing the strength of their armies by numbers. The armies are growing more numerous, but less and less capable of resisting invasion, and more and more burdensome and oppressive to the inhabitants; hence it is that agriculture is neglected.

A million of dollars was appropriated to the encou-

ragement of agriculture, and assigned by congress to the executive for that purpose. This was part of the loan of ten millions made in England. The history of this loan is well understood; and it is not necessary to enquire the fate of the one million; but at best it is, as has been often said, a single bottle of water poured out on a sandy plain.

The judicial power remains, together with the legislative and executive, in *one* hand, that of the dictator-liberator. He prefers military tribunals to civil courts; these are too slow for him; and his will is the law of the land.

Even were the dictator the great man he has been taken for, one man cannot be every where, cannot do every thing. Bolivar must necessarily leave to his subalterns the greatest part of business in the departments and provinces. There are military chieftains, little bashaws, so called, who rule and vex the citizens of Colombia—deciding according to their own interpretation and will.

What is to be the result of such a state of things in Colombia? Are these people free? Or is their welfare deferred for years, perhaps for centuries? Where is protection to be found for persons and property, for the culture of arts and sciences, for liberal institutions, schools, industry, agriculture, and the train of blessings necessary to the existence of prosperity and freedom? Were the inhabitants in a worse condition under the dominion of Spain, bad as it was, than they are now, under the bayonets of the dictator-liberator? These questions will be decided, according to the view that may be individually taken of the subject.

SECTION II.

EDUCATION, MANNERS, HABITS, CHARACTERISTICS.

Education of the Colombians—Their Vanity, Ambition, Contempt of Trades and Mechanic Arts—Classes and Ranks in society—Marriages—Intrigues and Dissoluteness—Women, their Manners, Character, Education, Dress—Those of Bogota as distinguished from those of Caracas and Carthagena—Houses, Furniture—Luxuries and Extravagance—Superstition—Influence of the Priests—Characteristic Habits and Traits—Llaneros, their Dress, Equipments, &c.—Paez, Zarasa—The Margaritans —Religious Ceremonies—Former Punishment for Murder and Robbery—Public Punishment of a Young Female at Bogota, for an attempt to steal the Jewels of the Image of the Virgin Mary.

THE crown of Spain, for the purpose of debarring its subjects from the lights and improvements of the modern nations of Europe, carefully prevented their intercourse with all other nations, as far as was in their power. The Spanish government laboured under the continual apprehension that the Americans would become acquainted with their own oppressed condition, and seek the means of breaking their yoke. The king reserved to himself the exclusive right of granting passports to go to the Spanish colonies. Before such a passport was granted, a Spaniard was obliged to submit to many humiliating examinations and formalities. It was more difficult still for a foreigner to obtain such permission, which was granted only to

those who were powerfully recommended to the king.

After the peace of Badajoz, France alone was permitted to send agents or consuls to the Spanish Americas; and their actions were pretty closely observed.

A Spanish American, desirous of going to Spain, was obliged to submit to the same formalities as the European Spaniard who wished to go to the colonies. The viceroy, and the captain-general, only could give them their passports.

Capital punishments were ordained against all masters of vessels, not Spaniards, who should attempt to enter any harbor in the Spanish colonies, and against all merchants not licensed to trade with the colonists. These measures rendered it impossible for the inhabitants to have intercourse with foreigners.

The clergy felt a deep interest in seconding the views of government. Their system of perpetuating the ignorance and superstition of the people, procured for themselves the greatest temporal advantages. In the pursuit of these they were utterly regardless of the spiritual welfare of the people, and of themselves!

The education of youth was therefore much neglected, although boys were sent to school at the age of four years, and the age was the same for entering a convent.

Education is to a man what culture is to a plant. It may be proper to enter into some details, to show that such education as the greater part of the generation now living in Colombia have received, under the Spanish dominion, could not possibly form men of

knowledge and of liberal minds. These details will best inform us what kind of men they are who now stand at the head of the government, and how those powerful chieftains were educated, under whose control the various departments are placed, and among whom they are divided. There are, it is true, in Colombia, and in other parts of the Spanish Americas, men of talents and knowledge; but they are much more scarce in Colombia than elsewhere, their political existence being crushed and destroyed by an arbitrary military despotism. Where bayonets form the basis of rule, liberty, knowledge, civil rights, and all political welfare are completely banished.

The greater part of the schools, colleges, and universities have been, and still are, in the hands of the clergy and the friars. The body of catholic clergy must not be confounded with those in other countries. They were full of prejudices, and had very little knowledge. The friars were not much better, and in some cases worse. They filled the heads of the school boys with histories of extraordinary and incredible miracles; with sketches taken from the lives of their saints. The boys learned by rote, and recited a great number of Latin prayers, of which they could not know the sense. They were taught to sing litanies and masses, and were subjected to exterior forms of piety. Thus were they formed to early habits of dissimulation and hypocrisy, under the influence of which their heads and hearts remained during life.

On leaving school, they entered a college, where they learned Latin and Greek very superficially. Their memories were charged with an obscure and diffuse

scholasticism, and with some superficial knowledge of geography, history, &c. Instead of being taught the principles of true religion, or of a sound and pure morality, they were taught to know the different ranks and classes of society; and the advantages of being born a nobleman, or of belonging to families in the service of the king, or the church. Their self-love and vanity were thus excited, and made predominant over every other principle and motive. This education was ordinarily finished at the age of fifteen or sixteen years. M. Dupons gives a correct and minute account of their instruction, in his work, which affords the fullest information on the state of education on the Main before the revolution at Caracas.

Since the revolution of 1810, the new government has not had much time or money to devote to the subject of education. Though peace has afforded more leisure for attention to this subject, they have been deficient both in funds and talents, and this deficiency has stood in the way of the formation of good primary schools and colleges, under able teachers. Will Bolivar establish such institutions? It is very doubtful whether he have the power to do so. And, with his military and absolute government, can he desire that knowledge should be diffused among the Colombians?

In Venezuela, to arrive at the title of marquis, count, or baron, was the height of human felicity. I have known various Caraguins to expend large sums of money in getting one of these titles from the Spanish government. Others obtained orders, or stars. In Spain all might be obtained, particularly

under the corrupt government of Manuel Godoy, Prince of Peace.

This rage for titles did not exist in so high a degree in New Grenada as in Venezuela. No title of nobility was known among the natives in the former place. The European nobility preserved their titles after leaving Spain. In Venezuela there existed a Creolan nobility, (unknown in New Grenada,) under the name of Mantuanos, of whom I will speak hereafter. But in both provinces, all mechanic trades and employments were much despised, and left to colored and black people. The really honourable occupation of cultivating land belonged exclusively to slaves. In Caracas and in Bogotá, no mechanic, even now, can be found, who is not a colored or a black person. It would be a disgrace to a man of good family to touch any of these occupations, or to gain an honest living by his own industry. He would like much better to have a brilliant uniform, or a friar's or clergyman's frock, to sing and serve at mass in church, or to obtain the title of doctor, that he might be regarded as belonging to the highest classes of society. He would prefer the laziest life, to obtaining subsistence by industry.

This vanity, the effect of early education, was the source of many dissensions, and of a ridiculous and childish jealousy among families. Hence each man derived an opinion that he was a more important being than his neighbour, and was anxious to be distinguished by his birth, rank, titles, and wealth. This was often the cause of jealousy, envy, and bitter enmity between two families.

The officers of the Spanish government and the clergy saw these dissensions with pleasure, and adopted the maxim, *divide and govern*. The numerous class of lawyers and attornies joined in this sentiment, because their own subsistence depended upon lawsuits, which of course they endeavoured to excite.

Before the revolution, society was divided into various and very distinct classes. To the first class belonged the Royal Audiencia, or highest council of government in civil matters, in which the viceroy or captain-general always presided; and to which belonged the regent, the auditors and the judges of the highest court of justice. The governors of the different provinces, the generals, the intendant, the treasurer, the inspectors of the army, and the colonels, were reckoned in this class. It was composed of European Spaniards, who were authorised to bear the title of excellency, or *usted* (gentry.)

The second class comprised the most wealthy and noted families of high birth among the Creoles. In New Grenada there was no term to distinguish these from other families, and they were designated by the phrase, "of high birth." In Venezuela, they had the name of "las familias Mantuanas." This was a kind of American nobility, commonly mixed with European blood.

The third class was formed of the judges of the ordinary courts, the municipal and military officers, from the lieutenant-colonel to the second lieutenant, the members of the bar, the public notaries, the lower officers of government, who were Creoles, the doctors, professors, &c.

In the fourth class were reckoned the merchants, the capitalists, or lessees, of a lower birth, the bankers, &c.—all white. The other classes were formed of men of colour and black men—all free—and Indians and slaves.

The clergy, regular and secular, belong to none of these classes. They were highly respected, and had their separate jurisdiction, their ecclesiastical council, of which the archbishop was president. They had their separate privileges, and were entirely independent of both viceroy and captain-general.

I shall here speak only of the customs and manners of the highest American class, designated under the second description, as that which is distinguished for its wealth and independence. All the rest being dependent on the government, or on some of the nobles, were obliged to conform to their manners, customs and usages. They do not exhibit a character sufficiently prominent to be worth drawing; but where there is a characteristic difference, I shall describe it. I shall endeavour to compare the character of the Caraguin with that of the Grenadan, and particularly with that of the inhabitants of Carthagena, as affording the most prominent points of difference; and shall afterwards speak of the Llanero and the Margaritan.

The families of Mantuanos in Venezuela were divided, like the grandees in Spain, into different classes; as *Sangre-Azul, Sangre Mezclada,* &c. These classes were formed for the purpose of marking distinctions of birth. Sangre Azul, (blue blood) designated the most opulent Creolan families, descended from Spanish ancestors, the first conquerors of

the country, who had established themselves definitively there, and whose children, born in the country, were there established from generation to generation. The persons of the Sangre Mezclada, (mixed blood) were of a later date, and had intermingled either with Spaniards or Frenchmen.

It was very common among the Mantuanos for a young man to marry as soon as he left college. His parents would consult together about choosing him a companion for life; in which case they regarded chiefly birth, rank, fortune, and family connexions, as is customary among the nobility in Europe. All being settled with the parents of the lady, she was taken, at the age of twelve years, from the convent where she had been placed at four, and married to a young man of the age of sixteen; frequently to one under that age. It was common to find such a couple, whose ages put together amounted to less than thirty. I knew a handsome young lady of Mantuana, who, at the age of eighteen had seven children living. Another had a daughter sixteen years old, that appeared to be the sister of her mother, who was not above twenty-seven years of age. Such a couple, without any experience, not yet knowing even how to behave themselves, were placed at the head of a large household, and surrounded by flatterers, and a numerous train of servants, who sought to dupe them. Having had neither opportunity nor judgment to know the character of each other, they believed they were in love, because their parents assured them of it. At first all was happiness and joy; but they soon began to discover faults, and to feel, in the company of

each other, a certain vacuity and listlessness. They began their differences by disputing, and then quarrelling and ended by hating each other. The husband amused his fancy abroad—the wife consoled herself by some other means. In this manner they lived, choosing separate courses of life, and would have been divorced, but for their dread of certain humiliating formalities, which require that witnesses should testify publicly to their dishonorable private conduct. Divorce was prevented only by pride and vanity.

Whether it be owing to manners and character, a far more temperate climate, or whatever other cause, marriages are not made at so early an age at Bogotá as at Caracas. Here families are more united and happy. They are not so ostentatious and showy, but their households are more orderly, and they have more solid possessions. They are less fastidious, and more cordial in their manner of receiving strangers, than at Caracas. A rich family of high birth in Bogotá, seldom expends the whole of its annual income, whilst the Mantuanos anticipate theirs by the contracting of debts.

Among the Mantuanos in Venezuela, the conduct of married people, in general, has a most pernicious effect upon their children. These become acquainted with the irregularities of their father, and the intrigues of their mother. What children learn in these schools of vice, they begin early to practise; even before their moral or physical powers approach maturity, these boys practise vices which in most other countries, at their age, are not attempted. There were to be seen many who, by excesses, had lost their

vigour, at an age when others begin to enjoy life. They fall victims to many diseases, and their pale and meagre faces are emblems of pain and suffering. In the midst of every advantage afforded by birth, wealth, and a delightful climate, their health suffers visible decline. These living spectres arrive at an early grave, deploring a vicious life, the effects of which are often transmitted from one generation to another.

It is, therefore, not surprising that all travellers who of late have visited Colombia, and particularly Venezuela, talk so much of the general corruption of manners. Among all the rest, Caracas is especially distinguished.

It was no unusual thing to hear a lady complimented, in presence of her husband, upon changing her *guerido* (gallant). The husband would speak of his mistress with the same freedom. The festivals and holidays, in these countries, afforded convenient occasions for intrigue between the sexes; such as the grand mass at midnight, the evening before Christmas, the whole time of carnival, the numerous evening meetings in honour of the Holy Virgin, or the saints, &c. Many passionate declarations, verbal and written, have been made in churches and chapels. On this subject I appeal to all who have been in these countries. To all this must be added the private conduct and corrupt principles of priests and monks, who, under the mask of religion, have seduced many young females. On the other side stands the military officer, whose brilliant uniform, and the idea of vigour and courage attached to his character, render him peculiarly attractive. By considering all

these things, one may form a correct opinion of the manners and customs on the Main.

Among the clergy in Caracas, the *Canonici*, were distinguished for their wealth and libertinism. Even the monks and friars generally kept their mistresses. A friend of mine, at Caracas, surprised his young and beautiful mistress with a sturdy and handsome friar. He dared not say a word for fear of the friar's vengeance, who would not have failed to do him mischief. This discovery, however, cured him of mistresses, and he soon after left the country.

The priests in the villages, small towns, and boroughs, generally have their female housekeepers, and a number of children.

Passing one day through Aqua del Pablo, a large village in the interior of New Grenada, I rested with my retinue at the house of the priest, with whom I had been acquainted in Carthagena, and who expected me to dine with him. His house was one of the largest and best in the country, and surrounded by various other buildings; proving, at least, great ease, if not wealth. I found a large table well provided with silver spoons, plates, and forks. We sat down gaily and dined. After dinner, the officers attached to my family retired. I remained alone with the priest, who was a good and benevolent man, generally beloved, and a father to his congregation. He was a patriot, and one of the most enlightened persons of the Catholic church. He was sitting with his back to the door, and I with my face towards it. After a while, the door was cautiously opened, and a beautiful female head appeared. I rose from my seat to re-

quest her to come in; but the door was hastily shut, and she disappeared. The priest asked what had occurred so suddenly; I told him what I had seen. "Oh," said he, "it can be no one but my wife! (*mi muger.*) The fool! she was anxious to send us some sweetmeats made with her own hands." I requested him to call her, but he declined, saying, she was not dressed well enough to appear before me. I then asked, as a favour, to be introduced to her. He laughed at my curiosity, as he called it, but at length, brought her into the room. I saw a young lady about eighteen years of age, well educated, and very amiable. She was the mother of two beautiful children. I was much pleased with her conversation, and particularly with the unassuming manner of it. The priest and his wife, as he called her, solicited me to stay with them until the next morning, which I declined, with reluctance, and only because my duty pressed my return to head quarters.

The houses of the Mantuanos were generally governed by an intendant, or major-domo, having many servants of both sexes under his command. As the master and mistress of the house considered it beneath their dignity to meddle with household affairs, they left every thing to the intendant, who received and paid as he pleased. When the master or his lady was in want of money, it was asked of him. After a few years the intendant became rich, and was enabled to advance money upon high interest to his master.

The author of Gil Blas has not at all overcharged the picture he draws of these intendants, and of the

Spanish viceroy in America—their luxury, corruption, &c.

The education of young ladies in Caracas was much neglected. They were taught, but not thoroughly, to read and write. They were also taught music and dancing. Playing on the guitar, needle-work, and dress, were their favourite occupations. To attend to any part of housekeeping, would have been considered so far below the dignity of a Mantuana, as to have been ridiculous. She occupied herself with a little embroidery, or reading some tale or book of devotion. Such were their occupations when not at church, at the promenade, on visits, or at balls.

The inhabitants of the same class in Bogotá were more reserved and cautious in society. The fair sex were, in general, more modest and timid. The ladies in the capital were distinguished by their clear and fine complexion; commonly supposed to be the effect of a temperate climate, and pure water. Some, nevertheless, are found to have wens, a disease very common in the province of Cundinamarca. Their manners are reserved, sweet, and agreeable, and interest by that timid candour which should characterise the sex. The ladies in Caracas are not so fair in their complexions, nor so reserved in their manners. They fascinate by their brilliancy, their wit, and their easy manners, or what may be properly termed coquetry. The ladies of Bogotá improve upon acquaintance more than those of Caracas. The education of the ladies in Bogotá, is much the better, more strict and more solid. The greater part among the first class were educated in convents of nuns, in

schools established expressly for that purpose. These boarding-school houses were enclosed within the walls of the cloister, but had no communication with it, or with the nuns generally. Three or four nuns were named by the abbess to take charge of the school: these directed all the economical duties of the boarding-school, and instructed the scholars. One of them was the directress, whom the others were obliged to obey. They were, like their pupils, excluded from communication with the convent, and passed through a small door to go to church, or to call on the abbess by her own order, or to pass an evening with the nuns on extraordinary occasions.

The pupils entered commonly at the age of four years, and were not permitted to go out except by order of their parents, at the time of their marriage, or of completing their education. It was very seldom that a young lady obtained permission to go out and see her parents; but they were permitted to visit her at the parlor, where they were separated from their children by iron grates. This permission was demanded of the abbess of the convent, and was granted upon condition that one of the nuns should be present at the interview, at the appointed day and hour. The permission was, however, often refused.

The pupils were taught to read, write, cypher, together with the elements of history, geography, natural history, chanting religious songs, dancing, playing on the piano-forte, the guitar, or harp, sewing, embroidery, and making clothes. They were taught to cook, and to make various kinds of sweetmeats and cakes. Those more advanced in age had, severally, during their week, the charge of the house-

hold. They were taught how to govern a family with order and economy,—qualities of which the young Caraguin ladies were destitute.

Those who stayed at home for private education, which seldom happened at Bogotá, were never allowed to go out without being accompanied by one of their parents, or a trusty servant. They were always dressed in black; so that they were not distinguishable from the common classes, but by the finer texture of their clothing, or their mantillas, (veils,) by their fine watches, or by their diamonds, pearls, or their golden chains, at the end of which was suspended a golden or ivory cross, richly garnished with pearls or diamonds.

Before the revolution, it was not unusual to see ladies at a ball or other festival, wearing more than 200,000 dollars value, in watches, diamonds, pearls, &c. on their dresses, without appearing to be overloaded. When going to mass, all dressed in black satin. Their faces were veiled with costly vandyked mantillas; and the upper parts of their frocks were garnished in the same manner. They wore no hats, but their hair was ornamented with costly combs, set with diamonds, pearls, &c. They were followed, often, by 20 or 30 servants of both sexes, free and slaves, very neatly dressed, and each carrying something for the use of their mistress, as books, umbrellas, fans, &c. The husband never accompanied the wife to church, either in Bogotá or at Caracas.

Children were taken to church as soon as they could walk, the sons with the father, and the daughters with the mother. Mass was said every day; and on Sundays and holidays it continued from

three o'clock in the morning until noon; during which time, every one had the option of going away at what hour he pleased. The military mass was at eleven o'clock: at that time the viceroy and most of those who were attached to the Spanish government, attended.

In New Grenada, there were, among the slaves, more coloured than black people. At Venezuela, it was the reverse. In the former, slaves were never permitted to appear abroad with shoes or stockings, though the weather there, particularly in Bogotá, is sometimes so cold, that ice is found in the streets. This custom was begun and continued, for the purpose of distinguishing slaves from free persons. Thus were the slaves constantly reminded of their degraded condition. In every other respect, they were perfectly well clothed, well fed, and otherwise well treated, and had very little labour to perform. The wealthy families had from one to two thousand slaves or more. Forty or fifty were selected to serve in the house, the rest were put to cultivate the soil.

At the public promenades, which are commonly called Almedas, the ladies in Bogotá usually rode in coaches; and here, as at all other public places, they were dressed in black. On great festival days, the ladies of the governor, generals, and other officers, in both capitals, rode out on horseback,* dressed in Amazonian habits, with the epaulettes, galoons, brodices, or other badges distinctive of the rank of their husbands. They had a brilliant and numerous retinue. The wife of the viceroy, or

* It is common for ladies to ride on horseback, throughout the Spanish dominions.

captain-general, was preceded by a number of aides-de-camp, and followed by the staff and the civil and military officers of the government. Their husbands were never with them on these occasions. These ladies were addressed and spoken of, by the titles of their husbands, as, "Her Excellency the Vice Queen, the Captain Generala, the Gouvernante, &c." The wife of a colonel is called *Ussia*, [Signora], &c.—this old Spanish custom being kept up by the Colombians of the present day.

The ladies of Bogotá did not wear their black frocks in the interior of their houses. When at a wedding, a baptism, or ball, they wore coloured and white dresses, generally following the newest French fashion.

The ladies in Caracas and Carthagena were dressed in black only when they went to church, or assisted at the public processions.

The plates, candlesticks, pitchers, and other utensils, were of pure silver, or washed with gold. A poor man in Bogotá would have felt himself disgraced without his silver spoon, knife, and fork. Steaks, pies, &c. were set upon the table in large golden plates.

The household furniture was very rich and sumptuous; and when we consider that all their articles were purchased at 300 per cent. profit upon their costs, reckoning transportation and exorbitant duties, we may have some idea of the wealth of these people. The houses of the wealthy classes of Bogotá may properly be called palaces. They were built of stone, were large and massy, and generally three stories high.

But Bogotá has suffered greatly by the dreadful earthquake of November 25th, 1827. So did Caracas in March 1812.

All this wealth, comfort, and agreeable society have now disappeared. The greater part of the distinguished families in Venezuela and in New Grenada have left the country; and the few that remain are ruined. The bad administration of the chieftains in Colombia, the party spirit, and the civil war, operating with other causes already mentioned, have spread anarchy and misery over this beautiful country. Grass is growing in the streets and public squares of both Caracas and Bogotá. The most frequented streets of both are full of beggars and miserable wretches, covered with rags, vermin and sores, who persecute you at every step, entreating or rather commanding you to give them something "*por l'amor de Dios.*"

The officers and soldiers, generally, were badly clothed and fed. The commission of theft, burglary, and murder during the night, was frequent and attended with impunity. All who have known both these cities before the revolution, will agree with me, that under the government of the dictator liberator misery and crimes are much more frequent than they were under the Spanish administration. I state these facts without any apprehension of being thought a friend to the Spanish system, or an agent of the "holy alliance," for a place in which General Bolivar is far better qualified, than he is to be at the head of a republic; unless it were one composed of despots and slaves.

Libertinism is a strong, perhaps the strongest, cha-

racteristic of the Creole. He will spare nothing to obtain the last favour from the female he happens to fancy. Luxury in furniture, houses, jewels, dress, the table, and mistresses at, Caracas, was most extravagant. Their jealousy, vanity, and desire to surpass each other, were extreme; and before the revolution had ruined many families, I saw one of these Creoles wearing a golden repeater which cost a thousand dollars. Instead of the twelve numbers, he had upon its face the twelve letters in his name, *Juan Elisondo*. Soon after this watch was received, two neighbours of this gentleman sent for similar ones, and paid each the same sum for them.

Creoles of the higher classes are generous, or rather prodigal of money; but the common people are very mean and sordid, and are readily induced to commit any crime for money, particularly in Caracas. The higher classes would expend a great deal to gratify their fancy. Foreigners who obtained permission to come to the Spanish Americas, amassed a good deal of money in a short time. The most successful in this way, were the physicians and surgeons, the musicians, mountebanks, charlatans, rope-dancers, and all who could contribute to amusement and the gratification of fancy. But as Mr. Depons, in his work upon the Main, says, "a stranger who tried to be a merchant, or a farmer, was exposed to be regarded with an envious eye; and if he was prosperous, he was persecuted, and many times exposed to lose all. It was with much regret that the natives suffered him; and they did all they could to reduce him to beggary." At the same time the Creole is not destitute of com-

passion, and it seldom happens that a man in want does not receive considerable relief immediately. I once saw a gentleman (happening to have no money with him) borrow from another two doubloons and give them to a beggar. Five of us were standing in the street talking together; so that there was, no doubt, ostentation in this act of charity. But before the revolution it was a rare thing to find a beggar in the streets of Caracas or Bogotá. If any were found they were taken by the police officers to an *hospice* provided for that special purpose. These places were either convents or houses built expressly for this, by the charity of private persons. The Spanish government did nothing towards such establishments.

The Creole is devout, superstitious, credulous, and ignorant. The ladies of the first class were more so than their husbands, many of whom had acquired information by travelling. The ladies have each their own particular saint, to whom they are greatly devoted; always by night and by day carrying his image in their bosoms suspended by a golden chain. Another image is hung over their pillow; another under the looking glass of the drawing-room; and others are found in their books of devotion. I have often known them to have at least a dozen images, of different sorts, of the same saint, fixed in various places of the apartments. Besides these, they were well supplied with crosses, holy virgins, and other saints, and angels, &c. The reign of priests and monks in the country was powerful; and their influence is still very great. The patriot chieftains have never dared to be severe against any priest, even when he was known to

be an enemy to their cause. The archbishop of Caracas was known to be inimical to the cause; and yet at Bolivar's entry into Caracas he was not molested; but during the reign of Bolivar was treated by him with the highest respect. The bishop of Carthagena, it is true, was exiled; but his place was supplied by his great vicar, known by the title of Father Provisor, who detested the patriots; and who, in August 1814, some days after the president of the government of Carthagena, the secretary of the state, (himself a priest,) the general-in-chief, and various distinguished gentlemen of the city of Carthagena, were received freemasons, excommunicated publicly the whole order, by a formal decree affixed, during the night, by his order, to all the church-doors of the city. In spite of this spirit of public opposition, he remained in the quiet possession of his office, and has never been troubled on account of his political principles and measures.

As one of the first cares of the Spanish sovereigns was to propagate the Catholic faith in their immense provinces, they established tribunals of the Inquisition, successively, in the cities of Mexico, Lima, and Carthagena. But in the latter part of the reign of Charles IV. this formidable tribunal was not much feared. This influence was exercised, chiefly, to watch and keep out of the country all free literary productions, by them styled *philosophical* books.

In the year 1826, a bookseller sent from New York to Carthagena various boxes of valuable Spanish books. Among them were some copies of Voltaire's famous *Dictionaire Philosophique*. The boxes were

opened, and, by the influence of some priests, the greater part of the books, among which was the Dictionary, were refused admittance, and sent back to New York. I have this fact from the bookseller himself.

Don Vicente Pazos, in his letters to Henry Clay, on South America, says, that from Lima to Monte Video, an extent, including Peru, Chili, and Rio de La Plata, of more than three thousand miles, and a country consisting of cities, towns, and villages, with many universities, schools, courts of justice, &c. there was but one printing press before the revolution in 1810, and that a miserable old thing, belonging to the Jesuits of Cordova.

To show to what an extent the superstition of the people, and the authority of those whose spiritual power they acknowledge, are frequently carried, I will relate one example furnished me by the individual who was near being its victim. Lieutenant-colonel Collot, a French officer who had served in France under Napoleon in the artillery, came over, as many others did, to the Main, and served in his rank as an artillery officer, in the army of the patriots. Becoming much disgusted, he asked his dismission from General Urdaneta, with whom he was serving. His request was refused. Soon after, he obtained leave to go from the environs of Tunja to Carthagena, where he had some private business to settle. He travelled on horseback, with a guide, a servant, and a few dragoons, all well armed. After travelling a number of days under a burning sun, he arrived at a large borough in the interior of New Grenada, called Fa——,

before the largest inn of which he dismounted. As soon as he came into the house he was suddenly seized with great pain and a violent fever, insomuch that he cried aloud. The people of the inn put him to bed, and called in their priest, in great alarm. This man was versed in the arts of curing; and believing the stranger to be in the last extremity, came with the viaticum. He sat down before the stranger's bed, and made various enquiries about his malady; and then told him it was not of a dangerous nature. He ordered the numerous bystanders to retire. When all were gone out, he rose from his chair, and carefully locked the door. He then resumed his seat, and in an interested manner enquired if he was a Christian,—meaning a Roman catholic, which, in these countries, the word signifies. Mr. Collot understood him, but answered not his question; and supplicated for a glass of water. The parson repeated the question in a louder tone. The sufferer again urgently asked for water. The parson told him he should first answer to his God, of whom he was the representative, whether he was a Christian? The patient, under the suffering of pain and thirst, (having been born a catholic), answered that he was. The parson then opened the door, and at his call, some excellent lemonade was brought in a short time, which in some measure relieved him. The priest then renewed his questions about the disorder; and told him he had an Indian, not far from the borough, who could cure him perfectly; but, as you are a Christian, added he, "it is necessary to confess you first; and that you receive the sacraments, which will cause half your cure."

The colonel replied, saying, that this was surely a jest; that the Indian might come and cure him, after which he would confess himself with great pleasure. No, no, my friend; it is absolutely necessary to begin with the confession and the sacraments. Mr. Collot, seeing his obstinacy, told him to go out. The parson jumped from his seat in a violent passion, saying, "Well, sir, as you deny your God, I can give you no help;" and then he went out, shutting the door with violence.

A miserable night lamp was in the room, and he saw what they call a Christ, suspended under a small looking-glass, upon the wall. Mr. Collot remained some time in a state of stupefaction; then raising his head, he perceived that silence reigned through the house. After suffering in this condition for about half an hour, with pain and fever, he called as loud as he could for assistance. The door half opened, and a woman demanded, in a harsh and stern voice, what he wanted. "Assistance, for God's sake!" he answered; "help, help, for I am deadly sick." He spoke in good Spanish; but the door was shut immediately. He received no answer, and silence again reigned over the whole house. Notwithstanding frequent calls for a glass of water, no one came to him. It was expressly enjoined upon his servant, who was very much attached to him, to remain with the people, or he would incur the vengeance of the holy father, as they called the priest. The servant was a native of New Grenada; and was so terrified by these words, that he did not dare go to his master's assistance. The priest, in his curse, had distinctly declared that no

one, under pain of excommunication, should enter the room of "that perverse sinner, who denied his God." Colonel Collot at last asked, as a great favour, that the landlord would come to him for a minute. After a long time the landlord appeared, half opened the door, and harshly demanded what was wanted of him. "Come nearer, my friend," said he, "I want to speak with you." "What," said the landlord, "will you confess yourself? Shall I call the reverend father priest? Oh, do so; it would make me happy above any thing." "No, sir, I do not speak of confession, I wish ——." "I cannot hear you then," said the landlord: "good bye, sir; may heaven assist you." So saying, he shut the door, and disappeared. The Colonel in his distress made every exertion to move their compassion, but in vain. They absolutely refused to do any thing for him.

The apprehension of dying in that condition at last compelled him to declare that he would be confessed and take the sacrament. The parson came, after four hours absence, at eleven o'clock at night; and the Colonel confessed and received the sacraments. All was now changed around him. The Indian perfectly cured him, in the following singular manner. He stripped him naked, anointed him with a decoction of indigenous plants, and, laying him on the ground upon some blankets, he handled him just as a baker kneads bread; so that he cried out with pain. The Indian continued the operation until his patient was in a proper sweat. He then wrapped him in a blanket, and put him to bed. The next day the operation was repeated; and the colonel was per-

fectly cured. When he was quite recovered, he was scarcely suffered to depart. He and the priest became close friends, and he was treated by all the inhabitants with the kindest hospitality. When he insisted on going, and asked the landlord for his bill, he was told that so good a Christian owed nothing. He could not prevail on them to receive any thing. On the contrary, at his departure, a mule was laden with excellent provisions and choice fruits for his journey.

The character of the inhabitants of New Granada is very different from that of those of Venezuela. A striking difference also exists among the thirty-seven provinces of Columbia in this respect. The Margaritans, for example, differ in many points from the Llaneros; so do those of Cumana and Barcelona, from those of Caracas, &c.

The Caraguin is much quicker, more petulant, and also more sanguinary than the man of Bogotá. He is also more enlightened. But he is more corrupt, vicious, false, cunning, jealous, and inclined to vengeance, than the Grenadan. The latter having given his word will keep it. The Caraguin will give his word promptly, and will add protestations, and even oaths; and after he has deceived you, he will laugh at your credulity. The Caraguin will sacrifice every thing for pomp and show, and especially for a brilliant retinue. The Grenadan is more modest, more prudent in his expenses, and has far more order in the interior of his establishment. The Caraguin, when observed, will give handfuls of gold to a beggar. The other will give secretly, but not profusely, and will enter into the feelings and sufferings of the ob-

ject of his charity; while the Caraguin gives, and thinks of him no more. In almost all the convents of Bogotá, there was a house for the poor, maintained by the charity of private persons. There was, besides, a large hospital for men, and another for women.

The Creoles generally are jealous of all foreigners, and dislike to be commanded by any but their own countrymen. They will obey a foreigner, in their necessity, but as soon as they cease to feel their need of his services, they obey no longer, and use every exertion to turn him out. Duty and gratitude have little or no weight with them. In Venezuela, where no foreigner has ever been admitted to the *chief* command, there have been repeated instances of their being displaced. In New Grenada various foreigners have been entrusted with distinguished commands; and have generally been perfectly well received and treated, and still are so. The Caraguin, as he hates all foreigners, despises the Grenadan, and submits with great reluctance to be commanded by him; taking every opportunity, in his absence, to render him suspected or contemptible.

The uncultivated and ignorant Llaneros will encourage no stranger, extending their aversion to Europeans, Caraguins, Grenadans,—to every one not born in the plains of their country.

The antipathy and hatred existing between the inhabitants of Venezuela and New Grenada, is strongly expressed, though no good reason can be given for it. It is well known to have existed for centuries; and continues in full force to this day. It has produced consequences dreadful to the cause of

independence; as I shall show in the course of this memoir. The vain and proud Caraguin has never ceased to despise and ridicule the more ignorant Grenadan, who, whilst he feels his own inferiority, secretly and bitterly hates the other on account of it. The native of Caracas is distinguished by his gesticulations, his continual talk, his boasting, and biting wit. He has a sovereign contempt for all who are not born in his own province. It has been said by well-informed persons, that the Caraguin has all the vices of the native Spaniard, without any of his virtues.

New Grenada still continues her laws, customs, and privileges, as she possessed them before the revolution. Institutions that would be useful in one of these provinces, might be of no avail in the other. A viceroy of Grenada had no authority whatever over a captain-general of Venezuela. These rulers were as distinct from each other as were the characters and customs of their subjects. Each rendered his account to the king, and received orders directly from him.

The Colombians have all the manners and customs of the old Spaniards. Their festivals, civil and religious, their society, manner of living, eating and drinking, and dress, laws, institutions, &c. all are like those of the European Spaniards. In the army and navy of Colombia, the old rules and ordinances of the king are strictly followed.

A ball must be opened by the most elevated in rank of the society, before any one else is permitted to dance. They are passionately fond of fighting-bulls and game-cocks—as in Spain. Their theatres were, like those in Spain, poor and miserable. The fan-

dango and boleros were and are still the favourite dances of the Colombians, and next to them waltzes and English country dances. The music is that of old Spain; and their concerts the same. The guitar is the favourite national instrument. But in Caracas they have some good patriotic songs and marches, distinguished for harmony and expression, which I have often heard with great pleasure.

The character of the province of Carthagena differs greatly from that of both Caracas and Bogotá. License of manners is greater than in either of the two other provinces; the women are generally pale, from the insalubrity of the climate; and the morasses, lakes, and stagnant water surrounding the fortress of Carthagena, with a beaming sun, soon produce putrefaction, and cause contagious and putrid fevers. The water they drink is unhealthy, and of a brackish taste. People of fortune alone drink rain water, which is collected in large cisterns, and sold at high prices.

The number of poor people and beggars is greater here than in any other province of Colombia, in proportion to the population. The causes of this are a ruined commerce, the oppression of high duties, both of import and export, and the absolute sterility of the soil. Under the presidency of Torrices, in 1812, 13, and 14, Carthagena flourished, and was the only province where foreigners were received with kindness, and were secure and highly respected; but under the intendancy of General Mariano Montilla, they have been exposed to high duties by his arbitrary and vexatious measures. Most owners of foreign vessels,

and others coming from this place, have confirmed this fact.

Besides these putrid fevers, the Carthagenans are affected with swollen feet; and above all, a kind of pestilential malady, called "el mal de San Lazaro," which I have before mentioned.

The inhabitants of Carthagena are desirous of imitating the easy and natural manners of the Caraguins, and they do it in such an awkward manner, that the latter laugh at and despise them. The women make a similar attempt, but they have neither the grace, beauty, nor wit of those of Caracas. The inhabitants of Caracas do not much like those of Bogotá; and ridicule them by mimicking their drawling tone and manner of speaking the Spanish language. But they hate the Caraguins; there has never been a good understanding between them. Ignorance is more prevalent in Carthagena than in Bogotá or Caracas.

I have already spoken of the immense plains of Venezuela, and their excellent pasture. These plains are generally inhabited by converted Indians, who are distinguished by their cruelty, their cool ferocity, their ignorance, prejudice, and superstition. They are known under the general denomination of Llaneros (people of the plains). Their favourite and exclusive occupation is, and ever has been, to take care of their numerous flocks and herds of every description. They are half savages; and have multiplied rapidly, through the richness of their country and their mode of existence. From their childhood they are accustomed to catch and mount wild horses, which run by

hundreds upon the savannas. They may almost be said to be born horsemen.

When at war they are generally armed with a long lance, and very often have neither swords nor pistols. They have no regular uniform; nor boots or shoes. They have a few rags upon their bodies, with a kind of large mameluke pantaloons. All have their blankets, (mantas,) and many their hammocks. I may here be permitted to copy the curious and just description of the people, by colonel Hippisley.

"Sedeno's cavalry (Llaneros) were composed of all sorts and sizes, from the man to the boy, from the horse to the mule. Some of the troops with saddles, very many of them without. Some with bits, leather head-stalls and reins; others with rope lines, with a bite of the rope placed over the tongue of the horse as a bit; some with old pistols hung over the saddle-bow, (I cannot call it the pommel,) either encased in tiger skin or ox hide holster pipes, or hanging by a thong of hide, one on each side. As for the troopers themselves, they were from thirteen to thirty-six or forty years of age; black, brown, sallow complexions, according to the casts of their parents. The adults wore coarse large mustachios, and short hair, either woolly or black, according to the climate or descent. They had a ferocious, savage look, which the regiment they appeared in did not tend to harmonize or improve. Mounted on miserable, half-starved, jaded beasts, whether horse or mule; some without trowsers, smallclothes, or any covering except a bandage of blue cloth, or cotton, round their loins, the end of which passing between their legs, fastened to the

girth, round the waist; others with trowsers, but without stockings, boots, or shoes, and a spur generally gracing the heel on one side; and some wearing a kind of sandal made of hide, with the hair side outward. In their left hand they hold their reins, and in their right a pole from eight to ten feet in length, with an iron spear, very sharp at the point and sides, and rather flat; in shape like our serjeant's halbert. A blanket of about a yard square, with a hole, or rather a slit, cut in the centre, through which the wearer thrusts his head, falls on each side of his shoulders, thus covering his body, and leaving his bare arms at perfect liberty to manage his horse, or mule, and lance. Sometimes an old musket, the barrel of which has been shortened twelve inches, forms his carbine, and with a large sabre, or hanger, or cut and thrust, or even a small sword, hanging by a leather thong to his side, together with a flat hat, a tiger-skin or hide cap on his head, with a white feather, or even a white rag, stuck into it. Those troopers of the legion of Sedeno appeared complete, and ready for action. My picture is a perfect transcript from the original, and by no means too highly coloured."

Paez's cavalry was much superior in point of dress, appearance, and the management of their horses, but they were not uniformly clothed, though none of them are so naked as many of Sedeno's legion, but they comprise some without boots, shoes, or any body-covering except the blanket, which is a necessary appendage of the general uniform. They wear trowsers or loose drawers, and their arms are similar to those of the other corps of cavalry. Many of Paez's men

are clothed in the spoils of the enemy; and hence are seen in helmets bound with brass and plated metal, and have large sabres with silver hilts and buckles. I actually saw one horseman whose stirrups were made of silver.

The Llaneros are active, and even brave, in defending their valleys, and in gaining booty; and the more so when General Paez is at their head; who, in their view, is the greatest hero in the world—far greater than Napoleon. Paez was born in their valleys, smokes with them, sleeps on the ground, as they do, in his blanket, eats a banana, drinks with them, and speaks their corrupted and savage language. In truth, Paez is, in every respect, a complete Llanero.

Their manner of warfare is very like that of the Cossacks. Like them, they attack their enemy with loud cries, and never in ranged files; they fly to form and attack again. They surround their enemy on all sides, and never suffer him to keep them together. They follow an isolated corps, fall on its rear, and kill their prisoners without mercy. They plunder the wounded and fatigued. In fine, in their warfare they are complete savages.

It is difficult to subject them to discipline. Their organization is, therefore, different from that of any other troops in Colombia. They select their officers from among themselves, and turn them out at pleasure, sometimes killing them, and putting others in their places. They never suffer themselves to be commanded by a stranger; some of their own generals have been in danger of being killed by them when they were suspected of cowardice or treachery.

This was the case with generals Sedenno, Roxas, and Monagas. Paez, however appeased them, and protected these chieftains. He is their supreme commander, and he alone is adored by them. They care not much for general Bolivar; and, on various occasions have been heard to say, that they never see him amid the fire, nor at the head of a charge; and that he is too far from the camp and battle-field, to be able to judge for himself how the action should be conducted. General Paez, exasperated by the loss of a battle, told General Bolivar, in presence of more than forty officers, that where Bolivar commanded in battle, he caused the loss of it, but that when he himself commanded alone, he had beaten General Morillo.

After Paez, general Zarasa has the greatest authority and most influence over the Llaneros. He is brave, intelligent and humane, and is, in every respect, superior to Paez, who is jealous of him. The Spanish chieftains, particularly Morillo, have repeatedly attempted to gain him over, but his firm character defeated their efforts; enraged at this, they avenged themselves upon his wife and children, who were murdered.

The Llaneros have undoubtedly rendered very great services to the republic, and in this long and bloody war have distinguished themselves above all the inhabitants of the Main except the Margaritans, of whom I shall speak hereafter. The Llaneros have been constantly and entirely devoted to the patriotic cause, whilst the people of Caracas, Bogotá, and Carthagena, have frequently changed their political

opinions. This wild race, far more raw and ignorant than any other people in Colombia, have nobly adhered to the republic. In 1813 they contributed powerfully to the success of the dictator, Bolivar, who however dislikes Paez, but treats him publicly with great regard, for the purpose of managing him. The truth is, if Paez had been a different kind of man, he might, at various times, have displaced Bolivar. Three distinct offers have been made him to that effect.

The inhabitants of the small and rocky island of Margarita, which forms one of the provinces of Venezuela, had, like the Llaneros, their favourite commander. This was general Arismendy. But he lost his influence by being too arbitrary with his countrymen, the Margaritans. But I will speak further of the characters and talents of both Paez and Arismendy, in my biographical sketches of them.

The Margaritans are much more cultivated and humane than the Llaneros. Their maritime coasts enable them to carry on a trade, notwithstanding the laws, with the inhabitants of St. Thomas's, Curaçao, &c. Margarita has many small bays where vessels may enter; and which are not so closely watched by the Spanish vessels of the king or the company as the larger ports of Cumana, Barcelona, and the larger cities belonging to the inhabitants of the plains. Intercourse with foreigners was easier and more frequent at Margarita than any where upon the Main.

It is well known that the Margaritans, since the beginning of the revolution, (1810,) have been sup-

porters of independence; and could, never since, be reduced, by the most powerful efforts of the Spaniards, whilst a great part of the plains have been in possession of Boves, Morales, and Morillo. They are true republicans, industrious, brave, and hospitable. If any of these provinces have deserved freedom and independence, Margarita is the first; and all who have known her people will agree with me in this opinion.

The catholic religion is rendered the more imposing by the ceremony of its followers; and no city on the Main had so many, or so brilliant religious festivals, as Bogotá, the capital of New Grenada. Caracas, Carthagena, and other cities, had the same ceremonies, but in a less imposing style. The cause of this difference is to be found in the greater wealth and devotion of the people; Bogotá being the seat of the viceroy, governor of twenty-two provinces, with a numerous and splendid retinue, and a strong garrison; whilst the captain-general had only eight provinces. Besides, the Grenadans, whilst they are less enlightened, are more rich, numerous, and powerful.

From Lent Monday to Holy Friday, in passion week, there was every day a solemn and numerously attended procession, which passed through the principal streets and squares of the city of Bogotá.

Before I close this introduction, I will relate an extraordinary punishment inflicted for robbery, burglary, and the like, characteristic of manners, under the government of the late viceroy of New Grenada. Between the condemnation and punishment, two or

three weeks intervened, that the country people might be convened, and witness the punishment.

A convict was condemned to receive, with a kind of whip, long in use among the Spaniards, a certain number of lashes upon his back and posteriors, to remain in prison, or to work in the mines, or gallies, a certain number of years, according to the degree and aggravation of the offence. The punishment was rigorously inflicted, without regard to age, sex, or rank. At the appointed hour the criminal was deprived of all clothing, except a strip of coloured cloth about his middle, and placed upon an ass, so as to present his posterior parts and back to the executioner: his hands and feet were tied, and the reins were placed in his hands. In this position he was taken, under a guard of soldiers, from the prison to the public square; the party halted, and the officer read, with great emphasis, the judgment, together with the christian and family name of the criminal, his name, native place, office, and the names of both his parents, with their place of abode. He was then whipped at the four corners of the square, and at the corners of the principal streets. As the city of Bogotá is large, it was sometimes more than three hours before the prescribed places were passed, and the number of stripes given. In 1805 this punishment was inflicted in Bogotá, under the following circumstances:—A beautiful girl, 18 years of age, whose parents were both European Spaniards, and who had received a good education, and was much esteemed in Bogotá, assisted at the festival of the purification of the Holy Virgin, in the church of San Francisco.

On that day, the waxen figure of the Virgin was ornamented in an unusually splendid manner, with pearls and costly diamonds, and surrounded with many hundred waxen tapers. The girl, totally blinded by the splendid exhibition, took the sudden resolution to become possessed of the jewels. She afterwards said, in her confession, that the idea was suggested to her during the sermon, by Satan himself, who completely succeeded in tempting her. She hoped this excuse would save her from punishment. She succeeded in the following manner: instead of going out with the crowd, she hid herself in one of the dark corners of the church, behind a saint. The sexton, not doubting but all were gone out, extinguished the waxen tapers, went out, and locked the door. She came out of her corner, and by the light of the eternal lamp, so called, which is kept burning in catholic churches, she succeeded in despoiling the Virgin of her jewels, selecting them at leisure.

While she was in the church her parents sought her every where, in the most cruel anxiety. Early the next morning, the sexton, on entering the church, was astonished to find her fast asleep upon one of the steps of the main altar, having the jewels in her hand and frock. He hastened back, after cautiously shutting the door, and made his declaration before a magistrate. She was convicted, the jewels being found upon her. It would be vain to attempt to describe the feelings of her parents. They, with the most respectable and wealthy families, even the judges and members of the royal audiencia, warmly besought the viceroy to spare her. The parents repeatedly kneeled

at his feet, imploring his pity. The viceroy's wife herself interceded. The parents, who were in very good circumstances, secretly offered to sacrifice their whole property. All was in vain. The viceroy replied that he could not alter the laws; that if he prevented their execution in the case of an European Spaniard, the natives would have reason to be dissatisfied, particularly as the crime was of such a horrid nature. Don Antonio Amar was a good and sensible man. He pitied all the sufferers, but did not feel himself at liberty to relieve them.

In this case the punishment was inflicted, as in every other respect, except that the executioners received a secret order to strike lightly. The surrounding croud of citizens and country people was immense, and eye-witnesses have assured me, that not one was seen to enjoy the spectacle; but that all were deeply moved. Her sufferings lasted about five hours.

Her parents went eight days before to Mompox, never to return to the place of the shameful punishment of their only child. As a special favour, she was released from prison the next day: she rejoined her parents, and died of a lingering illness two months after. The miserable parents followed her to the grave.

This barbarous punishment exists no longer. A thief is now punished with a certain number of stripes, or consigned to the public works.

After what I have said of the education, character and morality of this people, the reader may form his own opinion with regard to their existing ignorance and prejudices. He may now also be enabled to judge

whether Bolivar and the other chieftains of Colombia can confer on its inhabitants, intelligence, liberty and freedom. The rulers of Colombia have naturally adopted the manners and customs of the Spaniards; but they are far less advanced than the latter, not through their own fault, but as a natural consequence of the Spanish system, which was designed to keep them in darkness and ignorance.

By means of this pernicious system, the Colombians are at least 150 years behind the people of the United States in the science of government.

MEMOIRS OF BOLIVAR.

CHAPTER I.

Causes of the present imperfect Knowledge and erroneous Opinions respecting the Political Events and Leading Characters in Colombia.

To trace with justice and impartiality the history of powerful men who have not yet finished their career, is by no means an easy task. Burke says "that death canonizes a great character." In the political and military life of Gen. Bolivar, many traits, however, have already appeared, which give a correct knowledge of the character and talents of the Liberator.

The most extravagant and contradictory opinions, have, at different times, been given of Gen. Bolivar. Some say, "He is a great—an extraordinary man; a man of transcendent knowledge and talents; the hero of South America; the benefactor of his country;

its Washington; its Napoleon." Others assure us "He is the Cromwell, the tyrant, the oppressor of his country." Truth is rarely to be found in any extreme.

That such various opinions should have been received of this man, is not at all surprising, when we consider that the majority of mankind are inclined to admire splendor, power and success; and the more so, when the object of their attention is beyond their own sphere: moreover, they blame or approve, according to their own interest or feelings. Rarely is their opinion formed from the evidence of truth, or with the spirit of impartiality. But the professed defender of freedom and the rights of man, naturally attracts our attention more and more intensely, by every successful event.

The actions of Gen. Bolivar have been considered as being in accordance with the wishes of all liberal and enlightened men; nay, with those of every oppressed and enslaved being. His smallest successes have given general satisfaction, and every eye has been fixed upon him and his proceedings. But without any exact and positive knowledge of facts, each individual has formed his own idea of General Bolivar, in conformity with his own wishes, and with his confused and incorrect notions of events on the Main. Public opinion was soon captivated to such a degree, that whatever accurately informed and impartial men could say against the Liberator, was disregarded, and treated as mere calumny, or as coming from agents of the Holy Alliance, from enemies of the cause of freedom, or from rash adventurers. The

majority of the public have been prevented from judging for themselves, and have continued to contemplate General Bolivar, as the hero, the father, the liberator of South America.

Various causes, in the commencement of General Bolivar's career, contribute to form these opinions: First,—The great difficulty of procuring exact information from the Main, because every one possessing it, had his own opinions, his own views, his own interests, while corresponding with his friends; others concealed the real state of facts, or circumstances which might enlighten, fearing their letters might be intercepted or miscarry, or that their names might be mentioned by their friends, and so their interest be affected on the Main.

Secondly,—The bulletins and proclamations of the rulers in Colombia, on many occasions, have been very extravagant and partial, as is generally the case with documents of this description, in every army throughout the world. These bulletins and proclamations have been faithfully translated, without comment, without any of the particulars which would give a correct idea of the events, and have naturally inspired gigantic notions of the power of *armies* in Colombia; and of the heroic bravery, and deep military skill of the leaders of these armies. Besides, the Spanish language is distinguished from all others by its pompous phrases, which give it an agreeable and high sounding expression. The effect of the language, too, is enhanced by the Caraguin character, which is generally vain and boasting. And so it has happened, that a skirmish, in which, in fact, only a

few men were killed or wounded, was given out as a regular and bloody battle.*

* When I was chief of the staff at Carupano, on the Main, in May 1816, Gen. Bolivar, then *supreme chief* of the republic of Venezuela, ordered a detachment of about 75 men to take possession of the village and the little fort of Santa Rosa, which lies upon a hill, and commands the harbour. No enemy was found in it, except twenty-five half-naked and badly armed men; and these retired after having twice discharged a twenty-four pounder, the only piece of ordnance then in the fort. Not a man was killed, wounded or taken. The next day I was not a little surprised to find a printed bulletin, signed with my name, and in the proper place, in which is said, " The independents landed under the immediate command of the supreme chief, in four *divisions*, and the divisions of Gen. Piar took, after great resistance, and a heavy fire, the strong fort of Santa Rosa, by storm. The division of General Marinno distinguished itself by its bravery and coolness," &c. &c. The fact is, that General Piar, with his twenty-five men, jumped over a low wall of this *strong* fort, and found it empty; the Spaniards had fled as soon as Piar approached, and could not have been taken or killed, being already more than four musket shots distant from him.

When I saw this pompous bulletin, signed with my name, I asked Bolivar how my name came to such a paper,—a real and ridiculous satire upon our forces, which did not exceed 800 men, but from which 75, divided into *four divisions*, were more than sufficient to drive 25 enemies from Santa Rosa. He answered, laughing, that Baillot (our printer) was anxious to finish the bulletin before midnight; and that he ordered Captain Chamberlain, his aide-de-camp, to write it, under his dictation, and that I not being at home he sent it, with my name, as chief of the staff, to the printer. The bulletin may be found in many Gazettes, particularly in the Curaçao Courant, July 1816, with my name. Neither Bolivar nor myself were present at this skirmish. He remained quietly on board with Admiral Brion. I arrived in another vessel, a brig, after all this was done.

Sometime afterwards I handed to General Bolivar a Gazette from Baltimore, in which was repeated this *famous and glorious*

Thirdly,—We are in absolute want of a good, detailed, and exact history of the events of the revolution, and of the contending parties on the Main, from 1810 to the present time. It is a fact, that the people of the United States know little or nothing with certainty, of what has passed, and is still passing, in Colombia. Our Gazettes give some accounts, but they are few, and exceedingly imperfect.

The imperfect and erroneous statements which have been published, and the exaggerated proclamations and bulletins, have chiefly influenced public opinion; the *habit*, too, of thinking General Bolivar a great and extraordinary man, a hero, has been growing since 1813, and has increased to such a degree, that it will be a difficult task to convince men of the exaggeration of their ideas, and extravagance of their notions, respecting him.

So far as I am concerned, I can declare, that I have neither desire nor interest to flatter or calumniate General Bolivar. I vouch for the correctness of all the facts contained in these Memoirs, well knowing that this work will obtain only that degree of credit with the public which it may appear to merit by its accuracy and candor.

victory, and in which it was added, that general Bolivar's army was 7000 men strong in infantry, and 3000 in cavalry. I could mention many other cases of a similar description.

CHAPTER II.

Birth of Bolivar—His Family—Visit to Europe—Marriage—Errors in the Biographical Sketch of his Life in Ackermann's Magazine.

SIMON Bolivar was born in the city of Caracas, July 24th, 1783, and is the second son of Don Juan Vicente Bolivar y Ponte, a militia colonel in the plains of Aragua, and Dona Maria Concepcion Palacios y Sojo; and both were natives of Caracas, and were Mantuanas.* The first died in 1786, the latter in 1789.

Young Bolivar was sent to Spain at the age of 14, in compliance with the custom of the wealthy Americans of those times, who usually spent in one year in Europe, the amount of several years' income at home; seeking offices and military decorations, that were often put up to the highest bidder, under the administration of Manuel Godoy, Prince of the Peace. The young Americans were likewise accustomed to go to Spain, to complete their education, and to pursue their studies in the profession of law, physic, or theology; for, according to the laws of the time, no American was admitted to the bar, and allowed to practise in

* Los Mantuanas, or los familias Mantuanas, were in Caracas a kind of nobility, and this is the distinctive title there of rich families of birth. In New Grenada the opulent families of high birth were never called Mantuanas; this distinction existed alone in Caracas.

his profession in the universities of old Spain, nor could he exercise his profession at home without a diploma from a university in Spain. Without the same qualification, too, no American could, at least in New Grenada, have the honour of being a Capuchin Friar! But as the object of young Simon was, to see the world, and not in any manner to study seriously, he paid little attention to any object other than that of pleasure, and of satisfying his desire to witness the different scenes of life. He, however, devoted some time to the study of jurisprudence.

He was at this period lieutenant in the corps of militia in the plains of Aragua, of which his father had been commander. He had an elder brother, who died in 1815, and two sisters, who enjoyed an annual income of from 40 to 50,000 dollars, the produce of several considerable estates, and particularly of an extensive *Hato*, on which were raised large herds of cattle. These estates were at no great distance from the city of Caracas, and at one or other of them Bolivar and his family usually resided. San Mateo was, however, the place he always preferred. It was the largest of his possessions, where between 1,000 and 1,500 slaves were regularly kept before the revolution. His residence in the valley of Aragua, not far from the lake of Valencia, was beautiful and striking. The famous Boves destroyed it in 1814.

From Spain Bolivar passed into France, and resided at Paris, where he remained a number of years, enjoying, at an early period, all the pleasures of life, which a rich young man, with bad examples constantly before him, can there easily find. I have

remarked, that whenever Bolivar spoke to me of the Palais Royal, he could not restrain himself from boasting of its delights. It was on such occasions that all his soul was electrified; his physiognomy became animated, and he spoke and gesticulated with such ardour as showed how fond he was of that enchanting abode, so dangerous to youth.

His residence in Paris, and especially at the Palais Royal, has done him great injury. He is pale, and of a yellowish colour, meagre, weak and enervated.

I have spoken of Bolivar's residence in Paris; and I ask, if such a school could inspire him, or any other young man, with an inclination for continued, deep, and laborious study; to that school I apprehend it to be in a great measure owing, that he cannot attend with assiduity to business for more than two or three hours in a day; during the greater part of which he is sitting, or lying down upon his hammock, talking about indifferent matters with his favourites and flatterers. The answer of aides-de-camp on duty, to those who wished to speak to him, while he was thus occupied, generally was, that he was very much engaged in his cabinet. He scarcely ever writes at all himself, but dictates, or indicates to his secretary, what he wishes to have written. In consequence, as I apprehend, of the flattery, to which he had been accustomed, since his residence in Paris, he is very fond of adulation, and very vain. But in the school where he acquired these two faults, (I mean those circles in Paris which call themselves *bon ton*,) he learned also the dissimulation to conceal them.

Bolivar returned in 1802 to Madrid, where he

married one of the daughters of Don Bernardo del Toro, uncle of the present Marquis of that name. His father in law, who was born in Caracas, resided in Madrid. Bolivar was but 19 years of age, and his lady 16. They returned, in 1809, to Caracas, and lived in a retired manner on their estates. Shortly after, his lady was taken ill and died, without leaving any offspring.

Bolivar acquired, in the course of his travels, that usage of the world, that courtesy and ease of manners, for which he is so remarkable, and which have so prepossessing an influence upon those who associate with him.

In the year 1823, Mr. Ackermann published in London a very interesting monthly periodical, in the Spanish language, under the title of " El Mensagero." It was entirely devoted to the affairs of the new Spanish republics. It contains, among other articles, a *Biographical Sketch of Gen. Bolivar*, in which the author asserts that the young Bolivar, during his residence in Paris, gave himself up to all the possible amusements of young men of his age: " Still," said the author, " he was assiduous to obtain the dear object he has had always in view, as the accomplishment of all his wishes, and his ambition, namely, *that of making with eagerness all possible acquaintances which might have been useful to him for the emancipation of his country!*"

I must beg leave to assert, that shortly before the revolution of the 19th of April, 1810, at Caracas, the names of General Miranda, Don Manual Gual, the Corregidor T. M. Espanna, Narinno, Zea, and others,

appeared on the list of those who declared their intention to liberate their country from the Spanish yoke. On the memorable day of the 19th of April, when the Captain-general Emparan was deposed, and his functions performed by a patriotic junta, the chiefs of this revolution were the alcalde [mayor] Don Martin Tobar, Don Francisco Salias, Carlos Machado, Mariano Montilla, Joseph Felix Ribas, and others; but the name of Simon Bolivar is not among them; he was at his ease, on one of his estates, in the valley of Aragua, and refused to take any part in the affair, although his cousin, Joseph Felix Ribas, labored to engage him as an active associate. Shortly after, the junta gave him his option of a civil or a military post, under the new patriotic government. Their offer was refused, and the pressing solicitations of his friends and relations were of no avail. Finally he accepted the appointment of a commission to London, with the grade of colonel in the militia. M. Luis Mendez y Lopez, who, during several years, was the agent of Venezuela at London, was at this time his colleague in the mission.

If Bolivar, as stated in Mr. Ackermann's Magazine, had from his youth formed the idea of liberating his country, he would have seized this opportunity of joining the chiefs of the revolution, and would have accepted a post under the government of the junta and the congress: he did neither, although the members of these two bodies, in 1810-11, offered him any post that might suit his views. On his return from London, he retired to his estate, without taking any part in public affairs.

The Magazine says, secondly, that Bolivar, *from* the time of the earthquake, came to join Miranda, who had then his head quarters at Vittoria, and that he was a colonel in the army. This is a mistake. Bolivar was named, *eight months before* the earthquake, governor of the fortress of Porto Cabello; but he did not come to join Miranda at Vittoria. After his secret departure from that fortress, and his leaving his garrison in the night, he dared not appear before Miranda; because he justly feared that he should be tried before a court-martial, for having secretly, in the night, together with some of his officers, and without leave or orders, left the strongest place in Venezuela, which Miranda had confided to his care. He sent Thomas Montilla, one of the officers who embarked with him, to Vittoria, with the news of this event, and with his excuses to General Miranda; the particulars of which I mean to give in their proper place. Bolivar was then lieutenant-colonel in Miranda's staff.

It is also asserted in the same article, "that the loss of Porto Cabello diminished in nothing Bolivar's influence over the army." This is another mistake. Soon after the loss of Porto Cabello, which in consequence of Bolivar's secret departure, fell into the hands of the Spanish commander, Don Domingo Monteverde, (June 1812,) the republican general, Miranda, felt so depressed by this unexpected loss, that he capitulated with Monteverde at Vittoria, in July 1812. In virtue of the capitulation, congress, the republic, and the army of Venezuela, were entirely dissolved, and the members of each saved themselves

as well as they could. What could be the influence of Bolivar over a disbanded and dissolved army? The author of the Biographical Sketch appears to be ignorant of a well-known fact, viz. the arrest of General Miranda, at Laguaira, by Simon Bolivar, Dr. Miguel La Penna, and the military republican governor of Laguaira, Lieutenant-colonel Manuel Maria Casas; and that Lieutenant-colonel Bolivar embarked soon after with a passport signed by the Spanish general, Monteverde, and with a letter of very high recommendation from the latter to a merchant then at Porto Cabello, who had his own brig ready to sail for Curaçao, and was requested, nay, urged, to receive Lieutenant-colonel Bolivar on board of his vessel.* If, therefore, Bolivar could have had at this time any influence with the patriotic army, how would he, how could he, have obtained a passport, and, moreover, the letter from the Spanish general-in-chief?

These, and many other particulars, prove clearly, that in a great part of the accounts given and published of Bolivar's life, the writers have endeavoured to attribute to him qualities and motives which he himself had never thought of before.

All that can be said, with truth and impartiality, of General Bolivar's patriotism, is, that it began with his being at the head of the army and the government; or, to speak more plainly, General Bolivar began from 1813 to be a zealous and ardent patriot, because from January 6th, that year, until the present day, (July 1828) he has not ceased to have either the

* I have these particulars from the merchant himself.

three powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, united in himself;* or to have, together with the executive power, the direction of all civil and military operations: the congress of Colombia and Peru, having been entirely submissive to the wishes of its president, liberator, or protector, as will be shown more particularly in the course of this Biography.

CHAPTER III.

Events previous to the Entry of Bolivar into the regular Army of Venezuela—First causes of the Revolution at Caracas—Napoleon's Invasion of Spain, and its influence upon the Spanish Colonies—Propitious Inducements for the Americans to rise against their Oppressors—Policy of the Cabinets of St. Cloud and St. James's in regard to the Spanish Colonies.—[Years 1807 and 1808.]

It will be necessary to give some account of the state of Europe and of the West Indies before the revolution; and to show the primary cause of a revolution which undermined the colossal power of Spain, and

* The following historical facts will prove it: as *dictator* at Caracas in 1813 and 1814; as *supreme chief* in 1816, 17, 18, 19, in Venezuela and New Grenada; as *president liberator* of Colombia; as *protector* in Peru and Bolivia, from 1820 until 1826. And again, from the 23d of November 1826, until the present day (July 1828), he holds the *dictatorial* power in consequence of the commotions in Venezuela and Valencia, under Gen. Paez. (See his decree dated Bogotá, Nov. 1826, in the *Appendix*, among the documents under No. 5.)

promised freedom and prosperity to the Spanish Americans.

Napoleon, the Spanish government, and the Holy Alliance, have contributed to provoke and ferment the bloody war between Spain and its colonies; and have powerfully assisted the latter to become free and independent;—Napoleon, by his invasion; the Regency and Cortes, by sending to the Main chiefs remarkable for ignorance and weakness, or for cowardice, duplicity, and cruelty. The want of a steady and well-planned system of moderation, and of a policy adapted to critical circumstances, has done more harm to Spain than to America. Millions of Americans have suddenly awakened from their lethargy of three hundred years; have been forced to defend their property and their lives; and have at last succeeded in driving their oppressors from their territory, and in declaring themselves free and independent. If Spain had adopted more justice and moderation towards her colonies, she would probably have succeeded in keeping them much longer in slavery. Events, related in the course of this history, will confirm my assertion.

The Holy Alliance, and particularly the French government, in coalition with Ferdinand, the Spanish clergy, and the army of the faith, invaded Spain, in order to replace upon the throne Ferdinand, a prince noted for bigotry, bad faith, cruelty, and despotism. That short-sighted crowned association was not aware of the consequences of such a step. They were not aware, that by ruining Spain they deprived her of all ability to reconquer her colonies. By enslaving eleven millions of Spaniards, they contributed greatly to

enable fifteen millions of Americans to proclaim their liberty and independence;—a policy worthy of a Metternich and a Villele!

Before the year 1810, various attempts were made to give independence to America. Tupac Amaru, Jose Antequera, Ubade, the brothers Llanzas, and others, were put to a cruel death: and all similar attempts were suppressed by terror.

It is an admonishing fact, that when the propitious moment arrived to declare their independence, and to free themselves from the Spanish yoke without bloodshed, and with little or no sacrifice, the Spanish Americans suffered it to pass by unheeded. They remained loyal, and in careless security. To prove my assertions, it will be necessary to give some account of the original causes of this eventful revolution.

In consequence of the treaty of Fontainebleau, 27th of October, 1807, between Napoleon and the *Prince of Peace*, in the name of Charles IV. King of Spain and India, the French legions crossed the Pyrenees, and penetrated to the heart of Spain, under the pretence of shutting her seaports against the commerce of Great Britain.

The conquest of Spain and Portugal appeared to Napoleon an easy task, and the object of one, or at most, of two campaigns. Besides the secret wish to create some more kings out of his own family, he had undoubtedly formed the plan of extending his dominion over the colonies in both Americas; and so to counterbalance the great colonial power of England in the East Indies. The weakness of Ferdinand and

Charles enabled him to mature these views. Some days previously to the departure of the latter from Madrid for Bayonne, Prince Murat was named his lieutenant-general of the kingdoms of Spain and India. He, by the secret order of his master, sent out one hundred and fifty chosen grenadiers, with a colonel, and many artillery and other officers. These disembarked at Laguaira, and passed to Caracas, to remain there. They met with a very kind reception from Don Juan Casas, the captain-general, and the inhabitants. This happened in 1808, when the Machiavelian principles of Napoleon were not known on the Main.

Napoleon would have succeeded on the Peninsula, if he had acted openly, and declared war against Spain and Portugal before he entered these countries. His conquests, his victories, and his wonderfully brilliant and rapid successes, had excited universal admiration. Not only was he admired by the populace; there was formed in his favour a strong and numerous party among the most enlightened and liberal men in Spain, who wished to change their weak and corrupt government. He was admired and cherished, too, by the greater part of the inhabitants of the Spanish colonies. His portrait was found in palaces and in huts. Woe to those who should have offered to speak against him before 1808!

But Murat's manner of taking possession of the fortresses, particularly Barcelona, in Catalonia; his disuniting the royal family; and, as soon as it was known, his favouring the escape of Manuel Godoy, Prince of Peace, changed the admiration of the

Spaniards into the most bitter hatred. The whole nation rose against their oppressors, and Spain heretofore peaceable and quiet, began now to be the theatre of a bloody and obstinate war, the horrors of which were extended to the immense possessions of the colonies. The Americans and Spaniards were united in their hatred and detestation of Napoleon and his family, and in the persecution of their agents.

The kings, Charles, Ferdinand, Joseph, the Emperor of the French, and the Juntas, Regencies, and Cortes, now strove to extend their influence and dominion over the Spanish colonies. The junta of Seville treated the legitimate and central junta, assembled at Cadiz, as a band of fugitives and traitors, and as the authors of all the mischiefs that had been brought upon them. Agents and commissioners were sent to the colonies by the former, with manifestoes and proclamations, in which they stated that Spain recognized their authority, and that the common welfare required peremptorily that the Americans should follow the good example. The junta installed by King Ferdinand, before his departure to Bayonne, had also sent similar manifestoes and proclamations to the colonies. The Prince Murat, as lieutenant-general of Spain and India, had done the same in the name of Charles IV. Some months afterwards, similar proclamations were distributed in the colonies in the name of King Joseph and Napoleon. The junta of the Asturias claimed the same authority, the same submission to its decrees, as the other; and Spanish America was filled with manifestoes and

proclamations, which only proved that Spain was divided into so many factions, all striving to command.

The moment was propitious for the declaration of American independence. The principal Spanish authorities were disunited; Spain occupied by French armies; King Ferdinand absent and a prisoner; Napoleon, with his brother Joseph, master of the greater part of the peninsula; not a Spaniard able to take the reins of government; the Spanish administration and finances gone to wreck; her marine of Spain ruined; her troops occupied with the defence of the country; the fortresses and new troops in the colonies in a bad and destitute condition.

Was it apathy, or devotion to the mother country, or want of good leaders, or generosity, that induced the Americans to refrain from taking a single step against Spain? The fact certainly is, that they distinguished themselves by their attachment—their enthusiasm for their beloved monarch, Ferdinand VII! and, when the vice-kings and governors endeavoured to distribute proclamations from the councils of India, or of Castile, in which the Americans were admonished to recognize the new king, Joseph Napoleon, the majority were strongly opposed to the measure. They burnt publicly, in different places, the proclamations of Napoleon, and drove his agents out of the country.

When at Bayonne, Napoleon constantly kept the Indies in view. He sent an armed brig (the Serpent, captain B.) from Bayonne to Laguaira, bearing secret instructions, proclamations, and other papers for

the captain-general, Don Juan de Casas. He gave also verbal instructions to the captain.

The brig touched at Cayenne, and was observed by the English frigate Acaste, Captain Deaver, who gave chase. The Frenchman arrived in July, 1808. The frigate came some hours afterwards. The English captain, observing from his deck the French commander going on shore, followed him. Captain B. arrived at Caracas about an hour before the English officer, and was immediately admitted to the presence of the captain-general. Don Juan de Casas, received the French captain very graciously. When the English captain presented himself, he was received boldly, and told, in a tone of ill-humour, that he had come at a bad time, and that he might call again in two hours. During this time Captain Deaver walked in the streets of the capital, a crowd of people surrounding him. He told them how the French government were going on in Spain, and that the Spaniards there were ardently opposed to them. Some hours afterwards the French captain observed a change in the manners of the inhabitants; but he persevered in executing his commission, and remaining at Caracas. He took lodgings in a public hotel, filled with strangers, and began to read to them one of Napoleon's manifestoes, directed to the people of Venezuela. After some minutes' reading, a Spanish officer caught the paper from his hands, tore it in pieces, and roared out like a madman, "that he and his companions in arms would never suffer a French king; that they were good Spaniards, and faithful to their beloved and legitimate sovereign Ferdinand

VII." He spoke and gesticulated with such vehemence, that all present caught his feelings; and the Frenchman dared not utter a word.

"The news brought by Captain Deaver struck the inhabitants of Caracas with astonishment, and excited their deepest indignation. The people assembled by thousands, and bore in triumph the portrait of their adored King Ferdinand; proclaiming that they recognized *him alone* as legitimate sovereign of Spanish India! They placed it with great solemnity in the government house, where it was to be seen illuminated during the whole night. The people, enraged against the French captain, hurried toward his hotel, and would have cut him in pieces, if he had not escaped in time, and sheltered himself in the house of Don Joachim Garcia Jove, who generously advised him of his danger, concealed him, and assisted him to depart the same night for Laguaira. The English captain followed soon after; and descrying the brig under sail, he pursued and took her at sea, not far from the coast.

Napoleon, shortly after Joseph's nomination as king of Spain and India, at Bayonne, ordered the great councils of India to send circulars to the vice-king and captain-generals, notifying to them this nomination in an official manner. He offered the inhabitants his powerful support in officers, ammunition, warlike stores, &c. if they would declare their independence. He was confident that he should easily gain the suffrages of the Americans.

The numerous agents of King Joseph and Napoleon offered the Americans independence and great privi-

leges; such as the continuance of the civil and military officers in their respective offices, &c., if they would make a treaty with the former, and acknowledge him king. But in vain: the Americans declined having any thing to do with Napoleon, or his brother Joseph, and persecuted their agents, some of whom were taken and put to death.

The failure of these negociations, and the advantageous offers of the emperor and his brother, as compared with subsequent measures, afford a proof of the ignorance, mistrust, and versatility of this people in their politics. Three years afterwards, (in 1811 and 1812,) they sent deputies to Napoleon, imploring his assistance. But it was too late: the Emperor had too much to do at home, and could not attend to the affairs of America. He was, moreover, displeased with the first refusal of its inhabitants, and placed little confidence in the sincerity and good faith of their application.*

Napoleon, however, possessed ample power to send to the Main (through the United States of America) money, arms, &c. and a sufficient number of experienced officers; and the consequences of refusing his powerful assistance were greatly injurious to the patriots. The British government became provoked; the forces of the Spaniards were increased; the Mexican republic, and the cause of liberty in Venezuela and in Grenada, were ruined. Torrents of blood were shed in the long protracted war, and, in

* A friend of mine heard him say, "Je ne me fie pas trop sur les belles paroles de ces Messieurs; je ferai cependant ce que je pourrai pour eux."

the intervals, troubles were excited in opposition to a government, under which the inhabitants had found security at least, and a shadow of freedom and felicity, of which they are at present totally deprived.

The British government, seeing the rapid progress of Napoleon in Spain, became apprehensive of her yielding at last. They feared, also, that the news of these successes, when received on the Main, would give him a predominant party there likewise. They saw the necessity of strong and speedy measures to prevent these evils. They despatched a fast-sailing sloop of war to the island of Curaçao, (at that time in the possession of England,) with orders to its governor, Sir James Cockburn, to depart, without delay, for Laguaira and Caracas. His secret instructions (which I have from good authority) were to employ every imaginable means to diminish and destroy the influence of the French party: secondly, to watch and prevent this party from getting the upper hand, and wresting the colonies from Spain: thirdly, to endeavour to establish a provisional government favourable to king Ferdinand VII. without engaging himself in any other concerns relating to the administration and interior affairs of the government of the country.

The captain-general, Don Juan de Casas, having been made acquainted with the intended mission from the English government, came, with a numerous and brilliant retinue, to Laguaira, where Sir James, on coming ashore, was met with great solemnity. The inhabitants received him with demonstrations of joy and respect, and even with regal honours. Public

opinion was entirely changed in favour of England. The aversion to Napoleon was so great, that I saw many gold and silver French coins, which had the bust of Napoleon, pierced with the point of a dagger or knife, and his portraits cut in pieces.

The ringing of bells, and the discharge of cannon at the public square and the forts of Laguaira, announced Sir James's arrival on shore; and his passage from Laguaira to Caracas was like a triumph. His entry into the capital was not less solemn than would have been that of the king himself. All was joy, bustle, and enthusiasm; the city was spontaneously illuminated; dinners, festivals, balls, &c. succeeded during the whole time of his stay; and the exclamations, "Long live our beloved, our cherished king Ferdinand VII., and the English, our good and generous allies!" were heard throughout the streets. The fickle people of Caracas were certainly sincere in their joyful reception of Sir James. After some secret interviews, the captain-general published a long proclamation, exhorting the inhabitants of Venezuela to recognize the authority of the new king of Spain and India. This was done immediately, with loud shouts and the utmost enthusiasm.

Sir James, highly pleased with his reception, returned to Curaçao, and sent a full and detailed report of his mission to the British government. Convinced now, that the Venezuelans, left to themselves, would be perfectly harmless, both to the politics and commerce of the English nation, the British ministry did not take much notice of the claims of the patriots; which they certainly would

have done, in case of any acceptance of the proposals of Napoleon. All their attention could now be directed to one point, the driving the French from the Peninsula. This would secure the great object of the British government, the extension of their commerce to the exclusion of other nations. This alone caused their alliance with Spain, and excited their aversion, their hostility, against whatever favoured the independency of the Spaniards in both Americas: while the refusal of Napoleon's offers, left in an isolated condition the cause of the independents in Spanish America.

Since the beginning of the revolution, its different governments have looked to England, and have all put equal trust and confidence in her, though she never offered to assist them. This proves clearly, that in the beginning of their revolution, the Americans had not conceived the idea of a separation from Spain. If they had, they would have accepted the brilliant offers of Napoleon and Joseph, and would never have implored the aid and assistance of the most faithful ally of the Spanish government.

The hope of effectual aid from the cabinet of St. James, arose, partly from the knowledge of the famous plan of William Pitt, who intended to render the West India colonies free and independent; and from the instructions of the British colonial minister (Dundas) in 1797, to the governor of the island of Trinidad, Sir Thomas Picton, by which the governor formally engaged to supply the Venezuelans with every support, in case they would declare themselves free and independent. The instructions were sent

from the island of Trinidad, but had not the expected effect. They were even forgotten until the revolution at Caracas, 1810; when the new junta, remembering these circumstances, sent Dons Luis Lopez Mendez and Simon Bolivar to London, to request assistance. But the British ministry did nothing. On the contrary, they sent orders to their governors in the West Indies to observe the strictest neutrality between Spain and her colonies, as long as the new government should act in the name, and by the authority, of King Ferdinand. The plan of the minister, William Pitt, to render the colonies in the West Indies, *not* belonging to England, free and independent, was pernicious and dreadful. Considering the great number of slaves and coloured people who could soon have become masters of the country, it is plain that the object of his plan was not to give freedom and independence to the inhabitants on the Main, but to ruin the country. Something like the same scheme was afterwards put in execution in St. Domingo, and the British government took an active part in it. The ruin of the West Indies would have conduced greatly to the prosperity of the vast British colonies in the East Indies. Upon such facts did the leaders of independence in Spanish America ground their sanguine hopes of support from England.

After Ferdinand ascended the throne of Spain (1814), the Prince Regent of England concluded a treaty with him, in which it was formally stipulated, that "hoping the king of Spain would make peace with the colonists, his Royal Highness would promise not to send the least support to the insurgents,

and would employ his best exertions to hinder any of his subjects from doing it."

After the earthquake at Caracas (1812), many inhabitants left Venezuela, and embarked in such haste and consternation, as to forget the necessaries of life. The British governments in the West Indies offered them not the least support. Many perished for want of food. The congress of the United States, informed of their miserable condition, generously hastened to give the necessary orders for their supply, and saved the miserable remnant from starvation and wretchedness.

The Spanish Americans, nevertheless, hesitated, in the hope of being supported by the British government. Buenos Ayres sent to London, in 1814, Don Manuel Saratea, as did the congress of New Grenada, Don Thomas Maria Del Real, with ample powers, and an order to conclude an exclusive treaty of commerce in favour of England, for twenty years. All was in vain. The deputy Real made attempts, at various times, to obtain a private audience of the British minister for foreign affairs, but was not admitted. The mission ended with obtaining only license to export some arms for ready cash, with the payment of heavy duties upon them.

Since that time the agents of the new American republics have been tolerated, but not recognized in their diplomatic character. Don Mendez y Lopez and Revenga, the former agent, and the latter Chargé d'Affaires, of the republic of Colombia, were imprisoned in London for debts. Don Hurtado, minister of Colombia, and lately Chargé d'Affaires in London,

was arrested in the island of Jamaica, in May 1828, for a debt of three thousand pounds sterling; but was released on furnishing bail.

Such has been the conduct of the British ministry towards the Spanish Americans. But as soon as these republics had succeeded in driving the Spanish forces out of their respective territories, and had gained some stability, the British government changed its policy, and was anxious to recognize, officially, their agents and ministers. England, by her ambiguous policy, had gained what others, and particularly the French government, had lost under the too well known Count Villele.

The British government has been highly applauded as the saviour and protector of Spain and Portugal; and also as having greatly contributed to the freedom and independence of Spanish America. But by developing facts, and closely examining the tortuous policy of Lord Castlereagh, when prime minister of England, we shall see that this applause has not been fully merited.

The situation of England relatively to France, in 1808-9-10, was that of Carthage in relation to Rome. Napoleon's continental system, supported by his numerous legions and his colossal power, menaced the total ruin of the British commerce and industry, and even its political existence. The wealth of England, in productions and merchandise, could be of no avail without a market. Contraband trade, even in all its multiplicity and extent, was of very little importance, compared with free, active, and direct commerce. The European ports of Spain and Portugal alone re-

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mained open for England. If Napoleon had conquered the Peninsula, Europe would have been shut against all direct commerce with her inhabitants. England was driven to a desperate game; all possible sacrifices were ventured, not to deliver Spain and Portugal only, but principally to preserve these countries for the commerce and safety of Britain.

Napoleon, it is true, was afterwards no more to be feared; but a rupture between Great Britain and Spain, in 1814, (for which the latter had given more than one cause,) would have been very favorable to the commerce of the United States of America.

The neutral system, or rather tortuous course, pursued by the British government previously to the too short ministry and the lamented death of Mr. Canning, has cost millions of dollars, and the lives of more than 600,000 souls in America, and has ruined the Spanish colonies for a long course of years. But British commerce has gained by the destruction, the misery, and the ruin of others.

Every well informed politician must remember the active part which the British ministry took during the French Revolution; their conduct in the last events in Naples, Savoy, Piedmont, and Spain; as also at Verona, at Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli; in Greece, in Brazil, and Buenos Ayres; and time will discover the policy of the famous Duke of Wellington in regard to Portugal, Russia, and Turkey.

This neutrality during the civil war of Spain and her colonies, has given to England not only wealth and an extensive commerce, but the name of having saved and protected the newly established republics!

It is just, however, to mention that the English nation highly disapproved of these ministerial principles of Pitt and Castlereagh, and took an active interest in favour of the independence of the republics. So did the opposition in both houses of parliament; and this will never be forgotten by any enlightened friend of rational and well-established freedom and independence.

CHAPTER IV.

Situation of Venezuela in 1808—Arrival of Captain-General Emparan, and Lieutenant-Colonel Simon Bolivar, at Laguaira, from Spain—Emparan's Administration—Details of the Revolution at Caracas, 19th April, 1810—Venezuelan Junta—Spanish Regency—Conspiracy—Commencement of Hostilities—Marquis del Toro—Miranda's arrival at Caracas—Congress—Executive Power—Patriotic Society—Islenian Conspiracy—Declaration of Independence—Military Operations of Miranda—Project of a Constitution—Situation of the Republic in 1811.—[Years 1808—1811.]

After having given a short account of what had passed in Europe in relation to Spanish America, and particularly to Venezuela, it will be necessary to give a general idea of the situation of the eight provinces, which, at that time, formed the captain-generalship of Venezuela.

Captain-general Don Juan de Casas was secretly in favour of what was then termed the French party; and much inclined to favour the views of Napoleon and his brother Joseph.

As no vessel other than those under Spanish colours could enter any seaport belonging to the Spanish crown in America; and as all letters, pamphlets, gazettes, and books, of whatever description coming from Europe, were ordered to be collected, and sent directly to the captain-general at Caracas, before they could be delivered to the persons to whom they were directed, under heavy penalties upon the master of the vessel on neglecting to comply with the order; it was easy for the governor to open the letters, to examine the papers and gazettes, and to deliver or suppress what he thought proper. He retained all the proclamations, orders, &c. coming from the different authorities in Spain (of which I have spoken before) in opposition to the French invasion. The inhabitants of Venezuela were kept in total ignorance of the events in Spain, particularly of the revolution of Aranjuez, the escape of Manuel Godoy, the bloodshed of the 1st of May in Madrid, &c., until the arrival of the English captain, Deaver, in July 1808, mentioned in the preceding chapter.

Captain-general Casas not having it in his power to prevent this English officer, as he did every Spaniard arriving on the Main, from communicating freely with the inhabitants of Caracas, they now became informed of the real state of things in Spain. The effects of his communications, which I have already mentioned, placed the Captain-general Casas in a very delicate situation. Moreover, some of the most influential men in Caracas secretly insinuated that he might have been interested in concealing the truth.

This news made a deep impression upon the minds of some few liberal and enlightened inhabitants of Caracas, who could not conceal their fears, that, through the critical and miserable situation of Spain, their own country would be left unprotected and helpless, in case of a sudden hostile invasion. Their fortresses were ill provided, and poorly garrisoned. Their troops were half clothed and half fed. The inhabitants were divided in their political opinions; and the government and its officers corrupt and indolent. These persons were convinced that the establishment of a good junta would give more energy and activity to the government, and would well suit the time. They therefore made out a short memorial, in which they showed the advantages of such a measure; and proposed that the captain-general should still retain his authority, and act as president of the junta. They also, therein, formally recognized their beloved Ferdinand as king. They caused this memorial to be circulated among their friends, in order to collect their signatures.

They recommended, first, that measures should be taken at once to quell the fears of the inhabitants of Venezuela, respecting the measures taken by the Spanish government in regard to them; secondly, that a more effective government should be given to the province of Caracas; thirdly, that efforts should be made to repair the abandoned state of Venezuela.

Notwithstanding that this plain and frank exposition was necessary for the interests of both Venezuela and Spain, and that it was made without any intention of changing or shaking the authority of the captain-

general, he ordered the arrest of the authors, and of the signers of it, and threw them into prison. But public opinion was in favour of the measures proposed by them; nothing criminal appeared in their conduct, and they were released. The real causes of their release were, the strong remonstrances against such arbitrary conduct, and the fear that it might produce serious consequences—perhaps a revolution. Among them were the Marquises del Toro and Casa Leon, both very wealthy and influential men; the son of the Count del Tobar, and various other young gentlemen of the first families in Caracas.

The arrival of Sir James Cockburn, governor of Curaçao, at Laguaira and Caracas, and the formal recognition of the authority of King Ferdinand, relieved the captain-general from his critical position. He saw plainly that the majority was openly in favour of the Bourbons, and he changed his policy accordingly. But the members of the great Junta, assembled at Madrid, having received some hints of General Casas's secret inclination, (suspected rather than clearly proved,) resolved to send another person, more openly devoted to their views.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand being proclaimed king of Spain and India, the authority of the captain-general was fully established, as his representative. But his administration was unpopular with the inhabitants.

Such was the situation of Caracas, when, on the 24th of March, 1809, three Spanish men of war, and about twenty transports, with the new captain-general, Don Vincente Emparan, the Brigadier-General Fernando del Toro, Lieutenant-Colonel Bolivar, and

his lady, with a great many civil and military officers and others, arrived at Laguaira. The new governor, some days after his arrival, was solemnly installed in office. General Emparan was a man of some talents and knowledge; he was good, just, of easy manners, and very humane. He began by putting in order the finances, and other departments. He embellished Caracas, maintained a good police, which attended promptly both to the cleanliness and the security of the streets and public market; and by his good and popular qualities, soon rendered himself beloved and respected. His great defects, as chief, were, that he was too confident, and too obstinately attached to the regency of Spain.

Soon after his arrival, news reached Caracas of the flight of the Spanish central jünta from Seville to Cadiz, of its dissolution, and of the nomination of a regency, entrusted to govern Spain and her colonies. This regency sent a proclamation to South America full of flattering promises, in order to gain its inhabitants. The same vessel brought tidings of the rapid progress of King Joseph in Spain, and of the regency possessing no more than Cadiz, the Villa of Leon, and a part of Galicia and Catalonia. The inhabitants became convinced that no reasonable hope could be entertained of protection from Spain, and of preserving a good understanding with the captain-general, Emparan, who, surrounded by bad counsellors, imperiously demanded a blind submission to every thing coming from the regency. They were also convinced that Cadiz and the remainder of the Spanish territory would soon be forced to submit, and that the regency

would, then, of course, be regarded as an unlawful authority. But as General Emparan was active, vigilant, jealous of his authority, and, as yet, very powerful, they could not act openly against him, and were obliged to use some stratagem.

The leaders of the revolution having fully ascertained the general discontent, which, indeed, was how strongly expressed against the governor, fixed upon Maunday Thursday, 19th April, 1810, for the execution of their plan. Among them were the alcalde [mayor] of Caracas, Don Martin Tobar, Francisco Salias, Mariano Montilla, &c. On that day an immense crowd of people were assembled, in order to witness the procession, which departed from the cathedral, and passed through the principal streets of the city. Before the procession began, the captain-general had summoned a council of the Royal Audiencia, at which he always presided.

On that day the leaders assembled in the public square, with their arms concealed, determined to strike the blow. They were sure of a majority of the inhabitants, many of the officers of the queen's regiment of the line, and nearly the whole battalion of veterans, composed of 800 chosen men, formed in lines, and then in waiting for the procession; so that 3000 armed men were assembled, and ready to act at the first signal.

When the captain-general, having dismissed the royal audencia, came out of the chapel to join the procession, with his retinue, Don Francisco Salias, one of the most determined of the leaders, came forward and told him he had a matter of the highest

importance, to reveal, on account of which he requested his excellency to go back to the chapel, where he would explain himself before the council of the royal audiencia. The general replied, "he could not grant him his request at present, because the procession was waiting for him, but that he would be ready to hear him as soon as the procession was ended." "No, no!" objected Salias, vehemently, "your excellency cannot delay a moment; you must absolutely hear me without waiting a single minute." His numerous companions now exclaimed, all at once, that it was a matter of the highest importance, which admitted not of the least delay. During this time the leaders surrounded the governor so closely that he could not advance a step. One of them, by accident or otherwise, coming close upon him, touched his arm. The governor, greatly incensed, treated him very rudely before the eyes of his companions; but, perceiving the mob to increase every minute, he became embarrassed, and at length yielded, and ordered the council to reassemble.

Salias entered the council room alone, and addressed the president, Emparan, in the following singular manner:—"Your excellency is an honest man; your excellency is a respectable and worthy magistrate, sincerely devoted to his Majesty, our beloved sovereign, Don Ferdinand VII.; but your excellency has been induced to insult publicly one of my friends, and no body could have advised you to commit such an act of injustice but this hypocrite, this impostor and miserable auditor, who sits next you," (pointing to the auditor, Vicente Anca, who was really one of the

most unworthy of Spaniards, and generally detested.) The governor, confounded by such language, nevertheless nodded his head at every flattering expression of Salias, and protested that he was correct in saying that he, the governor, was faithfully attached to his beloved king and master, Ferdinand. Anca being his private counsellor, to whom he was much attached, and in whom he placed the greatest confidence, he attempted to defend him; but Salias interrupted him, and repeating his compliments, added, "that he came in the name of more than ten thousand of his countrymen, to demand justice and the immediate arrest of this hypocrite; and that he, Salias, and his friends, had placed such confidence in the probity and uprightness of character of the governor, that they were persuaded his excellency neither would nor could any longer suffer that such a notorious enemy of the people should be seated at his side," &c.

The governor, intimidated by the boldness and firmness of this speech, and perceiving that Salias was powerfully supported, abruptly ordered the arrest of Anca, who tried to speak, but without success. He was sent to prison; passing through the square amidst the huzzas of an immense crowd of people.

Encouraged by this first success, Salias demanded the arrest of various other members of the royal audiencia, which was effected in the same manner. During this, some of the numerous friends of Salias entered the council room, and surrounded the governor and the rest of the counsellors, who were forced to submit to the wishes of the leaders. They had beforehand prepared a written declaration, in form of a

decree drawn up in the name of the royal audiencia, and its president, the Captain-general Emparan, in which was stated, 1st, That he, Don Vicente Emparan, with all the other members of the royal audiencia, *voluntarily* abdicated their functions, and were resolved to retire from public affairs: 2nd, That the royal audiencia should be succeeded by a junta, which should take charge of the administration and the government, &c.—Each member of the royal audiencia, after signing his own destiny, was separately confined in his own house, with liberty to go out of the country when and withersoever he should think proper.

The new government was proclaimed and installed the same day, under the name of "Provisional Junta of Venezuela, Conservatrix of the Rights of his Majesty King Ferdinand VII." The principal members of this junta were, Don Jose de Las Llamosas, a native Spaniard, president and first alcalde; Don Martin Tobar, second alcalde; Baltazar Padron, Andreas Moreno, and Diego Jugo, members. They commenced business by sending the ex-captain-general, Emparan, the regent, the auditors, the members of the high court of justice, the ancient Cabildo, and various other persons, to jail; whence they were sent, by sea, to the United States of America.

The junta abolished the toll money and duties in the custom-house, the capitation upon the Indians, and the impositions upon slaves. They occupied themselves about the freedom of commerce and the national industry. They decreed to give to the provinces of Caracas, and to the British ministry, official

information of the change of government. As soon as this change was known in the provinces, a similar junta was installed in each of them.

The junta of Guayana recognized, at first, the authority of that of Caracas; but soon afterwards refused to recognize any other authority than that of the regency at Cadiz. This change was attributed to the influence of the European Spaniards, who formed the majority of this junta. Those of Cumana and Barinas sent deputies to Caracas, demanding the convocation of a congress, and refusing to acknowledge the supreme authority of the junta in the capital.

The Spanish governor at Maracaybo, Don Fernando Millares, greatly dissatisfied with what had taken place at Caracas, ordered the deputies sent to him by this junta, with strong menaces, out of his presence. They passed from Maracaybo to Coro, the governor of which province, Cevallos, arrested and shipped them for Porto Rico, where they were put in irons. The earnest representations of the English Admiral, Sir Alexander Cochrane, at last, effected their liberation.

The provisional junta at Caracas, thought proper to notify officially to the regency at Cadiz the change which had taken place in the government of Venezuela, and declared, at the same time, its *cordial wishes for the welfare of the mother country, and the conservation of the royal authority on the Main, &c.* The junta said nothing of submission to the regency. Their declaration was in conformity with the laws of the Indian Codex, in which it is expressly said, "The Americans shall know no other authority than that

of the king, as president of the council of India." As the king was a prisoner, the regency treated this omission as high treason, deserving exemplary punishment. After having consulted the great council of Castile and that of India, they published against Venezuela a violent manifesto, dated Cadiz, August 3; and they decreed that the provinces should be treated as rebel and revolutionary, and declared their coasts in a state of blockade, with the exception of the provinces of Maracaybo and Coro, which formally recognized the authority of the regency, and took no part in the revolution of Caracas.

The regency, soon after, received despatches from various other American juntas, expressing the same sentiments of submission; and some offered to assist the Spaniards in their struggle against Napoleon. None declared any intention to separate from Spain. But meanwhile, none spoke of recognizing the authority of the regency. This uniformity of opinion throughout the vast provinces of the Spanish colonies, deeply exasperated the members of the regency. All proposals of accommodation or negociation were rejected. They talked only of rebellion, and demanded implicit and blind submission to *their* laws and decrees!

Civil war was now declared, and, in the public papers of Cadiz, the inhabitants of Spanish America were treated by the regency,—and at later periods by the Cortes—as rebels, who must be subdued by force of arms.

Don Ignacio Cortavaria departed from Cadiz for Porto Rico, authorized to employ every means to sub-

due the Venezuelans.—He said, in one of his proclamations, "that the inhabitants of the Main should *first* depose their existing government, and promised *then* to hear every complaint, and to do them justice *afterwards*." He endeavoured, by intrigue, to induce the clergy of Venezuela to send agents in order to spread discord and trouble. In one word, he neglected no means to fulfil his commission.

The junta of Caracas, soon after, felt the effects of Cortavaria's intrigues. Millares, the new captain-general, residing at Maracaybo, and Cevallos, governor of Coro, joined him, and excited several riotous disturbances.

A Spaniard living at Caracas, Don Francisco Gonzales de Linares, was designated as the leader of the counter-revolution party, whose object was to drive out the provisional junta, and replace it with a new one, composed entirely of native Spaniards. But, at the decisive moment, Linares hesitated; instead of giving, at midnight, the expected signal, he remained inactive. The conspiracy was detected; he and a number of his companions were arrested without any noise, the same night, and put in irons.

Hostilities now began, and the junta were obliged to put themselves in a state of defence. The Marquis del Toro was named general-in-chief of the army. Every where recruits and arms were collected, and soon after, the Marquis marched upon Carora, to suppress a revolt, and maintain order. After various operations and combats of little importance, the campaign of 1810 was closed, when the news reached Caracas of the sudden arrival of General Miranda,

at the island of Curaçao, from London. He had letters of introduction from the Duke of Cambridge and Mr. Vansittart, to the English governor of that island. He came under the name of *Martin;* and after a short residence, he embarked on board an English vessel for Laguaira, where he landed, and came to Caracas, in spite of the secret orders of the provisional junta to its agents in London, to hinder his coming to Venezuela, his native land. Miranda, being informed of this secret order, changed his name, and came without any attendants. In giving this secret injunction to their agents, the provisional junta were actuated by a dread of the great talents and patriotism of the general. It is said by some, that the order was given to prove the moderation of the junta, in regard to Spain.

Miranda was received with great enthusiasm and solemnity; the festivals of every description lasted many days; and he was every where followed and surrounded by a crowd of people. His influence decided the question of having a congress; and the provisional junta, in conformity with this decision, ordered the election of deputies in each province separately.

The junta, before the convocation of the congress, had designated a committee to draw up a project of a constitution to be submitted to congress. The majority of that committee agreed to propose a federal government, as best adapted to present circumstances. Miranda, who was a member of the committee, sent another plan, which he had proposed at the time of his expedition against Carthagena in 1806. This

plan differed very little from the Spanish mode of governing its colonies. It was, as instructed and able men have assured me, adapted to the spirit and character of the people; but it created him many enemies. As soon as he arrived at Caracas, some individuals began to fear his popularity and influence. But the true friends of a wise and moderate liberty were sincerely attached to him, and publicly disapproved of all the intrigues and secret murmurs against him. Miranda himself despised them; and, in spite of all opposition, he was nominated commander-in-chief of the land and sea forces, and member of the congress, which opened its session the 2d of March, 1811, under the presidency of Dr. Philip Paul.

On the 4th of April, the congress appointed three of its members to form the executive power; but fearing that this executive commission, composed of Dons Juan Escalona, and Mendoza, and Dr. Baltazar Padron, might make too great encroachments upon the rights and privileges of the people, the congress gave them but very limited power.

The anniversary of the revolution of Caracas, 19th of April, was solemnly celebrated by festivals and illuminations. The public spirit was excellent. But this state of things did not subsist long. After a while, the government sunk into indolence, the natural result of a too greatly restrained executive power. It had neither authority nor energy. The congress was perplexed, and uncertain what means to employ in order to give more strength and consistency to its government. During this time, a great number of the European Spaniards, dissatisfied with

the government, formed a very serious conspiracy, known under the name of *the conspiracy of the Islennos,* (men born in the Canary Islands.) This conspiracy was denounced on the moment of its explosion; but those who were contemplating it observed, at the same time, the apathy of the members of the government; and their confidence in their government daily diminished.

The friends of independence thought the moment favourable for action. The sittings of the patriotic society were more frequent, and its powerful members declared publicly that nothing could save the country but to declare it free and independent of Spain. The impolitic conduct of the Regency and the Cortes afforded sufficient reasons for such a declaration; and the inhabitants of Caracas, many of whom were people of colour, listened to such a question with joy, because they conceived from it great hopes of a more secure and honorable existence. The measure was generally supported; and some members proposed the question of independence, in the congress then assembled.

After long and animated discussions, the question was decided, and *Venezuela* was declared to be a *republic, free and independent of any foreign dominion* (by a decree of July 5th, 1811.) In the manifesto, congress mentioned the persecutions suffered during three hundred years, and developed the reasons which determined them to this resolution, which they declared to be sincere and irrevocable.

On the same day the Spanish colours were cut in pieces, and exchanged for a three-coloured flag. The

portraits of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. were taken down, and trailed through the streets of Caracas, with the outcry of "Long live the Independency!"

This event greatly discouraged the other conspirators, without extinguishing the machinations of the Islenos, who, being resolved to strike a heavy blow, assembled in great numbers, on the 11th of July, at three o'clock in the afternoon, in one of the suburbs of Caracas, called *los Teques*, in order to march thence united and well-armed against the government. Their design was to put to death the three members of the executive power, and the most influential members of the congress, and to arrest the others, and deliver them to the regency at Cadiz. They intended, afterwards, to reinstate the old Spanish government.

General Miranda hesitated not a moment. He united some armed men, and marched against the rebels. The government would not trust the regular army, knowing that many of them were native Spaniards, and having reason to fear some understanding with the rebels. General Miranda, after an obstinate battle, surrounded and disarmed them, and confined a great many in jail. Sixteen of the ringleaders were shot in the course of the same month.

This conspiracy had various ramifications. The inhabitants of Valencia, dissatisfied because congress had refused to grant their request to form a separate province, revolted openly. Miranda again marched against the rebels, and, after great resistance, took possession of their city, and condemned ten of the leaders to death.

Government, strongly supported by the military operations of general Miranda, acted with energy, and inspired confidence. The army was in a good state, and strong enough to defend the new republic. Commerce began to flourish, and every thing was going on well. But this happiness was soon dissipated, by an event which I shall relate in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V.

Earthquake at Caracas, and its Consequences—Particulars of Bolivar's entry into the Army, and of his nomination as Governor of Porto Cabello—Capitulation at Vittoria—Dissolution of the Republic—Arrest of Miranda at Laguaira—Anarchical State of Venezuela under the Government of Monteverde—Cruelties of the Spaniards—Monteverde's solemn Entry into Caracas.—[1812.]

THE clergy of Caracas, secret and powerful enemies to the republican form of government, (because congress had reformed many of their oppressive and pernicious privileges,) took this occasion to revenge the supposed insult; and a great many friars, monks and priests, raised their voices and preached in the streets to the terrified people, that this was a punishment well deserved by the authors of innovations so impious and criminal. One who was present, assured me that he had never before heard such rhetoric from clergymen, the ministers of divinity, of modera-

tion and of clemency. The impression was so profound, and the terror so general, that all who had not confessed or received the sacraments for some time past, were now anxious to do so; others, who had lived in concubinage, prostrated themselves before the priests in church, supplicating to be united in marriage before God. Monteverde had, some time before, increased the number of his corps; and, happening to be before Carora on the day of the earthquake, he attacked and took it.

Public confidence was destroyed; the paper money of the republic, which, before the earthquake, had become depreciated, was now reduced to nothing; and the situation of congress became extremely difficult and perplexing; not less so than when, some time afterwards, Miranda received the news that Porto Cabello had fallen into the hands of the Spaniards.

It is proper to insert here, all that I have yet to relate concerning Lieutenant-colonel Simon Bolivar, so as not to interrupt the course of events which, in rapid succession, took place after his arrival at Caracas from Spain.

Bolivar retired, with his lady, to San Mateo, one of his country places, in the valley of Aragua. He had the misfortune to lose her soon after their arrival on the Main. At the beginning of 1810, the principal leaders of the intended revolution were desirous to see Lieutenant-colonel Bolivar among them; and his cousin, J. Felix Ribas, offered to sound and gain him over. He was a brave, daring, and high-spirited young man. He was rich also, and was intimate

with Bolivar. As the latter was rich, and his father had great influence with the regiment of militia of the plains of Aragua, the leaders expected a powerful support in gaining over the son, who was beloved for his generosity. Ribas had an interview with Bolivar, who treated the attempt as a foolish and impracticable one. After various private conversations, Ribas found that Bolivar was not to be gained over. The resolution of the 19th of April, therefore, was made without Bolivar's participation. During that and the following days, as is known to all who were there at the time, he came not at all to Caracas, but staid at San Mateo.

When the patriotic junta assembled at Caracas, its members, among whom Bolivar had various friends, were anxious to see him take an active part in their new government; and proposals were made to him to choose a civil or a military office, with the assurance that his choice should be complied with, but in vain. He declined every office, under the pretext of the state of his health. At last the junta proposed to him a mission to London, with the rank of colonel in the militia, and in company with his friend Louis Lopez y Mendez. This offer he accepted; and they both departed for London in June, 1810.

The patriotic junta hoped, in vain, for the powerful support of the British cabinet. The two deputies could obtain nothing but leave to export some arms, at a great price, as I have before related. Bolivar, much disgusted, after a short stay, left London, and came with these arms to the Main, leaving Mendez in London. Shortly after he retired again, and de-

clined all military service under the orders of the general-in-chief, Marquis del Toro.

On the arrival of General Miranda, and his nomination as commander-in-chief of the army of Venezuela, he prevailed on Bolivar to accept the grade of lieutenant-colonel of the staff, in the regular army, and the command of the strongest fortress in Venezuela, Porto Cabello, which is a fine sea-port. He assumed this command in September, 1811.

Miranda sent his prisoners of war, regularly, to Porto Cabello, where they were confined in the citadel. In June, 1812, these prisoners revolted. They succeeded in killing their guards, and in taking possession of the citadel, which is separate from the city. Some of Miranda's officers censured Bolivar, because he had not carefully enough inspected the guard specially entrusted with the prisoners, and because he had not promptly rallied his numerous garrison, and endeavoured to overcome the prisoners, which, as they were unarmed, they said might easily have been done. Bolivar, however, secretly left his post, embarked precipitately with eight of his officers, (among whom was Thomas Montilla, a brother of the then intendant at Carthagena,) and withdrew in the night without the knowledge of his garrison. He embarked in an armed schooner, commanded by a Danish captain, at that time in the service of Venezuela, and arrived at day-break at Laguaira, leaving behind, his garrison, large magazines of powder, arms, military stores, &c. From Laguaira he retired to San Mateo, and sent Thomas Montilla to General Miranda to notify to him this event.

The garrison at Porto Cabello, waiting in vain for orders, saw, at day-break, that the commander had departed; and, judging that all was lost, retired in good order, leaving the place to its fate. Monteverde, though astonished at the evacuation, seized the occasion, and took possession of Porto Cabello. This event increased his force. He had been destitute of every thing, and had not a single strong sea-port where he could receive the necessary supplies from abroad. Porto Cabello gave him about 1,200 prisoners of war, now liberated, vast stocks of munitions of war, arms, &c., and one of the best harbours in Venezuela.

When the news arrived at Vittoria, the head-quarters of General Miranda's army, that Porto Cabello was lost, every one was astonished and dispirited. Miranda soon felt the effect of this loss. Many of his officers left the service, and a great number of the men deserted.

Monteverde wrote Miranda a letter, which the latter sent to the congress, and received from them authority to treat with the Spanish general. In virtue of the treaty (of the 26th of July, 1812, ratified at Vittoria) it was stipulated.

"1st, That the constitution presented by the Cortes to the Spaniards should be introduced in Venezuela, and recognized by its inhabitants.

"2nd, That no person, to whatever class or rank he might belong, should be persecuted or troubled for his political opinions; and a general amnesty was solemnly promised.

"3rd, That all private property should be sacred and respected.

"4th, That any one might leave Caracas and Venezuela, and retire where he pleased, without the least obstruction."

In consequence of this treaty, Caracas came again into possession of the Spaniards. The republican congress was dissolved; and the republic of Venezuela no longer existed!

General Miranda passed from Vittoria to Caracas, intending to leave the country, and embark on board the English corvette Sapphire, the commander of which, Captain Haynes, was ready to receive him. This circumstance, connected with the secrecy of his arrival at Curaçao from London, his assuming the name of Martin, his letters of recommendation from the Duke of Cambridge and Mr. Vansittart to the governor of Curaçao, (at that time in possession of Great Britain,) his constant correspondence with the English government through Curaçao, and his frequent interviews with the commanders of English men of war, who delivered him numerous letters from England,—rendered him suspected; and many Venezuelans believed that he had treacherous views against his country.* His enemies were increased by his own conduct;—he answered various interesting questions in a dry and short manner; and he became very unpopular.

He preferred English and French officers to his own countrymen—saying, that these were ignorant brutes, unfit to command, and that they ought to learn the use of the musket before they put on their epaulettes, &c.

* Miranda was born in Caracas.

These circumstances induced his enemies to prevent his voyage to England, and were the cause of his arrest. The following facts, being little known, deserve to be mentioned here, as Colonel Bolivar was one of the three who took a leading part in the arrest.

In the afternoon of the 30th July, General Miranda arrived at Laguaira, at the house of the military commandant, the republican Lieutenant-colonel Manuel Maria Casas, who every moment expected to be relieved by a Spanish garrison, which should take possession of the city and ports of Laguaira, in conformity with the treaty of Vittoria. Miranda met a great company, and among them the English commander of the Sapphire, Doctor Miguel Penna, civil governor (jefe politico) of Laguaira, and Lieutenant-colonel Simon Bolivar. All the company expected Miranda. He arrived, fatigued by the heat of the day; and, after having refreshed himself, was invited to stay to supper, and to sleep that night on shore. Captain Haynes strongly objected, and urged Miranda to go with him on board, where he would find every comfort, his secretary, servants, trunks, &c. He added, that he wished to sail immediately, that the land breeze would soon rise, &c. But Bolivar, Penna, and Casas, told the captain that the general was too tired to be able to embark that night, and that the land breeze would not spring up until ten o'clock in the morning; so that he might then be on board in due time. Miranda hesitated; but he consented to remain. Captain Haynes took leave, visibly

dissatisfied, but promising the general to send his boat and take him on board.

The company sat down gaily to supper; and Bolivar, no longer fearing the authority of his commander-in-chief, commenced an apology for what had happened at Porto Cabello; but Miranda would not hear of past events, and talked on indifferent topics with him and the rest of the company. He then, being aged and fatigued, begged leave to retire to rest; and took an affectionate leave of all the three.

By order of Casas, a bed was prepared for Miranda in a closet which could not be locked. While he slept, the triumvirate were contriving their plan, or rather the best mode of executing it. The plan, as I am well assured, was formed by Doctor Miguel Penna, a member of the congress, and a great enemy of Miranda. The steps of the latter were carefully watched. Information of his being about to embark, as stated above, being obtained, Doctor Penna, on his way from Caracas to Laguaira, called on Don. J. C., at his seat lying between the two cities, and proposed to him to join in the plot, and aid in the arrest of Miranda, who he said was a traitor to his country in signing the treaty of Vittoria. That honest man told Penna that the plot was abominable; and entreated him, but in vain, to desist from it. Penna left him in a hasty and irritated manner; and soon after the arrest of Miranda, Don. J. C. was arrested, put in irons, and thrown into one of the dungeons of Laguaira. This, he never doubted, was the result of the doctor's vengeance.

Bolivar arrived first at the house of the commandant Casas, where he was some hours after joined by Penna. They communicated their project to Casas, and he joined them. Miranda had yet too many friends to render his arrest practicable in the day time.

Captain Haynes afterwards told some of his friends, from whom I had these particulars, that he had a certain forboding that mischief would happen to Miranda, and therefore urged him to go on board; but that he feared to speak more plainly, lest the others should understand him.

Miranda was arrested in the following manner. Having ascertained that he was sound asleep, the three leaders, after a short consultation, determined to seize him that night, and give him up to the Spanish commandant, Monteverde. Casas, as military commandant at Laguaira, ordered a strong detachment from the principal guard. This detachment he commanded to surround his own house in perfect silence, to suffer no one to pass, and to kill any who attempted to escape. Not a word was said of Miranda. When all was ready, Penna, Casas, and Bolivar, at two o'clock in the morning, with four armed soldiers, entered the unlocked room of General Miranda. He was in a profound sleep. They seized his sword and pistols, which he had placed before him. They then awakened him, and abruptly told him to rise and dress himself quickly, and follow them. Miranda, in surprise, asked them why they awakened him at such an early hour, it being not yet daylight. Instead of answering the question, they told him he was a traitor, who deserved to be hanged, &c.

Unable to resist, he dressed himself and was forced to follow. They escorted him to the fort called San Carlos, at some distance from Laguaira, and situated upon a strong hill, where he arrived, exhausted from fatigue and chagrin. Having borne all the invectives they chose to load him with on the road, during which he was obliged to walk, as soon as they were come to the fort they ordered him to be put in irons; and notwithstanding his pathetic and fervent expostulations, he was locked in one of the darkest dungeons and treated like the vilest criminal.

The three chiefs returned with their guard to Laguaira, and the same night despatched an express with a letter to the Spanish general, Monteverde, informing him of the arrest of Miranda. This commander was surprised at the intelligence; but instead of ordering the immediate release of Miranda, and so preserving inviolate the faith of his own treaty, he received the news with his accustomed indifference and apathy, and took no step in favour of Miranda or against him.

The day after Miranda's arrest, a Spanish column arrived in the fort of San Carlos, to relieve the independents. Its commander was surprised to find Miranda in irons, and sent him immediately with an escort back to Laguaira, where he was again shut up in a dark mephitic prison made in one of the walls of that place, and where he remained in irons during several months. The Spanish commandant, Don Francisco Xavier Cerveres, who had relieved the patriot commander, Casas, gave orders to send Miranda to Porto Rico. He was thence transported to Cadiz,

where he remained in irons, in the fort of La Caraca, for some years, and perished.

Such was the miserable end of General Miranda. Without entering into any political controversy—without enquiring whether Miranda was a traitor to his country, (which well-informed men affirm not to have been the case,) history will demand what right Dr. Miguel Penna, Don Maria Casas, and Simon Bolivar, had to arrest their former chief and superior. That they did so without order, information, or participation of the Spanish general-in-chief, Domingo Monteverde, is an undoubted fact.

The earthquake, the weakness of the captain-general, Millares, and the treaty with Miranda, in a short time rendered the midshipman, Domingo Monteverde, master of a beautiful province, general-in-chief of an army, and sovereign arbiter of about a million of souls. Monteverde was weak, apathetic, and superstitious. The friars, monks, and priests, had the greatest influence over him. So also had the Islennos, inhabitants of the Canary Islands, where he was born, and of whom many were established at Caracas, Laguaira and Valencia. These all persecuted their enemies, abused their power, and ruined many thousand inhabitants.

When the particulars of General Miranda's arrest were known at Caracas, and it was ascertained that Monteverde acquiesced in it, all the friars, monks, and Islennos gave a loose to their passions, and Venezuela again became the theatre of frightful scenes. The following are selected out of thousands of facts. Monteverde had with him two favourites, both dis-

tinguished by their cruel and sanguinary conduct. He tolerated their most daring atrocities. Both were colonels — Joseph Antonnanza and Juan Suasola. After the treaty of Vittoria, 26th of July, 1812, many troops—whole corps—passed from the republican to the Spanish army, and presented themselves to Monteverde, whose head quarters were then at Valencia. On the 30th of July, some forty of these soldiers came to the Spanish general, and offered their services. Monteverde received them with kindness, and ordered Colonel Suasola to take an escort and protect them on their road to Caracas, where new Spanish corps were to be formed. Suasola was displeased at being obliged to leave Valencia, (where it is said he had an intrigue.) He obeyed, however, and selecting a strong detachment of men entirely devoted to him, he departed with his charge. After some hours march, he ordered a halt, and a circle to be formed by his troops, and the patriot soldiers to be placed in the centre. He then drew his sword, and, in few words, exhorted his troops to kill these "d——d rebels,—to follow his example." He then fell upon them with his sword, and, assisted by his troops, murdered, with sword and bayonet, every individual of these republican soldiers.

Suasola, gay and satisfied, returned to Valencia. Monteverde, knowing that he could not have made his journey in the short time of his absence, enquired, in surprise, what was the matter. "Oh, general," replied Suasola, laughing, "I have found out an excellent way to shorten my voyage," giving him at the same time to understand, by an unequivocal sign,

that he had murdered the men placed under his care. "Oh! very well, very well," said Monteverde, "I did not know; it is well done—very well done." Suasola, it need not be told, remained unpunished, and free as before.

The same Suasola, encouraged by this criminal weakness, entered the city of Aragua some time afterwards, where the inhabitants came out some distance, in solemnity, to meet and honour a man who was known to be one of the favourites of their new commander-in-chief. He arrived at the public square, where refreshments were prepared for him and his troops. After having spent merrily more than an hour, he gave a secret order to his troops to seize men, women, and children, and cut off their ears, and bring them to him. This savage order was executed, notwithstanding all the cries, supplications, and resistance of the inhabitants. He ordered some trunks to be filled with these sanguinary trophies, which he sent to his companion and friend, Colonel Antonnanza, then governor at Cumana, with a pathetic letter, requesting him to "accept this present as a proof of his zeal in the cause of his beloved king, Ferdinand VII." This conduct was highly praised by his friend, and a part of the trophies were sent by him to Caracas. Some of them he wore in his hat, by way of cockade; and, painful to relate, his vile example was followed by various inhabitants of Cumana. But I must add, many did it through fear; it being the practice of the Spanish troops to threaten all who did not follow their example.

Colonel Antonnanza, as well as Suasola, committed

the most barbarous acts throughout the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, in which they commanded. The former, having heard that the inhabitants of Araura had been distinguished in the last war by their patriotism and their zeal for independence, resolved to punish them in an exemplary manner. In violation of the solemn promise of amnesty, he marched with a numerous body of troops upon the city of Araura. Many of the inhabitants, well aware of his cruelty, fled hastily, but the greater number remained, being assured by his emissaries that he was coming with pacific intentions, and that he would faithfully observe the amnesty. After this, a great many persons, particularly women and children, came to welcome him, offering whatever their wretched circumstances could afford. He took the refreshments, and suddenly gave orders to murder every man, woman, and child. Of this horrid massacre many circumstances are known, which my pen refuses to describe. Antonnanza and his troops plundered and burnt the city, and Monteverde remained quiet.

His government was, in reality, nothing but the most complete and sanguinary anarchy. Each commander of the smallest detachment followed his own will and caprice. The vast territory of Venezuela was again the theatre of murders, cruelties, and every sanguinary deed, committed without the consent of Monteverde, who, if he heard them, when some few dared to complain, could not afford them any redress, his authority being usurped by these chiefs, who despised his weakness, and did every thing according to their own will and pleasure.

In consequence of this weakness, not a single article of the treaty of Vittoria was fulfilled. Each Spaniard or Islenno became an accuser, or a tyrant; and the prisons were soon so crowded, that at Caracas and Laguaira the commanders were obliged to convert various large houses into prisons. Want of air and food caused various maladies, and many thousands fell victims to their confinement.

One evening, whilst a stranger was with Monteverde, upon some business, the secretary handed him some papers to be signed. He took and signed them one after another, and handed them back to the secretary. While the latter was in the act of withdrawing, Monteverde, in the manner of one waking from a dream, enquired their contents? "They contain," answered the secretary, with a smile, "orders to arrest some mischievous individuals; and he departed with them, without another word from the general-in-chief. The stranger, who was on good terms with Monteverde, could not repress his feelings, but with frankness and warmth, pointed out the consequences of such proceedings. "What can I do, sir," replied Monteverde; "to know their crimes, is it not necessary first to secure their persons? Afterwards they will be tried and judged!" No enquiry was made relative to the supposed crimes, and a great many, arrested for political opinions, perished miserably in prison.

Monteverde, anxious to maintain his ill-acquired authority, consulted his friend and countryman, the naval post-captain, Don Jose Antonio Tiscar, as to how he should act in these critical circumstances.

The captain advised him to write to his legitimate chief, the captain-general, Don Fernando Millares (whose cowardice had frightened him from Maracaybo to Coro, and thence to the island of Porto Rico), inviting him to come and take into his hands the civil authority, and the command of the army. Such was the weakness of Monteverde's character, that he followed this advice in spite of his own wishes and intentions. As soon as Millares received this letter, he hastened to embark with a numerous suite, and landed at Porto Cabello. Monteverde was then at Valencia; whence he wrote a second letter to Millares, telling him that Venezuela, not being entirely pacified, it would be detrimental to the cause to install him at that moment; and that all had better remain as it was for a short time, when he would put into his hands the power which properly belonged to him. He added, that he himself should then depart for Spain, where he hoped to be rewarded by the Cortes for his zeal and services.

Millares, believing he should take possession of his new and brilliant charge, without having done any thing to deserve it, came over to Porto Rico with a number of civil and military officers, all anxious to be employed. Among the latter were the Mareschal de Campo de D. T. Cagigal, and the Brigadier-general Fierro. Some friends of Millares, of stronger and more courageous minds, advised him to march without delay to Caracas, where the Spanish government was already established, and to take possession of the office which the regency and Cortes had entrusted to *him*, and not to Monteverde. But Millares

refused to follow this advice, and preferred sending the Brigadier Fierro to negociate with Monteverde, and learn definitely his intentions. Fierro arrived at Monteverde's head-quarters, and had various conferences with him; but he was obliged to return with the simple verbal answer, that Monteverde neither could nor would change his last determination—not to deliver the command into the hands of the captain-general before all was pacified.

Millares humbly submitted to the will of his subaltern, and departed for Maracaybo, where he waited several months for the expected message from Monteverde. Perceiving at last that he was the object of ridicule, he left the Main and his supposed grandeur for ever, and returned as paymaster (contador) to Spain.

As soon as Monteverde was sure that the captain-general had departed, he proclaimed himself captain-general, and commander of the naval and land forces of Venezuela; and, leaving Valencia, made his solemn entry into the capital of Caracas, on the 9th August, 1812.

Before this, he issued a proclamation, full of the highest promises. "Caraguins!" said he, "the time is at last come, when you can enjoy perfect tranquillity and security, from which you were driven two years ago by artifices and crimes. I promise—I pledge my oath now to you, that I can and will protect your felicity. Let us forget all that has passed; for my part, I will give you a proof of this intention, by forgiving your errors, and maintaining, in all its vigour, the treaty of Vittoria, and never shall you have reason to complain of me."

On the very day of his entry into Caracas, however, the people, both there and at Laguaira, committed the greatest disorders. All strangers established in the time of the republic, in both cities, were very ill treated; the mob took all they possessed—plundering their houses and stores. Many of them were arrested and thrown into prison, whence they escaped with the greatest difficulty.

Such was the anarchical state of Venezuela under the government of Monteverde. Before I close this chapter, I will relate some particulars yet unknown to the world, relative to the origin of his usurped power.

When the revolution began, and Emparan was arrested, the regency appointed Millares, then governor of Maracaybo, to be captain-general of Venezuela. He was proclaimed as such in the provinces still in possession of Spain. And when hostilities began, he came from Maracaybo to Coro, where he ordered the sea forces to assemble, in readiness to assist him in his military operations.

Among the officers of the navy was Domingo Monteverde, an inhabitant of the Canary Islands, without education and possessed of very little knowledge; but ambitious and enterprising. He begged leave to come on shore, and presented himself before the new captain-general, Millares. He was poor and badly clothed. The general received him with a haughty and disdainful air, asking him, abruptly, what he wanted. Lieutenant Monteverde answered, that he wanted his excellency's permission to raise a corps, of at least a thousand men, for the purpose of driving the insurgents out of the country, or subject-

ing them to their duty. Millares, astonished at his request, replied that he was an audacious subaltern, that he should immediately return to his duty in his vessel, and that he must not come again to trouble him with such demands; and thereupon he dismissed him. Monteverde, not intimidated by the ill humour of the general, continued, in such an original kind of way, to represent to him the usefulness of such a corps, that the general could not help being diverted; and at length very graciously granted the order so perseveringly sought by the lieutenant, who now obtained orders to take from the vessels of the squadron, old muskets, swords, and uniforms; and in a few days the new commander found himself at the head of 200 vagabonds, who afterwards increased to the number of as many thousands.

Such was the origin of the power of Domingo Monteverde; and we have seen how he afterwards treated his chieftain and benefactor.

CHAPTER VI.

Departure of Lieut.-Col. Bolivar from Caracas to Curaçao and Carthagena—Expedition of Bolivar against the Spanish in Venezuela—His entry into Caracas—His nomination as Dictator.—[Year 1813.]

We left Lieut.-Col. Bolivar with Doctor Miguel Penna, and commandant Casas, at Laguaira, after having arrested Miranda in the port of San Carlos. Bólivar returned quietly to his country-seat, where

he resumed his usual occupations. But he soon observed that vexations and arrests became more and more frequent, so that he felt little assured of his own safety. Soon after the entry of Monteverde into Caracas, he had an audience of this Spanish commander, who received him most graciously, and expressed to him his satisfaction that he, Bolivar, had been an instrument in punishing the traitor Miranda, that rebel to his king. He readily granted him a passport to leave the country; and hearing it was his wish to go to Curaçao, he gave him a letter of strong recommendation to the same English merchant of whom I have already spoken, and who was on his departure from Porto Cabello, urging him to take Col. Bolivar as passenger in his own vessel. Bolivar joined him, and found him on board, ready to sail. As soon as Mr. F. L. opened Monteverde's letter, and found that the name of the bearer was Simon Bolivar, he expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of his conduct towards Miranda, and, without permitting him to offer a word in reply, ordered him to leave the vessel, telling him that no consideration would have induced him to receive him on board. Bolivar attempted in vain to justify himself. He was compelled to leave the vessel and go on shore. But, soon afterwards, finding another vessel, he embarked with his cousin, Joseph Felix Ribas, for Curaçao, where he passed some time, devoting himself to gambling and other amusements: the two cousins possessing a large amount in gold. After about six weeks, they left Curaçao for Carthagena, where they were well received.

At that time (1812) Manuel Rodriguez Torrices was president of the republic of Carthagena,—an honest, good, and liberal man, by profession a lawyer,—who received every stranger with kindness. He promoted the two cousins, Bolivar and Ribas, (who offered their services in the republican army under the command of a Frenchman, Peter Labatut,) at the instigation of the latter, to the rank of colonels. Previous to their arrival, a great number of Caraguins, who had served under Miranda at Venezuela, came to Carthagena, and all were anxious to hear news of the events in their own country.

Colonel Ribas, brave and patriotic, (the same who was one of the leaders of the revolution in Caracas,) inspired them with his own zeal and ardour, and proposed to them to form an expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela, for the purpose of delivering his countrymen from their yoke. He told them they could not fail to be joined by great numbers, as soon as they should arrive on the frontiers of Venezuela. All the Caraguins, and a number of strangers who had served under Miranda, received this proposition with rapture; and Ribas immediately proposed Bolivar, then a colonel, as commander of the expedition. Bolivar was not beloved; for his vanity, pride, and coldness, rendered him unpopular. He was known also to have left his garrison at Porto Cabello, and to have participated in the arrest of their beloved old general, Miranda. However, Ribas, who was sincerely attached to his cousin, managed affairs so well, that they consented at last to name Colonel Bolivar their commander-in-chief, with the express condition

that Colonel Ribas should be his major-general, and second in command.

These circumstances, trifling as they may appear, were the origin of the subsequent grandeur and military power of General Bolivar; who, as I shall prove by facts, has ever had the fortune to profit by the bravery, skill, and patriotism of others. When Ribas was killed, Bolivar fled. Piar conquered Guayana in the absence of Bolivar, and was condemned to death; Brion died in poverty when Bolivar was at the head of the government; Paez was victorious when Bolivar was not with him, and beaten when the latter directed the operations; Sucre gained the battle of Ayachucho, in Peru, when Bolivar was sick.

The plan of an expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela was immediately communicated to the president in Carthagena, who highly approved of it, and authorized such officers as would follow this new expedition, to quit the service of that province and join it. He gave orders that they should be provided with money, arms, ammunition, provisions, transports, &c., and persuaded his cousin, Colonel Manuel Castillo, to join Bolivar, with about 500 men from the garrison of Carthagena, and to assist him in his enterprize. Bolivar, assisted by Ribas, Bricenno, and others, enlished about 300 men; and with these and Colonel Castillo's troops, he departed in the beginning of January, 1813.

After some days' march, a dissention, relative to the right to command, arose between Bolivar and Castillo, and increased to a great height. Colonel Castillo pretended to the exclusive command of the troops

from Carthagena, because the president had entrusted to him the 500 men. Bolivar represented that the same president had authorised him to command in chief the whole expedition. An inveterate hatred, as is well known, has long existed between the inhabitants of Caracas and Venezuela and those of Grenada. The former generally despise the latter. Thus a division was soon established between the two parties. The troops of Castillo, all Grenadans, and the most numerous party, began to insult the Caraguins, who very properly recognized Bolivar as commander-in-chief of the expedition. The strangers took the part of the letter, and every thing foreboded a general and serious conflict. It was plainly the duty of Castillo to declare himself under the orders of Bolivar, and to soothe and appease his troops; instead of which, he suddenly departed, and returned with them to Carthagena. He excused his defection by saying, that the haughty and despotic character of Bolivar could never agree with his; and, strange to relate, this desertion remained unpunished.

This conduct of Castillo was a ground of bitter and lasting hatred between him and Bolivar, who, as soon as he was informed of the nomination of Castillo as commander-in-chief of the army of Carthagena, in 1815, warmly remonstrated with the government of Carthagena on the subject, as we shall see hereafter.

Bolivar remained with about three hundred men, and was so discouraged, that he thought to go back to Carthagena, for the purpose of obtaining a further supply of troops, fearing that the expedition might otherwise fail entirely; but Colonels Ribas and Bri-

cenno pursuaded him at length to pursue his course at least as far as Bogotá, at that time the seat of the congress of New Grenada, where they assured him he would find support. He consented, and embarking on the river Magdalena, they arrived at the city of Mompox, where they were perfectly well received, and supplied with money and provisions, and some hundred recruits. Besides receiving more troops and large supplies for his expedition, Bolivar had the satisfaction of being received, with his small corps, with great distinction by the congress at Bagotá.

The inhabitants of New Grenada, having heard of the vexations and cruelties committed by Monteverde and his subalterns in Venezuela, were excited to such a pitch of indignation, that Bolivar, named general, with his cousin, J. F. Ribas, met volunteers wherever they passed, so that his troops in a short time increased to the amount of more than 2,000 men. Having passed the Andes in the provinces of Tunja and Pamplona he crossed the river Tachira, which separates New Grenada from Venezuela.

Every circumstance favoured the splendid enterprise of General Bolivar; the farther he advanced, the greater were his resources. As soon as he had crossed the river Jaihira, his proclamations, spread throughout the country, united many thousands of his countrymen, who saw in him their deliverer from destruction and despair. He was now able to divide his forces into different corps, and to detach Colonel Bricenno to Guadalito for the purpose of organizing there a strong body of cavalry, of which he was in great need. This was done in a short time; for the

richer classes in the neighbourhood were so anxious to serve in the expedition, that they voluntarily armed, equipped, and mounted themselves, at their own expense.

Bolivar marched directly against the enemy, who, by his sudden appearance, were surprised, astonished, and discouraged. The Spanish army, being composed three fourths, as usual, of Creoles, these deserted by hundreds; entire corps—battalions—regiments—came over to the independents, so that Bolivar found but a very feeble resistance wherever he appeared. He beat his enemy at La Grita, and took possession of that small place, as he did afterwards of Merida and the whole district of that name, and also of the province of Barinas.

The Spaniards, having rallied and reinforced themselves, fell suddenly upon the corps of Bricenno, and beat him completely. He and seven of his officers were taken; and the governor of Barinas, Don Francisco Tiscar, ordered them to be shot. Eight of the most respectable inhabitants of Barinas, being suspected of having assisted Colonel Bricenno in his organization, were also shot! From that time, the war became much more bloody and murderous. Not only was every prisoner shot, but various Spanish chieftains extended this system to the peaceable inhabitants, without distinction of sex or age!

The reason the governor (Tiscar) gave for ordering the death of Bricenno and his officers was, their having been the principal instigators and signers of the proclamation of January 16th, 1813; in which they declared that they would put to death all Spa-

niards and Islennos (inhabitants of the Canary Islands) that might be taken prisoners.

Of that sanguinary document, the following are the true causes:—"Bolivar and his companions, while upon their march from Carthagena to Venezuela, heard that the Spaniards and Islennos committed the most barbarous acts upon the peaceable inhabitants in Venezuela, who, in virtue of the convention between Miranda and Monteverde, had confidently resumed their former occupations." It will be remembered that Monteverde was born in one of the Canary Islands. Surrounded as he was, by numbers of his countrymen, he was weak enough to concede altogether to their passions, and their hatred against all who took an active part in the revolution at Caracas. This news so enraged all the Caraguins, companions in arms of General Bolivar, that they published a solemn declaration, in form of a manifesto, in which they proclaimed the "war of death" against all the European Spaniards and the Islennos. The manifesto was signed by Antonio Nicolas Bricenno, (the same who was shot at Barinas,) Antonio Rodrigo, Joseph Debraine, and others, all officers under the orders of General Bolivar in his expedition against Venezuela. The Spaniards accused Bolivar of signing this sanguinary declaration, and said he began the proclaiming of the "war of death;" but he never did sign it. To be sure, he should not have suffered the publication of a paper so strongly characteristic of the bitterness of both parties. But it is true, on the other hand, that the European chieftains put to death not only various American prisoners of

war, but likewise peaceable inhabitants, before the manifesto was published; and that the officers of General Bolivar acted in retaliation of what these Spaniards had done to their countrymen at Venezuela. Whether such retaliation be justifiable or not, is left to the reader.

We will now occupy a moment with a personage who has been for several years the colleague and rival of General Bolivar; and who has acquired one of those equivocal reputations which it is the province of history to set in their true light.

Soon after the conclusion of the capitulation at Vittoria, and when the cruelties of the inhabitants of Venezuela had begun, a weak and ignorant, but very ambitious young man, assembled about 100 of his fellow citizens out of the city, (Cumana,) where they held secret meetings. He excited them to rise against their oppressors, and to arm themselves in favour of liberty and independence. His speech was received with enthusiasm, and he was unanimously named general-in-chief. This is the military origin of *San Yago Marinno*, who, from a student, rose suddenly to the station of general-in-chief of the army of the province of Cumana, which did not reckon 150 soldiers. The cruelties of the Spaniards soon brought him many adherents, who were the more attached to him, as he was of a mild, polite, and humane character, He established his head-quarters at Maturin.

As soon as General Monteverde heard of this, he ordered General Cagigal to join himself with his strong brigade, appointing the day when, and place where, they should form their union, to attack

the troops, posted at Maturin, under General Marinno. Monteverde took no more than 200 men, and having arrived at the place of rendezvous, he found neither Cagigal nor his troops. Monteverde, anxious for the combat, positively refused to listen to any prudent counsel, and in a fierce tone gave orders to attack "these traitors and rebels." The patriots were six times as strong as he, and advantageously posted. After a short conflict, he was totally routed, as his officers had predicted. His horse being killed, he would have fallen into the hands of the patriots, if the presence of mind of a reverend capuchin, named father Coronil, had not saved him. Coronil was fighting bravely at his side: when the horse fell, he seized the general, and, with his nervous arms, without dismounting, placed him upon his own vigorous horse, and made full speed from the field of battle.

When General Cagigal, who arrived 24 hours after the defeat, learned how imprudently his commander had acted, his indignation was excited. But instead of attacking with his own strong corps an enemy weakened and fatigued by the recent combat, he was discouraged, thought all was lost, and that the whole province of Venezuela must become the prey of the patriots. He declared publicly that he would take refuge in the province of Guayana, to save himself and his troops. His strange declaration so exasperated one of his captains, Joseph Thomas Boves, who heard it, that forgetting the respect due to his commander, he boldly remonstrated against so base a step. But seeing that the panic of his general rendered him incapable of listening to reason, and that

he had resolved at all events to depart, Boves told him, plainly and bluntly, that he might act as he liked, but that, for his own part, he was firmly resolved to remain in Venezuela, and there combat the enemies of his king and country, as long as one of them should exist! Cagigal, seeing that Boves was inflexible, authorized him to organize a body of troops for his purpose, as numerous as he could collect, and then departed, with a strong escort, for the purpose of putting himself in safety in the fortress of St. Tomas de la Angostura, in the then subdued and quiet province of Guayana.

Boves, having rallied as many as would follow him, came in April, 1813, to the city of Calabozo, where he established his head-quarters. He soon organized his corps of infantry and cavalry, which amounted to about 500 men. This was the origin of that famous partizan, who was distinguished afterwards, during the war, by his astonishing activity, bravery, and skill, but still more by his barbarous cruelty, of which I shall have more than one instance to relate.

Marinno, proud of his little success, now took the title of general-in-chief, and dictator of the eastern provinces of Venezuela. He imposed great contributions, established a luxurious mode of living, created generals, officers of the staff, and others, and a great many civil officers, but he had no fixed territory, nor any well-instructed officers, and still less had he any well-disciplined soldiers. He had, as is usually the case where troops are hastily raised, a band of armed men, without uniforms or instruction.

During these events in the provinces of Cumana

and Barcelona, General Bolivar entered the western provinces of Venezuela. He was joined by many thousands of his countrymen, who, driven to despair by the cruelties of the Spaniards, had no choice but to fight or perish. He divided his forces into two strong corps, gave the command of one to his major-general, Ribas, and put himself at the head of the other. Both proceeded, by forced marches, through different roads, to Caracas, crossing the department of Truxillo and the province of Barinas. The Spaniards were beaten easily at Niquitao, Betioque, Barquismeto, and Barinas. At the last place, Governor Tiscar, like General Cagigal, thought all was lost, and deserted his troops. He fled to St. Tomas de la Angostura, in the province of Guayana, where, like the other, he found himself in safety.

As soon as General Monteverde was apprised of the rapid progress of the patriots, he rallied his best troops at Lostaguanes, where General Ribas attacked him soon afterwards. The attack had but just commenced, when the greater part of his cavalry, composed of natives, passed over to the patriots, and soon decided the victory in their favour. Monteverde lost some hundreds of his men, and was obliged to shut himself up with the remainder in the fortress of Porto Cabello.

General Bolivar advanced rapidly upon Caracas, and found little or no resistance on the part of the enemy, who had concentrated his forces against the colomn of General Ribas. As soon as Governor Fierro heard of the approach of General Bolivar, he hastily assembled a great council of war, in which it

was concluded to send deputies to Bolivar, proposing a capitulation. This was made and signed at Vittoria, about a year after the famous capitulation between General Miranda and Monteverde. By this treaty, Bolivar promised that no one should be persecuted for his political opinions, and that every one should be at liberty to retire with his property from Venezuela, and go whithersoever he pleased.

While the deputies were assembled at Vittoria, Governor Fierro, seized, like Cagigal and Tiscar, by a panic terror, decamped in the night time secretly, and so hastily, that he left, as was afterwards ascertained, a very large amount of silver money. He left also more than 1,500 Spaniards at the discretion of the enemy. He embarked at Laguaira, and arrived in safety at the little island of Curaçao. The flight of their governor, of which the inhabitants and the garrison were not informed until day-break the next morning, threw the city into the greatest trouble, for he left not a single order. The Spanish party being dissolved, every one was left to provide for his own safety. Its principal chiefs, Monteverde, Cagigal, Fierro, and Tiscar, acting each in conformity with his own will, had all placed themselves in safety indeed, but without the least union or vigour. Monteverde remained in Porto Cabello without sending forth any order; Cagigal remained with Tiscar, at Angostura; and Fierro in the island of Curaçao.

It was therefore an easy task for Bolivar to enter the capital of his native land, and to take possession of the greater part of Venezuela. His entry into Caracas, (August 4th, 1813,) was brilliant and glo-

rious. The friends of liberty, who had suffered so severely, surrounded him from every corner of the country, and welcomed his arrival with many signs of joy and festivity. The enthusiasm was universal, reaching every class and each sex of the inhabitants of Caracas. The women came to crown their liberator. They spread the ground with many flowers, and branches of laurel and olive, on his passage through the streets of the capital. The shouts of thousands were mingled with the noise of artillery, bells, and music; and the crowd was immense. The prisons were opened, and the unfortunate victims of liberty came forth with pale and emaciated faces, like spectres from their graves. But notwithstanding this appalling sight, the people did not indulge their sentiments and feelings of vengeance against the authors of such cruel deeds. They committed no disorder. No European Spaniard, Isleton, friar or priest, was dragged from his hiding-place, nor even sought for; all were happy, and thought only of rejoicing.

The entry of General Bolivar into Caracas was certainly the most gratifying event of his whole military career. And notwithstanding that his enterprise and his victories were greatly facilitated by the astonishing pusillanimity of his enemies, he deserves great praise for his perseverance, and for the conception of such an undertaking, in which he sacrificed a considerable part of his fortune to furnish his troops with the means of following him. But here I cannot omit to mention a singular and characteristic trait of that vanity of which I have already spoken. Previous to

his entry into Caracas, a kind of triumphal car was prepared, like that which the Roman consuls used, on returning from a campaign, after an important victory. Theirs was drawn by horses; but Bolivar's car was drawn by twelve fine young ladies, very elegantly dressed in white, adorned with the national colours, and all selected from the first families in Caracas. They drew him, in about half an hour, from the entrance of the city to his residence; he standing on the car, bare-headed, and in full uniform, with a small wand of command in his hand. To do this, was surely extraordinary on their part; to suffer it, was surely much more so on his. Many thousands were eye-witnesses of the scene;—to them I appeal for the truth of this account of it.

The enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Caracas lasted but a short time. Bolivar, inflated with his sudden successes, assumed, in the capital, after a few days, the title of "Dictator and Liberator of the Western Provinces of Venezuela," in emulation of General Marinno, who had taken the title of "Dictator of the Eastern Provinces." The denomination of Eastern and Western arises from the geographical situation of the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona, which lie east from Caracas, of which Marinno was entire master. Bolivar gave the name of "liberating army" to all those troops that came with him; and established an order of knighthood, called "the Order of the Liberator," which exists to the present day, with this alteration, that the singular, "del Liberator," has been changed into "la Orden de los Libertadores," in the plural. He established a choice corps of troops,

called his body-guard, expressly and exclusively destined to his personal service, appointed to it a great many officers of the staff, and others, and was soon surrounded with flatterers and sycophants.

Various true friends of liberty, and of the dictator's glory, advised him to assemble a congress, and to establish a representative government, like that of the first congress at Caracas. Among them was the late admiral of Colombia, Louis Brion, who died at the island of Curaçao. I might mention various others. Bolivar answered them, that he wished to consider this advice, but that it would be inconvenient, for the present, to assemble a congress.

Meanwhile he organized his government, in which he united in himself the three powers,—legislative, executive, and judicial; in virtue of which, he became absolute master of the liberty, property, and lives of his countrymen. He named to offices those who could flatter him most. This dictatorship was nothing more nor less than an absolute, despotic, military government.

The eight beautiful provinces of Venezuela were now divided between three military chieftains, viz. General Monteverde, commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces which occupied the provinces of Guayana, Maracaybo, and Coro; General Bolivar, dictator in the provinces of Caracas, Barinas, and Margarita; and General Marinno, dictator in those of Cumana and Barcelona.

Each of these chieftains had his governors, generals, commandants, civil and military officers, and troops; who all lived at the expense of the inhabitants. Each

of them raised, armed, organized, and equipped troops, issued proclamations, manifestos, and decrees. These bulletins were often so inflated and involved, that it was extremely difficult to ascertain their meaning; and what was worse still, they frequently interfered with each other, insomuch that it was impossible to decide which ought to be obeyed. To-day, a city, town, or village, was occupied by troops of one of these chieftains; to-morrow by those of another. The subalterns and soldiers were, of course, masters of the inhabitants; and they ordered immediate supplies of money, provisions, and all other necessaries. There were no laws, no regulations, no order; bayonets, and the caprice of each little armed band of soldiers, so called, were, for the time, rulers of the citizens. A stronger band drove them out, and new vexations, new demands, new provisions, were the order of the day. This anarchy rendered the inhabitants of Venezuela so miserable, and so doubtful on which of these governments to rely, that many of the most distinguished natives realised what they could of their fortunes, and embarked with their families in search of another country, where security of person and property might be found. The United States of America and the West India Islands received many thousands of them.

It is a curious and astonishing proof of the imbecility of General Bolivar's character, (of which I shall give more than one example,) that, powerful as he then was, he suffered a young, inexperienced, and ignorant individual, San Yago Marinno, to raise himself to be his rival, when he might have brought

him to act under his orders. This eastern dictatorship was nothing but a division of the territory of the republic of Venezuela, as already established by the congress assembled at Caracas in 1811. The provinces of Cumana and Barcelona then made an integral part of its territory, had been always governed by the first congress, like the other provinces of Venezuela, (except Guayana, Coro, and Maracaybo,) and ought never to have been separated from them. This division of power, this rivalry between the two dictators, had the worst effects upon the welfare of the inhabitants, and upon the righteous cause of liberty. It lessened, considerably, the strength of each, and increased the power of the enemy. It caused the extraordinary duration of the war, and the loss of the lives of so many human beings more.

When the inhabitants of the other provinces heard of General Bolivar's arrival at Caracas, a new hope arose for their deliverance and freedom; and numerous volunteers, from all quarters and corners, came to offer their services to the new dictator.

The funds found in the royal treasury, and those voluntarily offered, united to the revenues, should have been sufficient to organize these volunteers into corps, and to discipline them so that they might have been able to expel their discouraged and diminished oppressors from their territory for ever. If General Bolivar had possessed common talents in the art of war, and for civil government—nay, if he would have followed the advice of able and experienced men, it would have been an easy task, in the space of three

months, to finish this bloody war, and to give freedom and happiness to his unfortunate countrymen.

In the month of August, 1813, Bolivar was far more powerful than any sovereign now living in the world, in proportion to the country and the resources of the people. Both sexes, of every colour and description, (and among them many Spaniards, Islennos, monks, and priests,) were anxious to assist him who so solemnly promised them freedom and prosperity. The enthusiasm of the time spread its sacred light through the whole country; it awakened the indolent inhabitants of the immense steppes and plains, known under the name of the Llaneros, who afterwards so singularly distinguished themselves under the orders of Paez, Sedenno, Zarasa, Roxas, Monagas, and others. Money, merchandise, horses, mules, cattle; even jewels, pearls, diamonds, golden chains, and other ornaments of the fair sex, were offered, with the kindest readiness to Bolivar, to assist him in his glorious enterprise.

Nothing, therefore, was wanting, but ability to unite, classify, and direct these vast materials and resources, and skill and inclination to surround himself with men of probity, experience, knowledge, talents, and prudence. To them he might have confided the direction of the different and complicated branches of his new government. All these they would have simplified, establishing the strictest economy in each department. The most successful, the most brilliant results would have been obtained, and Bolivar himself would have deserved to be compared with Washington.

But to the great detriment of his country and the cause of freedom, Bolivar rejected the advice of the friends of rational liberty. They advised him to a course of prudence, and to the enacting of wise laws, for the purpose of introducing economy and order into his new government. He formed a government of his own, such as it was. It consisted of four secretaries of state, one at the head of each of the departments, namely, of the interior, of justice and mercy, or pardon, [*de justicia y gracia,*] of the finances, and of war. All received their orders and instructions directly from the dictator, with whom they wrote in his cabinet, when he had the leisure and pleasure to receive them. Every thing was submitted entirely to him, and his decision rendered a person the most fortunate or the most wretched being.

He alone directed all military operations, by sea and land, issued proclamations, and made regulations and laws. He united in himself all the powers and attributes of an absolute and despotic sovereign. Anxious for his authority, he never suffered another to decide in any case; and, wishing to do all himself, he confounded every thing, for every thing was done in a hurry. Moreover, Bolivar, like most of his countrymen, loved ease and his pleasures better than exertion. His favourite occupations were, being in the company of his numerous mistresses, and lying in his hammock surrounded by his flatterers. They amused him with their stories, and their satirical and witty sallies on absent persons who had had the misfortune to displease the dictator. The most important business was left in the hands of these flatterers, par-

ticularly of Segnorita Josephine M., his acknowledged mistress, who had the greatest influence over him, and who was extremely intriguing and vindictive. I have seen her more than a hundred times, and must confess that I could hardly account for the dictator's predilection for her, which lasted, however, until 1819.

These occupations consumed much of his time; the remainder was spent in riding out and in business. Each of his secretaries of departments presented him a summary report of what had been transacted in his office, and also a summary proof of what ought to be done. In one word, Bolivar wished to imitate Napoleon Bonaparte; and was highly pleased when Charles Soublette told him, in my hearing, at Carupano, in May, 1816, that he was the Napoleon of South America.

His manner of governing was very prejudicial in its consequences. Its defects were soon felt in the army, in the navy, in every branch of the public administration. The public revenues were insufficient, and the want of money was felt every where. The dictator had expended large sums upon his mistresses and his flatterers: other large sums, indeed, were employed in the purchase of arms, ammunition, and warlike stores from abroad; but a great part was spent upon the companions, flatterers, or relations of the dictator, who took the money, departed, and returned no more.

This want of money was not easily supplied; and the measures adopted by the dictator to procure money, were a greater evil than the want of it. These

measures justly made him many enemies. Among others may be cited the extraordinary taxes, arbitrarily laid upon individuals designated by him, and demanded at his pleasure, without order or system. Some one, for example, told him that Don N. had sums of money concealed, or that he was an enemy to the common cause. Bolivar immediately sent a detachmen of his body-guards, in the night, to the house of N. They surrounded it, and, in the name of the dictator, penetrated suddenly to his bed-chamber, where the officer notified to him that his master wanted money, and named a sum to be given into the hands of the officer. At another time, the sum demanded was required to be paid within a certain number of days. If the inhabitant, for whatever reason, did not comply, he was put into prison, and harshly treated, until, by the help of friends or in some other way, he obtained the means of complying with the demands of the dictator.

When the impartial reader recollects what happened at Laguaira and Caracas, in April and May, 1827, upon the seizure of some American merchants, who were put into prison because they would not pay an extraordinary tax imposed upon them by the president liberator, although they alleged that the government owed them a much larger sum, which they had advanced, for which they held treasury obligations, (vales), and that Bolivar refused these, and persisted in demanding their cash; he will not be surprised on hearing what the same individual did, in 1813, at Caracas.

Were I to relate all that happened during the

twelve months of the dictatorship of Simon Bolivar, I should form another large volume. It will suffice to say, that the anarchy of Monteverde gave way to another anarchy more insupportable to the inhabitants of Venezuela, because they expected from their countryman any thing but what he actually brought upon them.

In August, 1813, the dictator sent a body of troops, under the command of Colonel Giraldat, to besiege the castle of Porto Cabello, the same which he himself, as its governor, had deserted a year before. General Monteverde, after his defeat at Maturin, had shut himself up in this place, and was again defeated by General Ribas, at Lostaguanes. He was greatly exasperated against the dictator Bolivar, whom he had so kindly received, and so strongly protected, after the active part he had taken in the arrest of General Miranda. Monteverde not only gave a passport to Bolivar, and his cousin Ribas, but recommended him strongly to a merchant of Curaçao, (Mr. Fr. L——, who was ready to sail,) being fully persuaded that Bolivar would retire and take no further active part in this war. He said publicly, that he had been betrayed by the dictator, and would have nothing more to do with him. In truth, Monteverde never would treat with Bolivar afterwards; but twice sent back his negociators without admitting them or their letters into his presence.

The inhabitants of Porto Cabello were exceedingly exasperated against Bolivar, on account of his deserting that fortress while in command of it; and learning that he had sent a strong body of troops to force

them to surrender, they made every effort in their power to resist him. They first set an example of resistance to the garrison, by organizing and arming themselves at their own expense, and by openly declaring that they would make every sacrifice in their power, before they would submit to be placed again under the power of that commander.

The dictator, apprised of what passed in the interior of the place, gave orders to blockade it by sea and land; but the squadron could not intercept the five transports from Cadiz with 1,500 chosen troops, under the command of Colonel Salomon, besides a great supply of arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores.

Before the arrival of this convoy at Porto Cabello, it directed its course towards Laguaira, which its commander supposed to be still in the possession of the Spaniards, though General Ribas had taken it some time before. He had only 400 men, and these poorly equipped and disciplined. The latter was a skilful, brave, and active man. When the squadron was descried, he rightly supposed them to be Spanish vessels, and immediately ordered the Venezuelan to be exchanged for the Spanish colours. This convinced the squadron that the place remained under the power of Spain. They approached and anchored about half a gun-shot from the batteries of Laguaira. The proper dispositions were made to land the troops; which consisted of the fine regiment of La Grenada, commanded by Colonel Salomon, and of some artillerymen. Ribas meanwhile had disposed every thing so to receive them, as to destroy, with one blow, their

hopes. He set at liberty some Spanish officers who had been made prisoners of war; and among them the former governor of Laguaira, Don Felix Marmon. These he compelled to put themselves in full uniform. He then made a short and energetic speech to his own troops, who were frightened and discouraged by their situation, and believed they should all be taken and lost. This speech inspired them with confidence, and every one repaired with spirit to his post. Ribas had with him an intelligent, cunning Islenno, named Don Jose Antonio Meloni, whom, as soon as the squadron had weighed anchor, he sent on board, promising him great reward in case of his fidelity and the success of his stratagem. He instructed him to present himself before the Spanish commodore as the secretary of the Spanish governor, Marmon, and to invite him and his principal officers to do his master the honour of coming on shore, and partaking of a dinner prepared for them, as the governor was anxious to receive his goods friends and companions in arms. The commodore, on hearing the name of Marmon, was highly pleased to find that his good old acquaintance was on shore; and gave the necessary orders to put out the long-boat. Meanwhile Colonel Salomon came on deck, and examined the place (Laguaira) with his spy glass; he wondered at seeing so few people on the quay and in the streets, as he had been told by some officers on board, that the port was crowded with busy people. He communicated his observations to the commodore, and advised him to take the precaution of first sending

some officers on shore, who might ascertain the true state of the place, and return immediately and report it to him. The commodore followed this advice.

When Ribas saw the boat approaching, he sent the commandant, Marmon, dressed in full uniform, upon the quay, to receive his countrymen. He had instructed Marmon how to act, and what to say to the strangers, and had assured him of instant death in case of his deviation. He also dressed a number of his own officers, on whom he could rely, in Spanish uniforms belonging to the officers who were his prisoners of war, and sent them to accompany Marmon as a kind of staff. He gave them particular orders to watch his movements, and to kill him, upon the least suspicious action or sign; and he took care to acquaint Marmon with these orders. The boat arrived at the quay, but none of the officers landed, notwithstanding the reiterated and pressing invitations of Marmon to them to come on shore, where he said a good dinner waited for them at *his* house, and that he would send *his* long-boat on board for the commodore, and bring him to join the party. The officers only replied by desiring the commander's order to take him on board the commodore, who would be very glad to see him. After some other conversation from among the crowd assembled, voices were heard to say, "It is a treachery!" The officers pulled instantly from the quay, and arrived, in great consternation, on board the vessel of the commodore, to whom they made their report. The batteries of the place, and the surrounding forts, previously prepared for action

by General Ribas, now opened a heavy fire upon the squadron, which greatly damaged their vessels, and killed about 200 of their men.

In one of the sorties of the garrison of Porto Cabello, Colonel Giraldat, commander of the patriots, was killed by a musket-shot. His death spread such terror among the remaining troops, that they hastily raised the siege, leaving behind them their artillery, ammunition, baggage, &c.

Considering the death of Colonel Giraldat as an ordinary occurrence of war, every one was surprised when the dictator, Bolivar, ordered extraordinary funeral services to be performed in honour of him. Many songs (which exist at the present day) were composed in honour of Giraldat, representing him as a most extraordinary hero.

Monteverde gave the regiment of Grenada some days' rest after its arrival at Porto Cabello. Colonel Salomon, on learning the origin of the usurped power and grandeur of Monteverde, became jealous and offended against a commander whom he considered far inferior to himself; and this had fatal consequences for the Spaniards in Venezuela. When Monteverde ordered Salomon to put his regiment in readiness to join him, that they might march their united troops against Bolivar and Urdaneta, who were posted at Valencia, Salomon refused to give him a man from the corps under his command, and declared publicly that Monteverde was not worthy to give him orders. Such was the weakness of Monteverde's character, that, instead of punishing him, he condescended, in the

kindest and humblest manner, to beseech him, that he would be so good, at least, as to follow with his regiment. Salomon consented, but, as we shall see, from that time more heartily despised him.

Monteverde took from his garrison 500 very badly armed, undisciplined militia-men, and marched them, by the road of Agua Caliente, towards Valencia. He was followed by Salomon's regiment, about 1,300 strong, upon which he relied entirely. He advanced to Naguanagua, a small village not two leagues distant from Valencia, without the least rencontre; but without any care as to whether he was followed by Colonel Salomon or not. The dictator, apprised of the approach of the enemy, gave order immediately to evacuate the present position, with the strong division of General Urdaneta, and to retire toward the defiles of La Cabrera. There he entrenched himself. He ordered this hasty retreat, believing that all the forces from Porto Cabello were coming together upon him; but no sooner was he apprised with certainty that it was Monteverde with no more than 500 militia-men, and that the regiment of Grenada was yet remaining very quiet at Agua Caliente, seven leagues distant from Naguanagua, than he came back and gave orders to attack Monteverde. The latter not only resisted a force three times as strong as his own, but was beginning to repulse them. Bolivar was, as usual, at some distance behind, and could not, therefore, rally his troops. But General Urdaneta, putting himself at the head of his division, attacked and routed the enemy. Monteverde received a musket shot in his neck, which fractured

his jaw, and in part caused the loss of the action. The Spanish general retreated with the remainder of his troops towards Porto Cabello.

Bolivar and Urdaneta now marched upon the regiment of Grenada, which they encountered in a place too narrow to admit the display of the whole force on either side. The Spaniards, after some exchange of musketry, drove the patriots back; but Salomon, instead of pursuing his advantage, ordered a retreat. He entered Porto Cabello with his regiment on the 5th October; and received the well-deserved reproaches of Monteverde. The latter being unable any longer to command, the former, being next in rank, took the command of the Spanish army.

Several other actions were fought, which cost many lives on both sides, without any important result. Bolivar, being informed that Monteverde no longer commanded in Porto Cabello, sent a new negociator to Colonel Salomon. He chose for this military commission, Don Salvador Garcia, a *priest*. After the usual formalities, the priest was introduced before the council of war, which assembled for the purpose. He began a long sermon, as if he had been in the pulpit. "What are you doing, gentlemen?" said he; "would it not be better for you to surrender, and to live in peace and quietness, than to expose yourselves to the horrors of a siege, during which you would have to struggle against hunger and all kinds of misery?" &c. &c. Who would have imagined that such a singular and ridiculous speech, delivered to soldiers, would have made such an impression upon the officers present, as to gain three-fourths of them

in favour of the proposal to capitulate? One present, however, who was commander of the militia, and a merchant at Porto Cabello, was so shocked with the thought of capitulation, that he rose from his seat, and spoke vehemently against it. He ended his speech by saying, that "those who were afraid to defend the place, might go whithersoever they pleased to go." He brought over the majority to his opinion, and the proposal of the dictator was rejected. The clergyman thought proper to remain, and left Bolivar and his cause, embarking afterwards with General Monteverde, for the island of Curaçao.

The patriots, after having defeated the Spanish forces under Cevallos and Yanes, directed their attention against Boves, who had considerably augmented his forces. Since receiving the authority of General Cagigal to raise a separate corps, without limiting its number, he had assembled a great many slaves and coloured vagabonds, had opened prisons and other places of confinement, had armed the whole as well as he could, and had organized them in bodies of different kinds of arms. It was a confused assemblage of vagabonds and criminals of every description, who engaged themselves in the hope of plunder—in the prospect of committing every possible crime with impunity. Morales was the second in command of these troops, who afterwards increased to 8,000 men, and whom the Spaniards themselves commonly designated by the name of *la devision infernale*, (the infernal division.) These two chiefs, with their subaltern commanders, Puy, Rosette, Machado, and others, in all their marches constantly left traces of blood, and

of the most barbarous cruelties, of which I will relate some shocking instances, in the proper place.

When Boves left General Cagigal before Maturin, he retired to Calabazo, whither Marinno went with 1,000 men to attack and surprise him, confident of destroying this new enemy; but Boves, with his 500 men, routed him after a short conflict, on the 13th of December, 1813.

Boves now took very active measures to augment his forces. He levied heavy taxes and extraordinary contributions upon the inhabitants of the surrounding countries, threatening them with fire and sword, in case of refusal to pay them. He acted as if he had been absolute master and commander-in-chief. He took no advice. He entirely disregarded the authority of Monteverde, whom he considered as a usurper, and despised as a weak man. He organized a great number of guerillas, who procured him money, men, horses, and mules; and began his operations by attacking Camacagua, where he made some prisoners. He marched upon Vittoria, Rosette, Mumara, and the town of Chaguaramas, where he routed the enemy.

He again established his head-quarters at Calabazo, whence he sent out different parties, which took possession of the positions of Charaguave, in the neighbourhood of Caracas.

CHAPTER VII.

Discontent of the Inhabitants of Venezuela with the Dictatorial Government—Convention held at Caracas—Skirmish of Flora—Execution of 1,200 Spaniards by order of Bolivar—Action of St. Mateo—Mission of Deputies to London, by order of the Dictator—Victory of the Patriots.—[1813—14.]

THE rapid and unexpected success of Boves, and his sudden appearance in the neighbourhood of the capital of Caracas, the insurrection of various towns and places of the interior not distant from Caracas, in favour of the Spaniards, the vexations of the agents of the dictator, and his arbitrary measures, by which the public misery increased daily, made a very unfavourable impression on the minds of the Caraguins. The majority loudly imputed the fault to the dictator, Bolivar. They accused him of establishing a military and despotic government, putting the finances into the greatest disorder, neglecting to organize and discipline the troops, which were in a miserable condition, constantly opposing the formation of a congress; and uniting and zealously retaining the three powers in himself, in spite of the advice of the true friends of liberty. They complained that he acted as a sovereign and absolute master, following no other law than his own will or caprice. The fair sex, and particularly his favourite mistress, Segnorita Josephine Ma——, commonly called Segnorita Pepa, had the greatest influence in many nominations. Many young men, relations and friends of these female favourites,

and who had no other merit, obtained grades in the army, and lucrative offices, in preference to others. One of them, Charles Soublette, had, as I was assured, risen in a very brilliant and rapid career.

The dictator was soon apprised of the general dissatisfaction; and, perceiving his delicate situation, he followed the advice of some friends in assembling a kind of junta, composed of the most influential inhabitants of Caracas, which was held in the convent of San Francisco, in the capital, January 1st, 1814. His intention was to soothe the spirit of discontent, by appearing to comply with the general wish, by establishing a congress, and by rendering a favourable account of his administration during the dictatorship. He appeared on the 1st of January, 1814, in this well-attended assembly, surrounded by a numerous and brilliant retinue of his officers, with the secretaries of state, war, and justice, and followed by a strong body-guard. The square before the convent, and the streets through which he had to pass, were occupied by the troops. The three secretaries read long memoirs, in which each gave an account of the transactions of his department. After this, the dictator, placed upon an elevated arm-chair, rose and spoke as follows:

"Citizens! The hatred vowed against tyranny caused my departure from Venezuela, when I perceived my country a second time in chains; and the love of liberty called me back from the distant banks of the Magdalena. I have overcome all obstacles which opposed my march to liberate my country from the cruelties and horrors of the Spaniards. My

efforts have succeeded; the colossal power of the enemy has been destroyed, &c.

"I have consented to accept and keep the supreme power, in order to save you from anarchy, and to destroy the enemies who would have supported the part of tyranny. I have given you laws; I have organized an administration for justice and finance; finally, I have given you a government.

"Citizens! I am not the sovereign; your representatives will give you laws. The revenues of the government are not the property of those who govern you. Judge now yourselves, and without partiality, if I have sought the power to elevate myself above you, or if I have not sacrificed my life, my soul, every minute of my time, to constitute you a nation, and to augment your means, or rather to create them."

"I now aspire to transmit this power to the representatives which you will choose, and I am convinced, citizens, that you will give me leave to resign an office which many among you are competent to occupy; and my only request is, that you will leave me the only honour to which I aspire, that of continuing to combat your enemies; then will I never rest until I see liberty established in my country."

This speech was greatly applauded, and various motions were made. In one, the orator proposed to erect a statue to the dictator, which he had the good sense positively to decline. But another, Don *Hurtado de Mendoza*, (the same who was lately sent by the president-liberator as minister plenipotentiary to London, and who, in May 1828, was arrested at Kingston, in the island of Jamaica, for a debt con-

tracted in London, of £3,000 sterling, and released upon bail,) made a long speech, exerting himself to prove the *necessity of leaving the supreme power in the hands of General Bolivar*, until the congress of New Grenada could meet, and Venezuela be united under one government.

This proposal, in direct opposition to the sentiments of the assembly, was, nevertheless, adopted, because no one dared to oppose it in the *presence of the dictator* and his powerful retinue. Bolivar was therefore confirmed dictator of the western part of Venezuela, and nothing further was ever mentioned of the convocation of a congress, nor of any change in the present government.

I have translated a great part of the speech of General Bolivar, for the purpose of making a short comment. This, compared with the greater part of his speeches and proclamations, contains the same sentiments, and about the same protestations; all are filled with high phrases of devotion to the cause of liberty, and of love and attachment to his country, of profound submission to the will of the people, and above all, of a desire to resign his office, and to enter into the common class of simple citizens. From 1814, until the present day, (July 1828,) he has offered his resignation on every occasion. But, in fact, General Bolivar has never ceased to possess the supreme power; although a man who firmly resolves to resign power, is always able to do it. What did General Washington? and what has the present liberator done, from 1812 to the present day?

Some well-informed persons are confident that Bolivar, through some friends, suggested to Don

Hurtardo the idea of making this proposal in that assembly, for the purpose of sounding public opinion. If we compare this fact with what has happened in Angostura, in Lima, in Bogotá, in Carthagena, and now in Ocana, the ground of such confidence will be by no means doubted. General Bolivar, in his last message to the national convention, assembled at Ocana, in the province of Carthagena, which contained four closely-printed columns of the Gazeta del Gobierno, and was dated Bogotá, February 29th, 1828, speaks much more plainly, and gives us to understand that the military power is the support of civil society. He calls the members of the assembly, the legitimate representatives of Colombia, delegates from the people, "that sovereign authority of which he is the subject and soldier, and resigns into their hands the *mace* of the president, and the sword of the general." He draws a most appalling picture of the disorder and dangers of the republic. The main suggestions of the message are, that rights and selfish interests were alone heeded, but duties forgotten; that the public credit was threatened with utter ruin; that the government was essentially ill-constituted, all power being concentrated in the legislature; that the right of suffrage was too cheap, too much diffused; that the jurisdiction of civil authority in military cases ought to be no longer tolerated; that the want of a general system of police produced great confusion, and the grossest abuses; that the spirit of the army was sensibly deteriorated, owing partly to its subjection to the civil tribunals, whose doctrines are fatal to the strict discipline, the passive submission, and blind obedience, which form the basis of *military*

power, the support of the whole society; that subordination and discipline had been greatly relaxed, too, by the obloquy which was cast upon the head of the party by the writings of subalterns, and by the application of political principles to the military law, or police; *that the army did not receive half its pay;* that all the public officers, except those of the treasury, *had suffered the greatest misery and distress;* that Colombia could not expect to be regarded or valued by foreign states, unless her internal affairs were well managed;—in short, that a new distribution of power, that inexorable laws, were imperatively demanded; that a *stronger executive is indispensable;* and a firm, vigorous, and just government, is the cry of the country. The liberator finishes this long message by representing himself *as a simple citizen,* no longer distinct from the multitude, and implores from the convention a system under which the laws should be obeyed, the magistrate respected, and the people free.

We see, in this remarkable and characteristic document, the secret wishes of the president-liberator expressed in very clear and distinct terms. But to return to Caracas.

The dictatorial power was, in consequence of Hurtado's proposal, continued for the government of those provinces of Venezuela in the power of Bolivar and Marinno. Meanwhile the Spaniards gained more ground and greater force. Among the latter, Boves was most formidable, in regard to his skill, his activity, and audacity. Boves departed, February 1st, with 600 infantry, and 1,500 horse, from Calabozo, surprised the advance guard of the patriots at

Flores, and put every one of them to the sword. He marched afterwards against the corps of General Campo Elias, posted near the village of San Juan de los Morros, routed him, and killed all the prisoners. Boves was wounded, and forced to establish his head-quarters in the city of La Villa del Cura. He detached from thence two columns, one under the command of Captain Rosette, and the other under Morales, with orders to march upon the city of Caracas.

The inhabitants of this capital, alarmed at the approach of the enemy, raised in the greatest haste 1,000 men, entrusted them with the defence of the city, and gave them two field-pieces.

The Spanish division, under Yanes, having been beaten on the 5th of December at Araura, was totally routed. Their commander retired to Nutrias, and from thence to San Fernando de Apure, where he recruited quickly, so as to be enabled to take the field. He attacked the city of Ospino on the 2nd of February; and in the midst of the action, a republican column, returning from Jugute, attacked suddenly his right flank. Yanes came up in support of this wing with a company of carbiniers, and received two musket balls, which killed him. The Spaniards fell into disorder, but Calzada took the command, rallied them, attacked the enemy, and forced his retreat.

Calzada established his head-quarters, on the 19th, at Araura. Col. Cevallos marched, February 3rd, towards Morituco, arrived, March 7th, at Tacaraqua, and on the 9th surprised the enemy before Barquismeto, under the command of General Urdaneta and Colonel Villapol. They fought bravely; but their position having been turned by the regiment of New

Grenada, they were beaten, with the loss of about 200 men. The Spaniards entered Barquismeto, where they committed many cruelties upon the remaining inhabitants; Cevallos marched from thence towards Quibor and Tocuyo.

The dictator Bolivar, having been informed that the Spanish chieftains, particularly Boves and Morales, had committed great cruelties wherever they passed, and had put to death prisoners, peaceable inhabitants, nay even women and children, and all who appeared to them not attached to their cause, ordered the arrest of all the Spaniards and Islennos settled at Caracas and Laguaira, and published, on the 8th of February, 1814, a manifesto, in which he announced the arrest, and his intention to put all these individuals, together with the Spanish prisoners of war, *to death*, as a retaliation for the victims who had fallen by the cruelty of the Spaniards. He announced the execution of this sentence to take place at Caracas and Laguaira, the 14th, 15th, and 16th of February.

This bloody sentence was effectually executed upon 1,253 Spaniards and Islennos, prisoners of war, merchants, and others, who had never taken arms against the dictator, and who were established in Curaçao and Laguaira. Of these, 823 were shot at Caracas, and 430 at Laguaira. These executions lasted the three appointed days, without any trial or judgment. The dictator would hear no representation, no entreaty: nothing could save them. Amongst these victims were men unable to walk, by reason of infirmity, or age, many of them being 80 years old, and upwards. They were put into an arm chair, strongly tied, drawn to the place of exe-

cution, and shot!—Persons who lived at that time in Caracas or in Laguaira, have assured me of this notorious fact. It may also be found in a printed manifesto, which the Spanish junta ordered to be published after the evacuation of Caracas by the dictator, (July 1814,) together with the details of this horrid butchery, and of some very pathetic scenes between these victims and their surviving families.

Boves soon recovered from his wound, and on the 12th of February, attacked the patriots under Ribas, not far from Victoria, and was totally routed. In this bloody conflict, neither party kept any prisoners; all were killed after the action. But Ribas, instead of pursuing his advantage, and endeavouring to destroy the forces of Boves, left the command of his troops to Colonel Campo Elias, who remained quiet at Valencia, while the general returned to Caracas. Bolivar, observing with anxiety the rapid progress of the Spaniards, united at Valencia all his disposable forces, and marched against Boves on the 19th of February. He proceeded towards San Mateo, while a small squadron of armed boats and transports, loaded with troops, were passing along the shores of the beautiful lake Valencia, to protect the plantations of tobacco, much of which was raised in this district.

Boves having promptly rallied his routed troops, with the remainder of his division marched to San Mateo to meet the dictator; and while the latter was at his country seat, occupied all the surrounding hills, expecting Bolivar to come and attack him. The dictator, however, remained quiet in his head-quarters. He tried to surprise Bolivar, but was re-

pelled. He now made a *ruse de guerre*, which succeeded. He deceived the patriots in the valley, by attacking their posts, which was soon supported by the remainder of the troops. By feigning a retreat, he drew them into an ambush of a strong body of cavalry, having black colours at the end of their lances, which fell suddenly, with loud cries, upon the rear and wings, while Boves assailed them in front. Very few of Bolivar's troops were able to escape. The dictator and some of his officers saved their lives by the speed of their horses.

The dictator and his staff had been just called to dinner when the attack commenced. A few hours after, Boves and his officers entered gaily, and sat down to the dinner prepared. Boves, on leaving San Mateo, burned the house, and destroyed its appurtenances. The military operations, on both sides, were directed with so little order, that continual changes took place in the occupation of cities and ground. No one could depend upon continuing to possess even a small farm, far less a town or a province. Daily skirmishes took place, followed by cruelties upon the defenceless inhabitants, who were daily in danger of being vexed or murdered. To relate all these little actions, which ruined the country, without any benefit to either of the contending parties, would be increasing the pages of this work, without any advantage to the reader. I will, therefore, relate here no transactions but those of the greatest interest.

The Spaniards, whose forces increased rapidly, saw the necessity of having more union in their operations, and particularly of having a commander-in-chief,

Monteverde having, in consequence of his wound, embarked from Porto Cabello for the island of Curaçao, where he spent, during several months, one hundred dollars daily for the expense of his table.* This fact alone* affords convincing proof of the vexations and plunder committed on the Main during the command of Monteverde, who had been, as I have mentioned, a poor and destitute subaltern.

General Cagigal received his nomination as captain-general and commander-in-chief of the Spanish army in April, Captain-general Millares having retired. He came from Angostura with a numerous retinue to San Carlos, where Cevallos and Calzada were waiting for him with their troops. He took the command in chief, ordered large supplies of ammunition and other warlike stores from Porto Cabello, also 400 horses from other parts of Venezuela, and recruited a large number of men.

Meanwhile, the dictator made an attempt to gain the protection of the British government. On the 12th of May, he sent off Colonels Lino de Clemente and John Robertson for London, in order to obtain favourable treaties of commerce, and other support. They embarked at Laguaira, in the English frigate Palma, the commander of which offered them a passage. On their arrival at St. Thomas's, the Danish governor refused to admit them in their diplomatic character, and they returned to Laguaira and Caracas. The dictator, occupied with more important concerns, relinquished the plan, and thought of it no more.

* I have this fact from the mistress of the boarding-house at Curaçao, where he lived.

Laguaira, being besieged by a strong body of Boves's troops, General Piar marched in support of the city. The besiegers were attacked, routed with the loss of 400 men, and compelled to raise the siege.

The Gazette Extraordinary of Caracas, published the 31st of May, 1814, stated that

"A general artillery salvo, fired at eight o'clock this morning, announced to the inhabitants the brilliant and decisive victory gained by the republican army over the Spaniards, on the plains of Carabozo. The following is the official account:

"I have the satisfaction to inform your Excellency of the complete victory of our army over that of Spain, under the command of General Cagigal and Colonel Cevallos, in the savannas of Carabozo, at six leagues distance from the city, (Valencia.) Their troops have been totally destroyed, with little loss on our side. They left on the field of battle all their artillery, munitions, baggage, a great many dead, 2,000 horses, all that had belonged to them, colours, drums, arms, forges, &c. included. The few remaining soldiers fled into the woods, and were pursued on all sides. Sixty or seventy horsemen, with Cevallos, barely escaped, our squadrons pursuing them with ardour, &c. &c.

"*(Signed.)* ANTONIO MUNOS TEBAR.
"Head Quarters at Valencia, 29th May, 1814."

From this time, which was the *ne plus ultra* of the patriot achievements under the dictatorship, their star declined, and that of Spain once more gained the ascendant. The misfortunes of the patriots were the

natural result of the inactivity in which their leaders indulged, who, instead of pursuing the advantages they gained, and making every exertion to destroy the remnant of the Spanish forces, particularly by attacking Boves, relied too much on their partial successes, and gave the enemy time to recruit, and to supply all their losses.

The dictator Bolivar had moreover made himself many enemies by his haughty manner, his arbitrary conduct, and his contradictory decrees and regulations, given one day and revoked another; but more especially by having never taken a single step towards convening a congress, but carefully avoiding every occasion to comply with the wishes of a majority of the people. The still heavy, extraordinary taxes, and the forced contributions paid from the beginning of his dictatorship, were increased to defray the public expenses; commerce and industry were greatly reduced by the heavy duties paid at the custom-house, and by the protracted war, in which the slaves had been called to take arms, upon the promise of their liberty.

The army, if such a band of badly-clothed, ill-armed, and poorly-disciplined men, can be so called, were neither regularly paid, fed, nor drilled. Those who belonged to the dictator's staff and to his numerous body-guard were much better treated than the rest, among whom this created great jealousy and disaffection. The effect was, that when, some months afterwards, the Spaniards again took possession of Caracas, Laguaira, Valencia, &c., thousands of these troops passed over to the Spanish army.

During the inactivity, then, of Bolivar, the enemy

had full time to repair his losses. Captain-general Cagigal was by no means a good military officer, but he was an excellent administrator, a good politician, a man of great humanity and feeling, polite and popular,—and these qualities gained him many partizans. After his defeat he retreated to San Carlos, and Cevallos to Barquismeto; at which places they both employed their utmost exertions to rally their scattered troops, remount their cavalry, &c.

Such was the state of things in Venezuela, that, in spite of daily fighting, nothing had been gained by the republicans, for want of able and skilful leaders, as will be shown in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

Boves—Battle of La Puerta—Defeat and Flight of the two Dictators—Caracas in the power of the Spaniards—Bolivar and Marinno embark at Cumana—Their Reception at Margarita and Carupano—Their Arrival at Carthagena—Justificatory Memoir—Secret History of their Conduct at Carthagena—Factions and Party Spirit in that City—Particulars of Occurrences in the Assembly of the Legislative Body at Carthagena—Persecutions of the Author.—[Year 1814.]

Among all the Spanish enemies of the dictator at that time, Boves was undoubtedly the most dangerous, the bravest, and most powerful. A short account of his life and actions may, perhaps, be interesting.

Joseph Thomas Boves was one of those partizan chieftains, distinguished by activity, audacity, bravery, skill, and cruelty, which a time of civil war

raises from a low station to the summit of power, for the terror and the torment of those who unfortunately fall within their reach. He was a Castilian by birth, and of very low extraction. He came to the Main, before the revolution, as a serjeant of the marine corps, and obtained the command of a gun-boat employed in watching the coast, to prevent fraud upon the customs. Instead of seizing the smugglers, he was gained over, and protected them; and being detected and denounced, he was cashiered, and punished with some months' confinement. He had acquired some money, and so began to be a pedlar, travelling from the plains to the capital, and back to the plains; and in this way gained his livelihood. When the revolutionary war began, his ambition was excited, and he intrigued so well that he was named captain of militia. As such, he accompanied General Cagigal, in 1813, in his march against Maturin, of which an account has been given in a preceding chapter.* Many instances of his barbarous cruelty, which rendered him the terror and the scourge of the Venezuelans, have been also related. He received, in the action of the 5th of December, 1814, a wound with a lance, and died soon after, holding the rank of brigadier-general.

In the last chapter, some account was given of the condition of the contending parties. Amongst the Spaniards, Boves was decidedly the most powerful in numbers and in military daring. His *infernal* division, as the Spaniards called it, was a band of black and coloured people, who, animated by the hope of plunder and the prospect of commiting all crimes with impunity,

* See Chapter VI.

and by the highest expectation of reward in case of success, fought with perfect desperation.

Boves having speedily united his forces, marched in June from Calabozo against the two dictators, Bolivar and Marinno, who had formed their junction at *La Puerta*, a small place between La Villa de Cura and the city of San Juan de Los Morros. The Spaniards attacked them the 14th of the same month, routed them completely, killed and took from them 1,500 men, seven guns, with baggage, &c. Bolivar fled in full speed towards Caracas, and Marinno to Cumana. Colonel Diego Talon was made prisoner, and hanged the day after the battle in the city of Cura: more than sixty officers were shot by the order of Boves. By this victory, the latter became master of the beautiful plains of Aragua; he also intercepted the communication of the capital with the interior, with the corps which besieged Porto Cabello, and with the garrison in the fort of La Cabrera. He marched without loss of time against the latter, routed a party of patriots, and marched upon Valencia, where the independents had fortified themselves. He forced them to retire into the principel street, which was strongly barricadoed; and, after leaving a strong corps to besiege them, marched with the remainder of his division to force the patriots to raise the siege of Porto Cabello. These, advised of his approach, retreated in the night of the 20th of June, and marched towards Ocumare, where they embarked for Laguaira. Boves entered the fortress of Porto Cabello on the 1st of July, where he received the news of his advancement to the grade of colonel in

the Spanish army. On the 2nd, he again marched against Valencia, with the resolution to order an assault, and to force the patriots in their entrenchment. They were compelled to surrender by capitulation. He detached two columns to march through different roads upon Caracas—one, commanded by Colonel Ramon Gonzales, marched through Los Cocuisas, where he attacked a patriot corps which had retired precipitately towards Los Teques, upon Bolivar's sending advice to its commander, General Ribas, that the enemy, with a second column, had entered the other road, and directed its march towards Los Teques. This was the other column of Bovès, led by Colonel Mendoza. The column of Gonzales followed its march almost to San Pedro, in order to call off the attention of the enemy, and, in case of need, to assist Colonel Mendoza. General Ribas, instead of the dictator Bolivar, rallying all the disposable forces in the capital, marched at the head of the division against Gonzales, who had not 500 men, whilst Bolivar and Ribas were more than 1,200 strong. The intention was to rout him, and then to fall upon the second column and save Caracas. But Bolivar, quite discouraged, listened to the advice of some weak friends, and held various conferences with the archbishop, (who, during the dictatorship, had remained at Caracas), to advise with him, whether it would not be best to evacuate the city, and to leave it in the power of the Spaniards. General Ribas was invited to these conferences: he indignantly refused; and preferred putting himself at the head of the troops, to consulting a prelate who was generally known to be secretly in favour of Spain.

The spirit of the inhabitants was by this time much changed. Their confidence in the dictatorial government was of coürse greatly diminished, by their seeing that, in spite of their great sacrifices during a whole year, the state of Venezuela still remained miserable and defenceless; Caracas having no money, no provisions, no ammunition, and the army, so called, no clothing, nor good organization or discipline. The dictator himself felt it necessary to abandon the place, and he did so, in great haste.

Colonel Gonzales, who marched through Vittoria towards Antimano, at two leagues distant from Caracas, found the remainder of the discouraged troops of Ribas, which he attacked. Ribas himself fought bravely, but his division could not withstand the force of Gonzales, and he was obliged to retreat. This excited great consternation among the inhabitants, who confided in the military skill and bravery of General Ribas, rather than in the dictator.

Caracas and Laguaira were evacuated in haste, and Bolivar retired, with the remainder of his troops, upon Barcelona and Cumana, ordering the vessels lying in the harbour of Laguaira to follow him. The inhabitants of Caracas were again left in the power of the Spaniards. Bolivar had requested the archbishop to preside in the junta entrusted with the affairs of the city, and then left them to their miserable fate. The junta sent some deputies to Colonel Gonzales, commending to him the care of the city and its inhabitants. He entered Caracas the 17th of July, 1814.

The patriots had some hopes in the division of

General Urdaneta and the troops which the dictator might rally in his retreat on Barcelona; but the former, after having occupied Barquismeto, and reinforced his division, arrived from Truxillo, and was attacked by Colonel Cevallos; and Bolivar found himself suddenly besieged and surrounded by the inhabitants of Barcelona and its environs, who revolted, and declared in favour of the Spaniards. They marched against him, with a strong body of cavalry, in the retreat upon Cumana and Maturin, whilst a column of the division of Boves pursued and harassed his rear-guard. The dictator retreated with his troops to Arguita, not far distant from Barcelona, where Boves attacked and routed him the 8th of August. The dictator lost four field-pieces, about a thousand muskets, and his baggage; and more than 1,500 men were killed and wounded. Bolivar, seeing no longer any hope of safety, left his troops secretly, in the same night, and departed with his cousin, General Ribas, some aides-de-camp, and good guides, who conducted him through by-roads in safety, to the city of Cumana, where he arrived on the night of the 24th. He remained a few moments, and then immediately embarked on board the Bianchi, where he judged himself safe. Marinno, with some of his officers, followed him soon after.

General Ribas had in vain employed all his exertions to prevail upon the dictators not to despair so soon, but to remain, to rally the troops, and to fortify Cumana. He told them that by embarking they would discourage their countrymen, and ruin the cause of liberty. But his expostulations were of no

avail; the two dictators were so anxious to depart, that they ordered the commander of the squadron, Joseph Bianchi, to cut his cables, and to sail without loss of time. Ribas, and some other officers, were highly displeased with this departure. They preferred to remain, and to die in the cause of liberty and independence.

As soon as Bolivar and Marinno arrived at the seaport of Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, General Arismendy sent them word, "that he was surprised to find them both coming there like fugitives; and that if they did not depart immediately to join their brave countrymen, whom they had left in so cowardly a manner, he would treat them like deserters, and shoot them as they deserved." As the decided character of General Arismendy was perfectly known to them both, they did not think proper to go on shore, and departed precipitately for Carupano, a large borough and harbour on the Main, not far distant from Juan Griego. There they met Colonel Bermudes, who, with some patriots, occupied the fort and the borough. Bermudes, astonished to see them, after some conversation, abruptly asked General Bolivar what he had done with his troops, where was general Ribas, &c.? Bolivar, somewhat confused, answered, that he had left them at Cumana. "Well, sir," was the reply, "return, then, immediately to join your troops; if not, I will treat you as deserters, and try you before a court-martial." Rebuked and disgraced by their own countrymen and subalterns, and feeling their forlorn situation, instead of returning

to the Main, they tried a last essay to put themselves in safety. They steered towards Carthagena, on the 25th of September, 1814, where every one was astonished to see them arrive.

The cities of Cumana and Barcelona were occupied by the Spaniards on the 29th August, and Venezuela fell again into the power of its tyrants. Ribas and Bermudes assembled some troops, and marched towards Maturin, where they were joined by all who remained faithful to the patriots.

Bolivar and Marinno were received at Carthagena in a manner beyond their most sanguine hopes. The governor, at that time called the president of this province, was a generous, honest, and enlightened patriot; all those who have known *Manuel Rodriguez Torrices* will agree with us in saying, he was one of the most distinguished Grenadans. He received every stranger with great attention; and while he was at the head of the government of the province, Carthagena was flourishing, and the only spot on the patriotic Main where security and liberty could be found. As soon as he left the province, to be president of the executive of New Grenada, at Bogotá, consisting of three members, Carthagena declined in its prosperity and commerce, and became the theatre of factions. The two ex-dictators were anxious to excuse their precipitate flight from Cumana, and published, in the official Gazette of Carthagena, of the 30th of September, a kind of justificatory memoir, too remarkable and characteristic not to be translated literally. It has the following title:—*Arrival of Generals Bolivar*

and Marinno, and Exposition of the Motives which obliged them to leave Venezuela, and to seek a Refuge in New Grenada.

"After the army of Venezuela, under the orders of these two officers, had suffered an unexpected defeat, on the 14th of June last, at La Puerta, in consequence of which the enemies of liberty remained masters of the fertile plains of Aragua, and intercepted the communication between the capital and the cities in the interior, with the army of the east, the besieging corps before Porto Cabello, and the fortification of La Cabrera,—the fate of the republic was decided. The cities in the neighbourhood of Caracas, which alone supported the struggle, fell suddenly into the power of the enemy, and Caracas, insulated, and without resources, even deprived of the necessary supplies of food, was no longer able to resist the efforts of the numerous forces which assailed it from all sides.

"In spite of all these inconveniences, the chiefs were nevertheless resolved to defend Caracas, and for this purpose organized in haste all the forces which they could assemble; but as the want of every thing daily increased, so the enemy approached. The enemy, hoping to be reinforced, then appeared to suspend his march, and to assume again the defensive. General Bolivar was now forced to order a sortie against the enemy, who had advanced to Antimano, thinking that this division could not be the principal corps of Boves, who was occupied in besieging Valencia.

"He marched on the 6th July with his small army, but returned the same night to Caracas; all his cavalry and a division of his infantry having been

beaten on the evening of the same day by a numerous body of troops, which were, according to the report of eye witnesses, more than 2,000 men strong, whilst the republican army amounted not to 600 infantry and 400 horse;—the first all composed of recruits, neither disciplined nor experienced; the latter, having the same deficiences, and badly mounted. The worst was, to find these two bodies spiritless, and discouraged by the exaggerated accounts given them of the superior force of the enemy, by individuals interested to hinder the sortie of the troops. It would have been imprudent to persist and to die in the place, without munitions or provisions, when, by effecting a retreat towards the eastern provinces, the army could have been reorganized, and put in a state not only to keep the field, but to reconquer the lost ground, which they would be compelled to leave for the moment. These considerations determined the general-in-chief to evacuate the capital, and to retire with the troops which were in garrison, all the inhabitants, and whatever belonged to the government, towards the province of Barcelona, where some other forces might be assembled.

"Preparations were begun on the 7th July to put in execution the proposed plan; but the prodigious number of emigrants which followed the army, whom it was incumbent on us to protect; the great quantity of baggage, the want of horses for its transportation, and the very rough and bad roads; offered so many difficulties and inconveniences, that, in spite of all speed, it was not possible we could arrive in less than twenty days at Barcelona.

"General Marinno, dictator of the east of Venezuela, had already united, in the city of Aragua, on the borders of the plains of Caracas, all the troops which could be furnished by the provinces to continue the war; but these recruits were raised in haste and totally undisciplined; it was therefore necessary to begin to drill them before the opening of the campaign. He was occupied in disciplining them when he received the advice of the enemy's having taken possession of Chaparro, a village ten leagues from Aragua. The republican army was less than 1,500 men strong in infantry, and 700 cavalry; while the enemy, from the reports received, had more than 3,000 men, of all arms.

"The republican army protected the city of Aragua, covered by the river of the same name, which was at this time of year so deep as to render it impossible to ford it. General Bolivar, relying upon these advantages, waited, not for the arrival of more troops, which were in march to reinforce him, but principally for cartridges, of which he was in great need, when, on the 17th of August, he received a report that his main guard, placed to defend the principal post where the river could be crossed, had retired, and that the enemy had immediately crossed it. The battalion of chasseurs, which was sent to take possession again of the post, unluckily missed the road, and left a free passage to the enemy, who soon came very near to the guard that protected the entry of the city. The action began with a very dreadful and destructive fire of musketry, which lasted more than four hours; but the cartridges of the defenders of Aragua, (who had

no more than 60,000,) were entirely exhausted, at a moment when the principal corps of the enemy (composed of more than 5,000 men) was not yet come into action. Under these circumstances, nothing was to be done but to try to save some of the troops by any possible means. General Bolivar advanced at the heat of a piquet of cavalry, to open a road to Barcelona, (which, as he was told, was intercepted,) ordering the remainder to follow in the same direction. But his troops were but recruits; and having suffered a loss of more than 600 men in killed and wounded, a panic terror seized them on seeing such a numerous body of enemies, so that it was impossible to perform this retreat with order and coolness. Many commanders of battalions had been killed, which increased the difficulty of the retreat; and it was effected in great disorder upon Barcelona and San Mateo. Thus were totally destroyed all hopes of raising again the forces of the republic of Venezuela.

"General Bolivar arrived at Barcelona, which he found in insurrection. There he united a few troops that had taken this road, and directed his march towards Cumana, in the rear of the families which had emigrated from Caracas. Terror had seized every one; and each was thinking how best to fly. The troops which had perceived the danger, were the first who fled; and the confusion was so great, that of 700 infantry which departed from Barcelona, there were not 200 men left in a body.

"As soon as General Marinno heard of the loss suffered by the army of Aragua, he took measures

for security; but he saw himself forsaken by his troops, and even by the commandant of the fort of Cumana, who had embarked on board of the squadron, without the permission of the general, before General Bolivar's entry in the night of the 25th August. The unexpected news that the perfidious commander of the marine, Joseph Bianchi, had the intention to sail that same night, without asking or waiting for leave from government, (or to speak more plainly, of General Marinno, who had given him the command and the treasury,) with the small quantity of ammunition left, forced the generals of Venezuela to embark themselves, *in order to save their property!*

"When they arrived at Margarita, and afterwards at Carupano on the Main, they found these countries in anarchy, in consequence of the seditious views of some military chieftains, who were anxious to raise themselves to the high station of first magistrates! After having tried every means of conciliation which prudence could dictate, and being convinced of the obstinacy of these seducers, in order to avert a civil war, which would have been unavoidable if the two generals had tried to maintain their own dignity* in remaining in that country, they adopted the moderate resolution of quitting Venezuela, and coming to this capital (Carthagena) in order to go farther on, and take the command of the army of General Urdaneta, who occupies the western provinces of Venezuela, and to co-operate on their way for the complete liberation of New Grenada."

* We take leave to ask what sort of dignity can be attributed to any person who quits his post without permission?

Observe this justificatory memoir. It is, as regards those distant readers who know nothing about the circumstances, sufficient to give a plausible colouring to a dark, and, in itself, a very bad picture. Having been perfectly enabled to examine minutely all the circumstances of the events related in this memoir, and not having the least interest to mislead the public, I will truly and faithfully relate the facts.

Credible eye witnesses of *both parties* have assured us positively, " that the column of Colonel Gonzales did not exceed 550 men; that the second, under Colonel Mendoza, was less." It is therefore cautiously said in the memoir, *according to the reports of eye witnesses*, the division of Gonzales *alone*, was *two thousand men* strong! It is asserted that the capital had no provisions; that when they took the sudden resolution to defend it, the recruits, raised in haste, stood in want of every thing. But how came this want? Bolivar and Marinno possessed, from August 1813 until July 1814, a large part of the provinces of Venezuela; the sea-ports of Laguaira, Cumana, Barcelona, Ocumare, Carupano, of the island of Margarita, and many others, offered them every facility; the great enthusiasm of the inhabitants, in the beginning of their honourable enterprise, gave them more than sufficient means to bring it to a close: all contributed to facilitate and to consolidate their conquest. Instead of using these powerful means for the benefit of their cause, they ruined the country by a bad administration, and arbitrary measures: and when they thought that all these means were exhausted, they lost all hopes and strength of mind; and finally

put themselves in safety, and left thousands of their countrymen, who had placed the greatest confidence in them, in misery and despair. The precipitate flight of the two dictators would have destroyed for ever the sacred cause of freedom, if their subalterns, Ribas, Villapol, Urdaneta, Paez, Piar, Arismendy, Bermudes, and many others, had not acted better than they did! and when the two latter gave them well-deserved reproaches, they stigmatized them in the memoir as *seditious men, who were anxious to assume the power of a first magistrate!*

What had become of the victorious troops at Carabobo? How did they lose the precious time for pursuing their victory gained over Cagigal and Cevallos? Why did they leave them time to reorganize their forces? Why not at once fall upon Boves, or at least organize guerillas, to harass and intercept the means of their enemies? These had to struggle against public opinion, and all the difficulties which climate, the nature of the territory, and want of every thing, placed in their way: whereas Bolivar had all advantages united, which required no more than an ordinary capacity to give them a fair direction. The besieging of Porto Cabello was confided to the hands of young men without experience and military talents, like Giraldot and d'Elhugar. We have known well the latter, and can answer for him, that he was much fitter for intrigues, as he showed at Carthagena in 1815, than to command fifty men!

The siege of Porto Cabello lasted from August 1813 until July 1814, and wasted much money and many men, who, however, did not fall in battles, but mostly

by maladies and the unhealthiness of the environs of that fortress. These men, and the money for all the necessary warlike stores, might have been much better employed any where else, as the least check spread such a panic through their camp, that they left cannon, baggage, and every thing, more than once, and raised the seige, which continued to last until 1824, at which time Porto Cabello was finally taken by capitulation.

The two dictators begin by saying, " that the unexpected defeat of the 14th June, at La Puerta, *decided the fate of the republic of Venezuela;* and that the communication between the capital and the eastern *army*, the corps which besieged Porto Cabello and the garrison of the fortifications at La Cabrera, was intercepted. And thus they despaired, when they publicly acknowledged the existence of *an army*, (that of Marinno,) a besieging corps, and a garrison at La Cabrera; and when they say further, that Bolivar had, on the 6th of July, 600 infantry and 400 cavalry, and that he determined to march to the eastern provinces, *where the army could be reviewed, and put in a state to reconquer the lost ground.* And we may ask, what reason compelled the dictator Bolivar to return the same evening so quickly to Caracas? Where left he his 1,000 men? It appears, by the report of some well-informed eye witnesses, that he acted *here* under the same motives which caused his sudden embarkation at Cumana, at Ocumare (in 1816;) his desertion from Porto Cabello, (in 1812;) his flight from Barcelona, (in 1817;) his going from Carthagena to Kingston in Jamaica,

(in 1815;) &c. &c. Moreover, have not the Spaniards sufficiently proved that the dictators left behind immense means, by which they have carried on the war upon the Main ten years longer? What shall we think of such a confession? It can only mislead strangers totally unacquainted with the want of capacity, the ignorance of military operations, and the erroneous administration of these chieftains.

The dictators complain of the too great quantity of baggage, the prodigious number of emigrants, and the want of transports in their retreat. May we ask a simple subaltern officer, of the least experience, if he would not have burnt or destroyed that prodigious quantity of baggage which opposed the quickness of a retreat? Bolivar would have been then in time to quell the insurrection at Barcelona, would have made his junction with Marinno, whose army was about 2,000 men strong, and probably have checked, if not beaten, the enemy. And what has been the fate of all these emigrants, who put their last hopes in Bolivar? The memoir says clearly enough, "that it was impossible to perform this retreat with order and coolness." It states further, "terror had seized every one, and each was thinking how best to fly." The troops which had perceived the danger were the first to fly; and we see clearly that the dictator provided himself with good guides and horses, and arrived with a few officers safe at Cumana, &c. From this may be easily drawn the consequences, in the miserable fate of these emigrants, of whom the memoir speaks not a word, in spite of the great protection promised by the dictator.

What signify the following words: "As soon as General Marinno heard of the loss suffered by the army of Aragua, he took measures for security,"—when, some paragraphs before, it is stated, "that General Marinno, dictator of the east of Venezuela, had already united, in the city of Aragua, all the troops which could be furnished by the provinces to continue the war?" By these words it should appear that Marinno left Aragua before the attack, or that Bolivar came after the retreat of Marinno, with his recruits, from Aragua to Cumana. And in what consisted these same measures for security, taken by Marinno? Was it in ordering the ammunition to be embarked, which would have been so serviceable to Bolivar's troops? or was it in embarking hastily his trunks and baggage, and the money of the public treasury? And what shall we say of the singular reason given in the memoir, "that the news of the intention of Commodore Bianchi to make sail, &c., *compelled* the dictators to embark, *in order to save their property?*" Of very little importance indeed is the loss of some two or three vessels, and the small sum which is called so pompously the public *treasury*, in comparison with the life, liberty, and prosperity of their countrymen, who placed full confidence in the skill, the virtue, and the bravery of the two dictators. The truth is, that the only cause of this unexampled desertion lay not at all in the salvation of that property, but of *themselves;* as Ribas and thousands of others did not act so *prudently* as Bolivar and Marinno did in Cumana. If there were something to be saved on board the vessels, Marinno was *alone*

competent to save it; but Bolivar, so anxious to be compared with the greatest heroes of antiquity, who entered in triumph eleven months before into Caracas, and who published so many promising proclamations —Bolivar, at least, should have remembered that posterity would look closely upon his actions, and place them in their proper light. But *fear* is stronger than reason and reflection; and thus Bolivar forgot every thing, and embarked. That the sacred cause of liberty was not at all extinguished in Venezuela, and that their flight was very culpable, will be seen by the events of which we shall speak hereafter.

We must now enter into some particulars which will throw more light upon the character of Bolivar, and show how grateful he was to Carthagena, to that little republic which assisted him so powerfully in his first expedition against Monteverde in 1813, and which received him with so great hospitality, and such unexpected honours, in September 1814, and where Arismendy and Bermudes (both Venezuelans and his subalterns) had treated him literally as I have related. The particulars which follow, make a distinct and characteristic *picture* of the *secret* history of Simon Bolivar, *totally unknown*, but of which I vouch for the truth as an eye witness, having served, at that time, in the army of Carthagena.

When, four years since, an article appeared in "the American," of New York, announcing that I was preparing a history of the republic of Colombia, some *good* friend took the alarm, fearing I might publish *the truth;* and used every exertion to preoccupy public opinion against this work, by trying to

disparage my private character and services at Carthagena. The article referred to appeared in "the Aurora," at Philadelphia, about four years ago.* I have always despised an anonymous writer in such cases; there is cowardice in aspersions of this nature, against a man who had come as a stranger to a hospitable and generous country, where alone freedom and the sacred rights of mankind are allowed in the full extent of their vast signification. After mature reflection, and the suggestion of my friends, I suspected that the article against me came from a certain personage at Washington, who was at that time a great partizan and intimate friend of the brothers Pineres at Carthagena, and whom I could, if necessary, name.

The poor Mr. M., consul of Colombia at New York, has rendered himself ridiculous in the eyes of many of my friends acquainted with the transaction, in a certain trifle, which showed clearly how much he feared me.

All these obscure manœuvres shall never silence me, nor hinder me from telling and showing *the truth* by facts, and not in words only. Those facts related by me, who have given my name, and can vouch for all I say, cannot be erased; the public and posterity will best judge them, and not the selfish and interested writers of some anonymous criticisms. Napoleon used to say, *Il n'y a que la vérité qui blesse!*

* I have never attached any importance to such an attack, and therefore cannot precisely tell in what number the article appeared. When I twice pressed the then editor of the Aurora to give me the name of his correspondent, '*Americanus*,'—*he never answered my letter.*

The more the public shall hear said against me, the better will it be convinced that this *vérité les a blessés.* I declare here that I will never take the trouble to answer any of these attacks, as being unworthy of me and my established and well-known character.

At the time of the arrival of Generals Bolivar and Marinuo at Carthagena (September, 1814), Manuel Rodriguez Torrices was at the head of the government of this province, as he had been when Bolivar served in 1812 and 1813, as colonel. He had been an attorney-at-law, an honest and upright man, with liberal principles, and very humane and moderate; but he had a great defect for a man of such high standing; he was too weak, too indolent and fearful, and but little fit to govern a province agitated by war and factions. This weakness had encouraged various intriguers, a year before, to attempt getting themselves into the office of president; and he hesitated to arrest and to try them before a court of justice. At the head of that faction were the brothers *Pineres.* The elder, *German,* was president of the high court of justice of the province; the second, *Gabriel,* vice-president of the government of Carthagena. Both were without any transcendant merit, but since the revolution have become rich and powerful. They committed great vexations, and lived in a high and luxurious way. The sound part of the inhabitants hated and feared them, as being audacious, intriguing, cunning, vindictive, and having a strong party with the mob, and all who had nothing to lose. The president and his friends were well aware of these intrigues, but feared to take severe measures against

them, lest the mob should openly take part in their favour, and, revolting, commit great depredations.

Such was the interior state of Carthagena when Bolivar arrived from Cumana. He immediately united himself very closely with these two brothers, because they flattered him greatly, but more especially because they were great enemies of Manuel Castello, the general-in-chief of the army of the province, who was a relation and an intimate friend of the president Torrices.

I have related, in a preceding chapter, how Castillo behaved towards Bolivar in 1813, and the reasons on which was afterwards grounded the hatred between these two ambitious chieftains. Bolivar, vindictive, but perfectly dissimulating, was very glad to find a good occasion to avenge himself against Castillo; and as the time of an election of the president was near, Gabriel Pineres proposed confidently to General Bolivar the office of general-in-chief, if he would assist him to be chosen president. The latter accepted the proposal, with the secret intention, as well-informed persons say, of putting aside Pineres, and naming himself dictator of Carthagena, in order to employ all the means which the province had at that time, to march a second time against the Spaniards. This assertion gains much credit, as it is well known by those who know the character of Bolivar, that he would never have consented, in earnest, to accept a subaltern rank, after what he had been at Caracas.

General Bolivar, on arriving at Carthagena, had taken his quarters at the palace of the bishop (who had emigrated) where Mrs. Soublette and her two

pretty daughters were established a fortnight before Bolivar's arrival. The two sisters, whom I visited various times, talked always with the greatest enthusiasm of General Bolivar, whom they designated even then by the name of *poor Simon*, (in relating to me the events at Caracas, where they had formerly resided with their mother and their brother Charles,) and to whom they appeared to be uncommonly and tenderly attached. The inhabitants of Caracas and Laguaira, those of St. Thomas de La Angostura, in Guayana, and every stranger who resided at the latter city in 1818—19, will confirm this fact, the source, as they say, of the high standing of Charles Soublette, the present secretary-general of the president-liberator.

When the two Pineres had settled every thing with General Bolivar, they had very frequent secret conferences with him and their partizans. Marinno, and a great many Caraguin officers, were initiated; the former living in the house of Gabriel Pineres. The latter gained about twenty deputies of the most intriguing and noisy class; and the money which the dictators had brought with them served to gain more adherents. At that time were assembled at Carthagena more than 800 strangers, counting the owners and the crews of privateers. Among them Pineres had a strong party, because Torrices had laid heavy duties on the prize merchandise, and had limited the privateering business, by which Carthagena subsisted in a great measure at that time. Pineres, knowing the persons concerned in the privateers were not much satisfied with those restrictions,

employed every means to foment this dissatisfaction. One of these means was, to post up a libel against the existing government, in which he said that the majority of the strangers were on the side of the vice-president Pineres; that they should open their eyes on the vexations and the tyranny of Torrices; and that all would change in their favour, if they would support him in the approaching election, &c.

The police officers, seeing these libels on the church doors and at the corners of the streets the next morning, showed them to the president and the general-in-chief, Castillo. I was, sometime previous to this event, in the service of the army of Cartha-gena, at the solicitation of the president and the general-in-chief. They could not offer me more than the grade of colonel, in virtue of the constitution, by which the congress of New Grenada, sitting at Tunja, had reserved the exclusive right to name and to con-firm all the generals; but as I had not come to seek any grade, but to serve the sacred cause of freedom (as I had done at the beginning of the French revolution,) I contented myself with the solemn promise of these two gentlemen, to deliver my brevet of general to the president Torrices, who took upon himself to send it to the congress of New Grenada to be confirmed; and I agreed provisionally to serve as colonel in this army, until the return of my commission. Since then I have heard nothing more of it. Castillo and his superior, General Cortez, of Campomanes, were at that time only colonels, but were called generals.

The president Torrices, on seeing this libel, sent

immediately for the general-in-chief and the corregidor, as chief of the police, and communicated to them the paper. Castillo, after some conversation, suggested the idea of calling on me as a man whom they could rely on and consult with. We were intimate, and so he came to my house. I had seen the libel, and was much better acquainted with the facts than he and the president could be. I assured him that the government could count upon the firm resolution of a great majority to support it. They departed together to the palace, where Ducoudray repeated to the president Torrices, yet pale and agitated, what he had said to Castillo. Ducoudray spoke then with some of the owners of the privateers; amongst them was Mr. Charles S—— from New Orleans, an enterprising, wealthy, and very determined man, who had a great ascendancy over the other captains of the privateers. He convoked them, and, in a short speech, persuaded them to rally round the existing government, and oppose any faction that should try to overthrow it. This had a very good effect; and amongst them there was not, I must say to their honour, a single dissenting voice. Every measure was taken with the general-in-chief, to whom Ducoudray was called. The latter was named commander of all the strangers residing in the fortress. The numerous crews of the privateers were secretly disembarked, armed, organized in companies, and distributed into the different quarters of the city, and at the most important posts on the walls, at the batteries, &c. The day before the sitting of the legislature, all was in the greatest activity. Ducoudray

and Castillo went about the whole night, busy in visiting the posts and giving the necessary orders. All the captains of privateers, the foreign officers and merchants, French, English, and German, and the commanders of an effective armed battalion of coloured French people, cannot be too much praised for their exertions to maintain a very severe discipline among such an assemblage of men from different countries, and of different colour; and what is much more to be admired is, that during the two days and three nights of their being under arms, not a single excess was committed, not a single complaint of disorder was brought before Ducoudray or Castillo. The inhabitants of Carthagena will, if they ever see this account, confirm what is here stated. Such was the good behaviour of these strangers, so generally hated by the Colombians! Should we have seen a thousand of these latter, or of their troops, behave so quietly on a similar occasion, as did these 800 strangers?

Meanwhile the brothers Pineres, Bolivar, Marinno, and their adherents, were busily employed in preparing their means to strike a decisive blow in the assembly, which was to meet the next morning at eleven o'clock, I was that same evening at the house of Bolivar, on a visit to the Soublette family, and found there a large assembly of Caraguins; but Bolivar was busily engaged with the Pineres in his private room. I saw, going into and out of his cabinet, a great many gentlemen, and amongst them the personage mentioned before; but he remained not half an hour in the house. This resembled very much one of

the most active head-quarters, of which I have seen several during my military career. I could say, in truth, that the moving in and out of all these naturally not very stirring Caraguins, would have filled with fear any one not initiated into the secret, as a presage of some event, such as the enemy's besieging the place; while the palace of the president was quiet and deserted, and himself sick, and in bed!

The following day, the representatives of the legislature of the province of Carthagena assembled at their usual place, in the palace of the now abolished inquisition. All the members were present except the president Torrices, who had a strong fever during the night, the effect of his anxiety of mind. Pineres, his antagonist, was highly pleased on hearing this news, as it now belonged to him to preside in the assembly. His retinue, as president on this occasion, assembled at his residence, to escort him with great formality to the assembly. Ducoudray arrived with his adjutants a little later than the appointed hour, and found a very large company assembled in the saloons. Don Pineres saw him enter, rose from his seat, came to meet him at the door of the saloon, took him by the hand, and told him very obligingly they were then waiting for him, and that he was welcome. He then assigned him a seat opposite to himself, near to the open piazza, inquired with apparent interest after the state of his health, and obligingly reproached him for not having yet called to see him. He asked him a number of insignificant questions, but in an awkward manner, and with a mind very much pre-occupied and distracted, looking at intervals towards the door, and

then at the piazza which faced the great square; while his whole behaviour showed clearly great uneasiness of mind and anxiety. Neither Bolivar, Marinno, nor any of the Caraguin officers not employed in the army of Carthagena, were present.*

Soon after Ducoudray's arrival, they told the vice-president Pineres, "all was ready to receive him at the assembly." The numerous retinue, consisting of the civil and military officers of the province, and some distinguished strangers, was obliged to cross the public square, filled with troops in order of battle, and paying him the usual honours in the midst of a crowd of people. Pineres appeared to wish to harrangue these troops, but Castillo and Ducoudray being on his left and right hand, and observing all his movements, were ready to oppose such an unusual and dangerous step. He appeared to have observed it; then, after having looked some minutes at them, he turned abruptly towards General Castillo, who was at his right, and said, *vamos, vamos,* (let us go, let us go.) In saying these words, he made a motion with his left arm, and saluted with the right hand, in which he held his hat.*

As the assembly was a public one, seats were reserved in its interior for the general-in-chief and the other officers, and for some distinguished strangers. About half an hour after the opening of the sitting, Gabriel Pineres presiding, one of the representatives belonging to the faction, a great friend of Pineres,

* I enter into all these details, in order to show the character of these rulers in their true light, not by *reasoning*, as so many writers have done, but *by facts*.

rose, and made a motion to convert the sitting to a secret one, to treat and debate upon a subject of the highest consequence, in which it was important to leave to the deputies the liberty to speak, *without being influenced by military authority*, AND STILL LESS BY STRANGERS.* The president Pineres immediately rang his bell; then there were heard various murmurs among some of the members opposed to this strange motion. Some rose to speak, but Pineres called to order, and silenced them. He ordered the serjeant at arms to invite every one not belonging to the assembly to leave the room, and then to close the doors; this was done, and astonished all, as being an unusual and extraordinary measure,—no president of an assembly in a free state having the right to take so much upon himself, without being supported by the majority, when a motion of such importance is made. Ducoudray (who sat next to Castillo,) when he heard this strange and insulting motion of Dr. S., said to him, laughing, that it was a forty-eight pounder directed against them, and remarked to him the concert which was visible between Pineres and S., as the former silenced with his bell and his cries every opposing voice. Castillo informed him that S. had, the evening previous, very frequent and long conferences with the vice-president, and afterwards with General Bolivar, and was seen passing three or four times from the residence of the one to the other. General Ducou-

* These were the expressions of Dr. S., the same personage who resided some years ago at Washington, as minister of Colombia, and who is one of the greatest partizans and flatterers of the dictator.

dray, as soon as he came from the assembly, sent orders to the commander of the arsenal to deliver the four brass field-pieces which he had designated the day before, with their batteries; ordered a larger number of cartridges to be distributed to the different posts, and sent word to their commander to be ready at the first signal given. Every column had received, the night before, the necessary instructions, and the most severe orders were given to suppress any riotous act, and prevent bloodshed, and to leave the most perfect freedom to the deputies. But as the president Torrices had signified, in his conversation with Ducoudray and Castillo, that his friends would be intimidated from acting in his favour by those of the faction, he requested from both a respectable armed force, to support these friends when they should call for assistance.

While the two generals were on the floor of the assembly, they saw enter the corregidor, Elias Lopez, he being called to the bar as director of the police. The friends of Torrices, well informed that a respectable armed force was ready to support their independence, were not to be moved by the hostile attempts of the friends of Pineres against the existing government; and a large majority voted for Manuel Rodriguez Torrices to be continued as president, while another large majority elected Don Juan de Toledo as vice-president, so that Gabriel Pineres was entirely excluded. Enraged at this defeat, his friends declared that an armed force was assembled in order to influence the assembly, and moved that the corregidor might be called to confirm the fact. He was asked,

"if it was true that an armed corps of strangers was assembled? by whom commanded? and upon what authority they acted? &c." The faction had now good opportunity to avenge themselves upon Torrices, in accusing Ducoudray, who acted by the former authority of the president and the general-in-chief; but as Torrices had not explained to his friends in the assembly, that Ducoudray had received full authority from him to act as he did, the decree against him passed without any opposition. The substance of this decree was, that this commander, a *stranger*, (as they designated him,) should be called before the corregidor, and that his trial should commence in twenty-four hours after this session, as having committed an act of high treason against the representatives of the people. To this decree a trifle was wanting, viz. the sanction of the president, to whom alone the executive power was confided.

In the course of the next morning, General Ducoudray received a written invitation from the corregidor, Elias Lopez, to call at his office, where he, the corregidor, had to communicate to him some business concerning the said Ducoudray. As the latter was not at all acquainted with the existence of any accusation, he was surprised to receive an invitation of this kind, and told the bearer to be so good as to tell the corregidor, that if he had a communication of importance to make, and would take the trouble to do it personally, and call on him, he would receive him with pleasure. Some minutes after, Ducoudray received an official letter from the same corregidor, in which he enjoined him to give a detailed account of

his conduct during the night of the 1st and 2d October, and that by *superior order!* Ducoudray answered him in his letter, "that as he did not know any authority superior to him, other than that of the president and the general-in-chief, he was very sorry to decline positively giving to *any body else* an account of his conduct, demanded through the channel of Mr. Corregidor." On the receipt of this answer, the corregidor, in a great rage, called immediately on the president, and denounced General Ducoudray formally, showing him the letter. When Torrices had understood the whole affair, he reproached the corregidor with having acted too rashly, in serving as an instrument of a faction which had tried to change the government, and assisting them to ruin an officer who did nothing but *obey his instructions, and who acted only by his* (president Torrices') *formal authority!* He added, that the corregidor must first begin by impeaching him, the president, before he could take any further steps against this officer, &c. The president then sent his aide-de-camp to General Ducoudray, and communicated to him all that had happened between himself and the corregidor, expressing his satisfaction with Ducoudray's services. The corregidor went some days after to pay a visit to General Ducoudray, and they were, and have since remained, very good friends. The faction was thus silenced, and Torrices remained in quiet possession of the presidency.

CHAPTER IX.

Situation of New Grenada—Arrival of General Bolivar at the Congress of Tunja—His Reception—His March against Bogotá and Carthagena—His Stay at Mompox—Correspondence between him and General Castillo—Bolivar's secret Motives in besieging Carthagena—Details of this Siege—Bolivar embarks for Kingstown in the Island of Jamaica.—[Years 1814—1815.]

THE twenty-two provinces of New Grenada rose about the same time; then, the eight of Venezuela; and, after many commotions, the provinces of Casanare, Pamplona, Tunja, Neyva, Popayan, Carthagena, Mariquita, Antiochia, Choco, and Socorro, formed a union, and on the 27th November 1811, at Bogotá, adopted a federal compact in 68 articles; whereupon a congress was assembled, which united in itself the legislative and executive power: but this compact was not approved of by the leaders in the province of Cundinamarca, (Santa Fe de Bogotá,) which was the origin of a long and bloody civil war between Marinno, as president of the latter province, and the congress of New Grenada.

Bernardo Alvarez had succeeded Antonio Marinno, as president of the province of Cundinamarca. The former refused obstinately to unite his province with the others, notwithstanding congress had sent commissioners on various occasions to represent to him the fatal consequences of his obstinacy. These internal

divisions had the most destructive consequences on the prosperity and liberty of this beautiful and rich country. Out of twenty-two provinces, ten only had sent deputies to the first congress, which removed its seat from Bogotá to Tunja, in consequence of the ambitious views of its president, Antonio Marinno, who caused the convocation of some deputies of the other provinces not in the possession of the Spanish troops. These proposed a *monarchical constitution* in their assembly held at Bogotá, but without success. Quito, Pastos, Santa Martha, and other provinces, remained yet in the power of the Spaniards. The congress at Tunja had very limited power, Cundinamarca, the richest and most populous province of New Grenada, having refused to join the union, and impeded by its example the union of six others.

Such was the internal situation of New Grenada, when General Bolivar arrived from Carthagena at Tunja, on the 22nd November, 1814, where the congress was then assembled. The name of Bolivar was already so generally known, and his reputation so highly established, that he was received by congress with distinguished honours. The members of this assembly admired his successful march from Carthagena to Caracas a year before, and regarded him as a hero, a skilful soldier, and one of the greatest patriots on earth. Those few fully acquainted with the leading circumstances which had united in his favour to raise him to power and fame—those who saw in him an ambitious and selfish leader, solicitous to abuse his power, without having the capacity required to sustain such a wish,—were, of course, silenced by the

great majority, and dared not oppose the enthuasiastic reception of General Bolivar.

We have seen that these leading facts were, 1st, the proposal of Felix Ribas to his companions assembled at Carthagena, at the end of 1812, to unite in avenging the cruelties of Monteverde and his subalterns, committed in Venezuela after Miranda's arrest. 2nd, Ribas's nomination as commander-in-chief of this expedition; no confidence being placed in his cousin Bolivar, after his having clandestinely deserted the fortress of Porto Cabello, entrusted to him by General Miranda. 3rd, Ribas's success, at last, in prevailing over his countrymen to admit the nomination of Colonel Bolivar as their commander in his place. 4th, Bolivar's proposal, after the defection of Colonel Manuel Castillo's forces, to abandon the enterprize, and to retreat again to Carthagena, and the persuasion of Ribas, Colonel Brizenno, and some few others, to go forward. 5th, The cruelties of the Spaniards, which had driven the Venezuelans to despair, who rallied by thousands under the standard of their countrymen, Bolivar and Ribas; the desertion of the Creole troops, in the beginning of some combats, and their junctions with the patriots; and Bolivar's elevation, by the force and union of the most favourable circumstances, to a fortunate grandeur and glory!

We have further seen how easy it was for him to force Marinno to unite and obey him, and to drive the scattered and discouraged remainder of the Spanish troops for ever out of his country; to assemble a congress, and to give liberty and prosperity to his coun-

trymen. He did nothing of all this; his aim was power, absolute power, in prosperity; and when the time had arrived to show his skill, courage, and superiority in that adversity which befel him after the loss of the battle of La Puerta, he suddenly depaired, and left his deceived countrymen in the greatest misery, embarking hastily at Cumana, and only anxious to save himself. We have seen how Ribas and others remained, how the two dictators were received and treated by Arismendy and Bermudes, &c. These leading facts were totally unknown, or disregarded by the mass of the people, who admired the brilliancy and the rapid successes that produced Bolivar's entry into Caracas.

The critical situation of the congress at Tunja was increased by the tidings of the formidable expedition preparing at Cadiz, under command of General Morillo, ready to cross the ocean, and to destroy them. They felt the necessity of acting more vigorously, and of being better united. Two measures were adopted as the most important and pressing: 1st, to force the president of the province of Cundinamarca to unite that province with the congress; 2ndly, to march against Santa Martha, the only fortified seaport in New Grenada remaining in the power of Spain. Its possession was very important for the republic, lying at the mouth of the large river Magdalena, which opened the way to the internal provinces, and the city of Bogotá.

The arrival of General Bolivar gave a greater activity to these projected measures, with both of which he was entrusted. Every exertion was made to col-

lect troops and to provide for their wants; General Urdaneta was ordered to join Bolivar with his strong division, which retreated after the battle of La Puerta in Venezuela, to the city of Cucuta in the interior of New Grenada; and Bolivar was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the three forces, under the title of *captain-general of Venezuela and New Grenada.*

He departed from Tunja in December, 1814, and marched with his troops against Bogotá, to force the president, Alvarez, to join and obey the congress. The city was surrounded, and attacked: and as some entrenchments, made in haste two years before, the time of a civil war with Marinno, were almost totally ruined, the inhabitants could not resist, with their few armed men, a force of at least 2,000. Bolivar received a deputation from the president Alvarez, who had ample powers to sign a capitulation, which was granted. By it, the province of Cundinamarca consented to join the union, and to obey and acknowledge the authority of the congress, with the condition that they should enjoy the same privileges as the other provinces, which was granted. But notwithstanding this capitulation, signed and ratified by Bolivar, he permitted the pillage of a part of this beautiful and large city, during forty-eight hours; a fact notorious to many eye witnesses of this strange proceeding; and when Alvarez and many other inhabitants of Bogotá made him the strongest representations against such behaviour, he replied in an angry tone, that he was authorized by the laws of war to act as he did, because the inhabitants of the city had resisted his troops, and deserved punishment.

This act was greatly disapproved of, it being against all laws of war, in civilized countries, to plunder a city after a capitulation signed and approved by both parties. The excesses and cruelties committed, particularly against females, were horrid, and his troops loaded themselves with gold, silver, and jewels of every kind!

The junta of Bogotá invited congress to assemble again in their city, which invitation was complied with; and soon afterwards the deputies once more assembled in the capital. Congress now had means and power to act, and its measures gained more energy, and were more efficient. They made some salutary reforms in the administration, and named an executive power of three members, consisting of Manuel Rodriguez Torrices, the late president at Carthagena, Garcia Rubera, and Manuel Pey, men well known for their unfeigned patriotism and talents. The title of president, as leader of the Provincial Government, was changed into that of governor, and all the governors of the federal provinces were subjected to the authority of the congress, and required to give a direct account of all that passed in their respective provinces to the executive convention, which had very extended power.

The union of Cundinamarca, and the changes made by congress, had a very favourable influence upon the inhabitants of New Grenada, who were further pleased, by the abolition of various aggravating laws, and the calling of many strangers to settle amongst them, by a decree of congress of the 13th July, 1814, by which protection and assistance were promised to

them. A manufactory of arms was established at Antiochia, and another of hats at Bogotá. The liberty of the press was unrestrained, and a great many clergymen distinguished themselves in the sacred cause of liberty and independence.

A great many strangers came to establish themselves at Carthagena, where they met with a kind reception, and were strongly protected by congress and the provincial government. Others entered the service in their army. Pierre Labat and Jean Castellux were named to command in chief the forces of the land troops, and Luis Aury those of the marine. Ducoudray Holstein received the command of the fort of Boca Chica in very critical circumstances, and was at the head of the troops by land and sea.

In comparing this true and honourable manner of acting in New Grenada, with that of the dictators, we regret to say that the government of the two dictators, Bolivar and Marinno, in Venezuela, in 1813 and 1814, was the reverse of the former. The dictators had neither laws nor fixed rules in their (so called) republics; the security of persons and property depended on their will and decree: the liberty of the press was a mere name; a single phrase which an editor might publish in his paper against the rulers, would have been punished instantly; taxes and contributions were increased, and misery, ruin, and death, were the fruits of their memorable dictatorial government. They destroyed what the congress in New Grenada had created; and the presence of General Bolivar, in the latter province, was as pernicious as his appearance in Venezuela. We have

seen already how he acted in Venezuela as dictator; now we will see how far his presence in New Grenada was pernicious to the welfare of the latter. After some stay at Bogotá, General Bolivar departed with his troops, and arrived at Honda, where large barges were in readiness to embark them on the river Magdalena, which they descended. He arrived at the beautiful city of Mompox, on a large and elevated island in the midst of the river. Its inhabitants were rich, and have distinguished themselves in the revolution by their enthusiasm for liberty, and their courage. This spirit extended to the fair sex. There were killed, in one night, 400 well-drilled and armed Spaniards, (whom Morillo had sent as a garrison,) and declared again in favour of liberty. This courageous deed was done by the advice, and the participation of the women at Mompox, in the night of the 16th June, 1816.

As soon as the Spanish governor at Santa Martha, General Montalvo, was informed that Bolivar had descended the river at the head of a numerous body of troops, and had arrived at Mompox, he suspected its destination, and felt very much alarmed. The fortress was in a pitiful state for defence, badly supplied, and not having 200 men to defend it. All those well acquainted with the miserable state of this fortress, and the bitter secret hatred with which the inhabitants of Santa Martha suffered the arbitrary and sanguinary actions of the too-well-known Montalvo, agree in opinion that if General Bolivar had presented himself with his army, as he was ordered to do, the majority of the inhabitants would have

forced the feeble garrison to open to him the gates, and would have received him as their liberator. Montalvo, sanguinary and cruel, was a great coward, and had already bespoken a French vessel, in which he caused his most valuable effects to be embarked secretly; so that he was ready to fly at the first alarm. Such was the state of Santa Martha at the arrival of General Bolivar at Mompox.

But General Bolivar preferred to sacrifice the welfare of his cause, and to forget the sacred engagements made with the congress to conquer Santa Martha, as he had promised the day before his departure from Tunja to various of its members, in order to avenge himself of a personal insult received of Colonel Manuel Castillo, when the latter left him with his troops on his march against Venezuela, in January 1813, as I have stated in another chapter.

The following are the true particulars of this little known action of General Bolivar, which was the cause of the total ruin of New Grenada in 1813.

The inhabitants of Mompox received Bolivar and his troops with open arms, well persuaded that he was going to take Santa Martha, the possession of which was highly important for their commerce and welfare. This, and his principal officers' assurances that such was his intention, increased the general satisfaction. Some respectable and well-informed men have assured me positively, that such was his first and firm intention, (and it is just to mention it here;) but unluckily for him and New Grenada, General Bolivar has not strength of character enough to pursue a settled plan with vigour and energy, unless his own

personal interest is particularly concerned. In this latter case he will perform every thing, except feats of personal danger and daring, to gain his aim. He prefers circuitous roads and dissimulation to frankness, or loses his fortitude as soon as he feels himself destitute of assistance, or in the situation of the weaker party.

At the head of the municipality (city common council) of the city of Mompox, was, at that time, Mr. Celedonio Pineres, as corregidor, or mayor. He was the eldest brother of the two Peneres, of whom Gabriel (vice-president of Carthagena) tried to remove Manuel Rodriguez Torrices, the president of that government, in union with General Bolivar, as I have related before. This Celedonio Pineres had very frequent opportunities of conversing with the general, as the latter lived in his house. He communicated to him all that had happened after his departure from Carthagena, where his two brothers, during the absence of Manuel R. Torrices, (who was called to Bogotá as one of the commissioners of the executive named by congress), were trying again to get the upper hand. Castillo, at that time with his army at St. Stanislaus and Baraquilla, hearing of what was going on in Carthagena, assembled his principal officers, and proposed to them to march against his native place, to restore the legitimate governor of the province to his office, and to re-establish order in the public affairs, having received various letters from his friends, calling on him and his troops for assistance. I was at this time with General Castillo, and intimate with him, so that I was acquainted with all the par-

ticulars which I relate, and could name, if necessary, the friends of order who wrote to Castillo. I saw all these letters, which he communicated to me. In this private council of war, held by Castillo, it was determined to march against Carthagena, and to defeat the whole faction. This was done very easily, we having the majority of the inhabitants on our side, who opened the outer land-gate, called the *half-moon*, at two o'clock in the morning, without any resistance, on the 5th of January, 1815, and Pineres, Delhagar,* and about twenty others, of the ringleaders, were arrested, and put into the prisons of the inquisition. But General Castillo, not satisfied, condemned to deportation all these leaders, and remained in quiet possession of Carthagena, where Juan de Dios Amador was elected governor of the province.

Celedonio proposed now to Bolivar to avenge his brothers, and to force Castillo to recall them and their friends. The captain-general, who hated Castillo mortally, seeing a welcome occasion to avenge his personal insult, changed his mind, and followed the perfidious suggestions of Celedonio Pineres. Bolivar flattered himself with the hope that the strangers might be now in his favour, knowing that they were

* This Delhagar was a *protégé* of General Bolivar, when dictator at Caracas, and commanded the siege before Porto Cabello, and was one of the first who fled when Boves came, after the battle of La Puerta, to Porto Cabello, in June, 1814. This same Delhagar was a young unbearded colonel of 19 years, who trembled extremely when Castillo sent one of his officers with guards-men to arrest him that same night. This officer, Captain Garcia, told me afterwards, laughing, that he had never seen such cowardice in a *colonel!*

much displeased with the haughty manners and arbitrary measures of Castillo in Carthagena. He imagined that these strangers, united with the numerous secret friends of the banished brother Pineres, would leave him no more to do than to present himself with his troops before the fortress of Carthagena, and see its gates opened to receive him. But as he could by no means march against Carthagena instead of Santa Martha, he consulted with his new friend to find a plausible pretext for putting his army in march. Hereupon General Bolivar,—who, like the greatest part of his countrymen of Caracas, is very dissembling, and very dexterous in finding out various secret means to intrigue, and to gain his aim by windings and doublings,—openly professed to be a warm patriot, a disinterested soldier, who wished for the welfare of his country, but was yet anxious to save his reputation, and zealous to preserve his authority. In the preservation of this absolute power lies *exclusively* all the patriotism of General Bolivar.

The pretext of which he made use to cover his secret purpose of revenge on this occasion, is as follows:—He sent an officer (the same Thomas Montilla whom he had sent to General Miranda in June, 1812, after his desertion from Porto Cabello) to the government at Carthagena, in order to demand arms, ammunition, &c., of which he was in great need, as he pretended, to enable him to carry on the siege of Santa Martha. This demand greatly surprised the government of Carthagena, as its members were well aware that General Bolivar was amply provided with all the necessary means to besiege Santa Martha. It appeared to

them strange, too, that the general should send this letter, after a stay of about a fortnight at Mompox, and that he had not applied on embarking at Honda. More strange did it appear to them, that he should not have known as positively as they did in Carthagena, the miserable state of Santa Martha, and the readiness of its inhabitants to open the gates to him as soon as he should present himself with an imposing force. All these considerations together gave rise to many suspicions; and those best informed, considering the character of General Bolivar, suspected "that his real intention was to render himself master of Carthagena, to displace Castillo, and to punish him, in revenge for the affront received in January 1813; to change afterwards the existing government in recalling the banished brothers Pineres; and finally, to march a second time against Caracas, with the troops of Carthagena united with his own, and the means which this well-furnished fortress could afford him, to free his native land, and then re-establish his lost dictatorship."

As soon as this letter was received, General Manuel Castillo and Lieutenant-colonel Marino Montilla, (brother of Thomas) at that time a bitter enemy to Bolivar, suggested to the governor what might be the real intentions of the general. It was therefore concluded to send an officer, who could be relied on, to General Bolivar at Mompox. The bearer of these letters was one of the aides-de-camp of General Castillo, Captain Manuel Davilla. The general wrote in his letter to Bolivar, that he would supply him, with pleasure, with all that he wanted; he would find in

the magazine at Savanilla (a small fort and sea-port at twenty leagues distance from Mompox, between that city and Santa Martha,) all that he demanded; and that he, Castillo, had already delivered the necessary orders to that effect; that he could assure him positively by all the secret intelligences received from Santa Martha, that its inhabitants were waiting for him and his army, and ready to open the gates as soon as he would present himself. He added—"he could easily convince himself of the truth, if he would only advance with his troops as far as the banks of the Cienega river," &c.

The governor, Juan de Dios Amador, confirmed, in a separate letter, all that General Castillo had stated, and urged Bolivar, in a very pathetic and strong, but obliging manner, to lose not a single moment in advancing against Santa Martha, the inhabitants of which would receive him as their liberator.

Captain Davilla met with a very harsh reception on delivering his letters to General Bolivar, who was still at Mompox. When Davilla came back to Carthagena he repeated to various of his friends some expressions which were not very polite, nor worthy to be used in the ordinary way of conversation. He added, that various of Bolivar's officers insulted him, and proposed to the general to arrest and treat him as a spy sent expressly from Carthagena to examine what was passing in their head quarters! This party-spirit, this hatred, this unworthy treatment of an officer on mission, deserving at least a civil, though it might be a cool reception, was communicated from the commander-in-chief to the subalterns, and showed clearly

the vindictive character of Bolivar against Castillo and all who came from him. Davilla was dismissed without any answer!

The festivals, balls, dinners, &c. at Mompox, of which amusements Bolivar is a passionate friend, lasted during the whole time of his stay; and the attack upon Santa Martha was delayed. It appears that, in leaving Mompox, he had already determined to act hostilely against Carthagena; and in descending the river from Mompox to Magdalena, he gave orders to seize all the armed gun-boats which General Castillo had established on the river, to keep the communication open between Carthagena, Honda and Bogotá. He declared the officers to be his prisoners, and gave the command to others chosen out of his army. This manifestly hostile act against Carthagena showed clearly his real intentions. He landed his troops at the little fort called Carabano; and, instead of marching directly against Santa Martha, where all were in the greatest consternation, he left it behind, and directed his march, through Baranquilla, Soledad, St. Stanislaus, against Carthagena. His head-quarters were established at Purbello, four leagues from the latter city. Here new festivals and balls were his occupation for a fortnight.

The inhabitants of Carthagena, anxious to hear from General Bolivar, followed his operations, and lived in hopes he might act in accordance with their wishes, and take Santa Martha; but as soon as the news arrived of his hostile act against the patriot gun-boats belonging to the republic,—as soon as his arrival at Turbacco was known, the general indignation rose to

such a degree, that they forgot the arbitrary acts of General Castillo, and organized themselves in regular corps, to repulse, by force of arms, the unheard-of attempt of General Bolivar against his brethren, and the cause of freedom and independence. More than 600 strangers established at Carthagena rallied round the government, and joined the armed inhabitants in organizing the camp and mounting guard. General Castillo had never been so powerful as during the siege of Carthagena. Martial law was proclaimed, which gave him unlimited power, and each man was anxious to prove his devotion to the cause. Many thousands, and amongst them the most distinguished ladies in Carthagena, worked day and night at the fortifications, erected and enlarged in order to put the place in a better state of defence.

Soon after Bolivar's departure from Carthagena to Tunja, Ducoudray Holstein was appointed commander of the four fine forts of Boca Chica, which are the key of New Grenada. These forts are at the entry of the sea-port of Carthagena, and lie at the mouth of a very deep and wide canal, four leagues long, by which the vessels pass into the port of the latter place. These forts were considered the key of the main, and were a post of honour and confidence in the command of that officer during a time of civil war, in which he served against General Bolivar, and whilst Morilla and Morales were besieging Carthagena and Boca Chica. He was fortunate enough to save the foreigners at Carthagena, who came to preserve their lives under the protection of the batteries of these forts. He was, therefore, perfectly enabled to be

well informed of all secret transactions passing at that time.

General Bolivar, being soon acquainted with what had occurred in Carthagena, and learning the general indignation felt against him, began to fear and feel that he had acted too rashly; but, being no more than four leagues from Carthagena, (at Turbacco,) and unable to return and attack Santa Martha, while his hostile intentions against Carthagena were too much divulged,—he resolved to throw off, as much as possible, his responsibility. He assembled a great council of war, and there spoke a long time, and with great warmth, against the government of Carthagena; at the end of his speech asking the advice of his officers, and sounding their dispositions, to know how he should act in this dilemma. Not one of these officers opposed the intentions of their commander, or had vigour of mind enough to represent the disgraceful consequences of acting as enemies against a province which had always shown patriotism and zeal for the sacred cause of liberty, and had never given any example of disunion or disobedience to the congress of New Grenada! Knowing the secret intentions of the commander, these officers were all in favour of attacking by force of arms the city of Carthagena, and treating its inhabitants as enemies! They contributed thus to the destruction of liberty in New Grenada, under noisy acclamations of "Long live our liberator Bolivar, and death to Castillo and his partizans!"[1]

They marched now directly against Carthagena; but the inhabitants of this strong fortress had shut

the gates, and, full of resentment against the undeserved hostilities already commenced by Bolivar, (in making prisoners the officers belonging to Carthagena, in the gun-boats upon the river Magdalena,) had spontaneously taken arms, resolved to repulse this undeserved aggression. As soon as Bolivar's troops appeared, they were received with grape shot, and compelled to retreat, and to encamp upon a large hill, about gun-shot distance from Carthagena, where a convent of friars, called the monks of *Nuestra Senora de La Popa de La Candelaria,* received him and his troops. After some days, various diseases began to spread amongst them, caused in a great measure by the want of fresh water. And here I must mention a trait of the greatest barbarity, which will give a convincing proof of the exasperation of the spirit of party which reigned at that time amongst both *patriotic* contesting armies! One of the leaders in Carthagena proposed, in a council of war, after it was well ascertained that Bolivar would attack the place, to occupy the Popa, that hill on which Bolivar had established his troops; but the other objected, on account of the danger of dividing the garrison, already small in proportion to the extent of the fortifications, and the difficulty of supplying these troops with the necessary provisions. This officer yielded to the majority; but being well aware that Bolivar had no other chance than to occupy the Popa, he proposed to poison the only well on it. This was executed by putting a large quantity of corrupted skins of animals, and other materials of a similar kind, into this well, which was very deep, with the express intention

of poisoning its water, and killing those obliged to drink it, it being known perfectly well that Bolivar and his troops would occupy this only post on the Popa. When they arrived, being exhausted by the march, the dust, the burning sun, and thirst, they drank copiously of this corrupted water, which soon caused great sickness amongst them, and of which a great many died in the most excruciating pains. They were soon deprived of every kind of fresh provisions, which the troops and the inhabitants of the province of Carthagena, all very much exasperated against Bolivar, intercepted entirely, whilst those of the fortress received them daily.

General Bolivar had with him a single small cannon, which he ordered to be established as a battery, against a place provided with about 80 guns, of which the smallest were twelve-pounders! His commander of the artillery, Mr. Collot, *from whom I have this fact*, an able and experienced French artillery officer, (who declined to assist, at the council of war held at Turbacco, disapproving highly of this hostility against Carthagena,) endeavoured to make him change, by remonstrating against such a measure, as highly ridiculous and useless; but Bolivar would hear nothing, and insisted. Lieutenant-colonel Collot was obliged to obey, with the greatest reluctance. When the order was given to fire upon the place, the inhabitants of Carthagena said jestingly, "that Bolivar surely must be in need of provisions, and that he was therefore obliged to kill some ortolans (which were very abundantly found in that part of the environs of Carthagena) to give him a supply!" In

one word, this *battery*, so called, not only excited the greatest ridicule amongst all classes of the inhabitants, but gave a very contemptible idea of the military dispositions and skill of a captain-general and commander-in-chief. He ordered the colours of the province of Carthagena to be hoisted at his head-quarters, as if he were already master of this fortress.

As soon as the troops of Bolivar were apprised that the water in the well of La Popa was corrupted, it became necessary to provide from another source. But, as the spring water in Carthagena is very scarce, and at a great distance, this water was to be carried on horses, mules, and asses, escorted by a large number of armed men to protect the convoy against the sallies of the garrison, or the attacks of the numerous and armed inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Bolivar attempted in vain to induce them, by paying largely, to fetch him every day a fixed quantity of water for his troops. Some few consented, but the majority refused his gold for their water,—and so his troops were obliged to provide for themselves, which fatigued them very much. He acted now as if he was in the land of an enemy, arrested a large quantity of merchandise going up and down from Carthagena to Bogotá, upon the Magdalena river, and sold it for the maintenance of his troops. I must, however, render justice to General Bolivar, in saying, that he has never been an avaricious or money-making man, for he is generous, and cares little or nothing about money. I have seen him often emptying his purse, and giving his last doubloon to an officer who asked him for some money on ac-

count of his salary; and when he was gone, he would turn to me and say, laughingly, "this poor devil (le pauvre diable) is more in need than I, and this golden stuff is worthless to me. I have given him all that I possessed."

The true friends of Bolivar endeavoured now to represent to him the dreadful consequences of such a siege, and used every exertion to make him desist from it; but he was deaf to all, and persisted in besieging the strongest fortress in the present republic of Colombia. The government of Carthagena called General Ducoudray Holstein, for some military transaction, from Boca Chica to Carthagena; he departed the 16th April, and visited the fortifications at the forts of San Felipe and the Cerro, by the request of the government. He saw with pleasure that all was in good order, ammunitions and provisions abundant, and joy reigning every where; whilst all expressed to him the highest indignation against the ridiculous attempt of Bolivar, who treated his countrymen, his fellow-citizens, fighting for the same cause, like enemies. Ducoudray remained a couple of hours in Carthagena, and then returned to his post. No one, of all the inhabitants in Carthagena, or in Boca Chica, was afraid of Bolivar, knowing perfectly well that he was unable to take either place; but commerce was totally annihilated by the suspension of all intercourse between Bogotá, the interior provinces of New Grenada, and Carthagena. The merchants of Carthagena, Mompox, and Bogotá, applied in vain to General Bolivar for the restitution of their confiscated property, he answering that he could not do any thing

for them, and spending the money resulting from these confiscations,—more than two hundred millions of dollars,—for his troops. This siege lasted until the 20th March, but was reduced to a blockade, during which the diseases and the mortality, natural consequences of the miseries felt by the besieging troops in their camp upon La Popa, increased every day.

The cruel and sanguinary Spanish general, Montalvo, being nominated commander-in-chief of the army, and informed of their civil troubles, attempted to take advantage of them, and sent two letters to the governor of Carthagena, Don Juan de Dios Amador, to propose to him to unite his provinces with Spain. The official answer of the latter deserves to be cited here, on account of the noble sentiments of its author, and as an unanswerable proof of the hostile intentions of General Bolivar against the republic of Carthagena. These were his words:

"We wanted by no means the protection which your excellency offers us in your despatches of 25th March and 15th of the present month, in which you propose to end the troubles which exist between us and General Bolivar; and supposing we did want them, we could not at all accept them. We prefer rather to perish a thousand times in this struggle, than to obtain, by such means, a triumph which would undoubtedly cover us with shame, and would end in the destruction of our liberty and independence.

"Your excellency has addressed yourself to our ambition, and you expect to gain by our internal troubles, but you are entirely in error; there has been

no division or misunderstanding in regard to the cause of liberty. No personal consideration, no opinion, no private partiality, can ever disunite us. Moreover, when our ambition is invoked, and we are exhorted to defend our rights, and repulse by force of arms those whom your excellency would undertake to resist—our tyrants,—how could you have thought we should act in so cowardly a manner as to be ever able or disposed to unite ourselves with them? Your excellency might have made us more flattering propositions, which might perhaps have influenced us; but having made these, they can be no other than very revolting, both in form and in substance. And who would not be shocked, and with reason, in hearing that a man like you, who trembles at the mere name of Bolivar, dares propose, as your excellency does, to exhort us to serve as an instrument to save you, who at the same time recommends to us to enter again into slavery? What impudence, what gross ignorance in this attempt to interfere, and this offer to take an active part in the differences between freemen; and, what is more, with the intention of breaking their chains only to reduce them again to slavery!

"Experience should have apprised you that these haughty expressions, which offend us much more by their ridiculous promises of pardon than by their style, do not at all impose upon us; nor will they intimidate us. You have, therefore, taken a gratuitous trouble by affecting so much concern, so much interest, and so much sorrow for our domestic dissensions. We know perfectly that no country has ever rendered itself independent without experiencing troubles and

convulsions. We endure them, always keeping in mind their commencement and their end; and we feel that it is necessary to make some sacrifices. They will end at last; and, if they should not terminate spontaneously, it will be our duty to bring them to an end. But what is this to you? What have you to do with the free and independent countries of New Grenada? Is it to have the empty name of governor of this people, or to be so in reality?

"In regard to the remainder of your excellency's despatches, I will submit them to the congress," &c.

General Bolivar continued to besiege Carthagena, even after having received the official news, which the governor transmitted him through a messenger of the arrival of the great expedition from Cadiz at the island of Margarita, under the orders of General Morillo (March 25.) The commissioner of the congress of New Grenada, the reverend father Marimon, the governor of Carthagena, Juan de Dios Amador, and various others, visited General Bolivar at his head quarters of La Popa, and made him the most urgent representations upon the dreadful consequences of a civil war in such circumstances, urging him to join his remaining forces with those of Carthagena, and march united against their common enemy. They offered him the command-in-chief, ammunition, provisions, and all necessary supplies, to enable him to keep the field; but all was in vain; he replied, he would consent under one condition, which was, that Carthagena should open the gates to him, and receive him with his troops into the fortress. As his secret intentions were too well known, they feared, not without some reason, that once mas-

ter of the place, he would think of nothing else but to avenge himself and to satisfy his passion. All negociations were therefore again broken off, and hostilities renewed, notwithstanding that the Spanish general Morillo, who arrived at Santa Martha, and had disembarked a strong body of troops, was already in his rear. The garrison of Carthagena had made various sorties, but they were constantly repelled by the troops of Bolivar. At the beginning of May, Bolivar at last began to open his eyes, and to conceive that he could do absolutely nothing against Carthagena. He found himself reduced to the humiliating necessity of sending to his enemy, General Castillo, a flag of truce, through which he requested an interview with him. This interview was managed by the father Marimon, commissioner of the congress at that time assembled at Bogotá, who was sent expressly, as soon as this assembly received the dreadful news of Bolivar's march against Carthagena instead of Santa Martha. This clergyman, although of a weak and timid character, was, nevertheless, a very respectable man—honest, upright, and an ardent patriot. He consulted with the governor and Doctor Pedro Gual; and after some visits paid by Marimon and Doctor Gual, at the quarters of General Bolivar—after many conferences on the part of the two former with Castillo, who gave his consent very reluctantly,—the meeting was at last fixed on the 8th of May.

At the appointed day, father Marimon conducted General Castillo out of the gates of Carthagena, at the foot of La Popa, where General Bolivar waited for him in a small private house, chosen for this pur-

pose. Their mutual reception was, in the beginning, rather cool and stiff, but Marimon prevailed upon them to put themselves, at least politically, in good accord. A treaty of peace and friendship was then drawn up, by which these two commanders solemnly promised mutually to forget what had passed, and to live in good harmony and friendship. General Bolivar consented to give the command of his army to General Florencio Palacio, his cousin, and, embarking the 10th of May, on board an English armed brig, with about a dozen of his officers, departed for the island of Jamaica, without having entered the city of Carthagena. Before he embarked, he published the following remarkable proclamation :—

" Soldiers!—The general government of New Grenada has put me at your head, to break the fetters of our brethren of the provinces of Santa Martha, Maracaybo, Coro, and Caracas.

" Venezuelans!—You would have returned to your country, and you, Grenadans, would have remained in yours, crowned with laurels. But this felicity has turned totally into mischief and unhappiness. Your arms have destroyed no tyrant, but have been stained with the blood of your brethren, in two battles, very different in their aim, and very painful to our feelings. We fought in Cundinamarca (Bogotá) in order to obtain a re-union; here (at Carthagena) to obtain mutual co-operation; on both occasions we have been covered with glory. We have been generous in both actions; we have granted pardon to the vanquished, given them equal rights, and admitted them on the same footing with ourselves. We have united

with those who have been against us, to march and free them from slavery, and save their fortunes and their families. The issue of the campaign is yet undecided. You will go into the territory of the enemy and terminate it, competing with me in our triumph over tyranny. You, who will devote the remainder of your days to give freedom to your country, are fortunate; but I, who cannot accompany you, and am forced to die far from Venezuela, in distant and foreign lands, in order to establish peace between you and your countrymen,—I am the most unfortunate of men.

"Grenadans and Venezuelans!—I am torn away from you, who have been my companions in so many disasters and battles, to go and live in inactivity, and to die not for my country! Judge of my sorrows, and the greatness of the sacrifice which I make of my heart, my fortune, and my glory, in renouncing the honour of leading you to victory. The welfare of the army requires it imperiously. I have not hesitated; your existence here and mine are incompatible with each other. I have preferred yours; your and my welfare, that of our brethren, of my friends, in fine, that of all, depends on the welfare of the republic. Farewell, farewell! This 9th May 1815.

"(Signed) BOLIVAR."

Here again is one of those captivating proclamations which call for some explanation. General Bolivar commences this address with a very singular phrase in saying, "Venezuelans!—you would have returned to your country crowned with laurels; but this felicity has been turned totally into unhappiness

and mischief. Your arms have been stained with the blood of your brethren," &c. How (may I ask) could they return to their country crowned with laurels? Was it because they had forced a defenceless city, as was Bogotá, or because they suffered it to be pillaged during forty-eight hours? And who has hindered this felicity—who has stained his arms with the blood of his brethren? What will be said and thought of such language, after reading the particulars, unfortunately too true, of the proceedings of General Bolivar against Carthagena? The dexterity, to say no more of it, with which he tried to make the public, who were ignorant of these circumstances, believe that he had sacrificed his existence to the welfare of his countrymen, may be called, with great reason, an *oriental* dexterity! After having contributed very actively to lose the cause in Venezuela, and then in New Grenada; after having shed the blood of his innocent countrymen, as *patriotic as himself;* after having desolated the province of Carthagena, betrayed the confidence of the congress, put the Spaniards in Santa Martha at their ease, and procured the means for Morillo to reach this fortified sea-port, into which he entered with his troops soon afterwards; after having facilitated the entry of the Spaniards into the interior of New Grenada;—General Bolivar foresaw perfectly well, that all would be lost very soon, and that he might have been arraigned and tried for not having followed the instructions of congress! It was for these reasons that he thought proper to save himself and put his person in security, in preference to remaining at the head of his

army, to accepting the proposals of the government of Carthagena, and to marching against the enemy to make reparation for the faults he had committed, and die a glorious death, if necessary, in the defence of his country. Instead of this, Bolivar embarked for Jamaica, where he was safe, and distant from danger! Nobody had *forced* him to give up the command of his army; on the contrary, the command of the two armies, as I have mentioned, was at his disposal; but the government refused the admission of his army into the fortress, as very impolitic and inexpedient, fearing, with reason, an unhappy conflict between the two parties, in the state of animosity of the troops of Carthagena against those under command of General Bolivar.

Bolivar wished to make it believed by this *ad captandum* proclamation, that he was totally innocent, and the victim of some secret enemy, or faction. But there existed no such thing; it was himself only who caused the death of more than a thousand of his soldiers—the dreadful consequence of a siege, which ended with the evacuation of Carthagena, and the ruin of the province of New Grenada, and its liberty.

CHAPTER X.

Consequences of Bolivar's besieging Carthagena—Situation of New Grenada and Venezuela—Marquis de San Leon and Captain-general Cagigal—Death of Boves—Execution of Ribas —Cruelties of Morales—Conspiracy of the Blacks.—[1815.]

General Bolivar's departure gave great power to his rival, General Manuel Castillo; and notwithstanding the formal promise to forget the past, to live in good harmony and friendship, the bitterness of party spirit, and the innate hatred which exists between the Caraguin and Grenadan, still continued in its force. The chiefs of Bolivar's troops, now under the command of General Florencio Palacios, were greatly excited against all who belonged to the army of Carthagena, and particularly against its commander, General Castillo. Bolivar, before his departure, had appointed his cousin, Florencio Palacios, as his successor in the command of the remaining troops, which, from 2,400 men, were reduced, by desertion and malady, to about 700! Castillo, by the treaty made with Bolivar, had bound himself to supply these troops with provisions and ammunition, of which they were in need, but with the express condition that General Palacios, with his troops, should be put under his (Castillo's) command; to which Bolivar was obliged to consent, on account of the state of total destitution of his camp. The knowledge of this article of the treaty spread a general dissatis-

faction among the troops still encamped upon La Popa. Some of the officers indulged in biting remarks against Castillo, which were reported to him, perhaps a little exaggerated. He was very vain, proud, and sensitive, and had flattered himself that, on the absence of General Bolivar, all would be forgotten, and order and harmony re-established. He was furious at hearing what had been said of him. But I must render to the memory of General Manuel Castillo the justice to say, that all that has been alleged of his being secretly attached to the Spaniards, is a mere calumny, and totally without foundation. His intentions were always pure and upright, in whatsoever concerned the welfare and freedom of his country; but his ambition, his passions, lost him every thing. All might have been again settled to the satisfaction of both parties, if he would have listened to the advice of friends, who entreated him to send for General Palacios, and to have a frank and friendly interview with him. But he refused any advice of such a kind, and treated it as being a weakness, and too great a condescension. I have known both generals very intimately; the one was my commander-in-chief, and the other my prisoner. Castillo, after having heard all that had been said of him and his army, on the day of Bolivar's embarkation for the island of Jamaica, ordered that the troops of General Palacios should be removed from La Popa, and encamped without the gates of Carthagena, in a very humid and muddy ground, where nothing was to be found except sand and stones. But General Palacios and his officers were shocked much more

when they found that this camp was close under the batteries of an out-work, called the Fort San Felipe, so that Castillo could, on the least rebellion, destroy them in a few minutes with grape shot! Every representation against such a revolting and extraordinary measure had no effect upon the exasperated feelings of Castillo. He refused peremptorily to change the ground of their encampment. True, the camp was provided with rations, but in an insufficient quantity; permission was, however, granted to some few of the officers to enter Carthagena, to get what they wanted; but it was refused to every non-commissioned officer and private to enter the city, and the guards at all the gates and batteries were reinforced, as if there were some fear of a sudden enterprise against the fortress. These measures indicated plainly to Palacios and his officers, the true sentiments of General Castillo respecting them. Seeing that there would be no change, they, in the evening, secretly called a council of war, in which it was determined to remove the camp, and retreat to Turbacco, four leagues from Carthagena, which was effected the same night.

When Castillo heard, the following morning, that Palacios and his troops had decamped, and when he received a very energetic letter from Palacios, who acquainted him with this resolution, and with the motives which had forced him to act as he did, he became much more furious. Palacios mentioned in his letter that he was always ready to act in union with Castello, whenever he would grant him the promised provisions and ammunition, and some auxiliary

troops to march against their common enemy. This last circumstance softened his resentment a little, and he felt that he had gone too far. He was placed, indeed, in a very embarrassing situation, and did not know how to act. Some friends advised him to take conciliatory steps, and to begin by sending to these troops provisions and ammunition, which he did. He sent Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Montilla, with the commandant Stuart, who commanded a battalion of about 400 men, with more provisions, and arms, &c. to Turbacco, in order to conciliate General Palacios. These officers and men were received well enough on their arrival, and the warlike stores were immediately distributed among the troops of Palacios; but after this was done, the latter, having given a secret order, surrounded the battalion of Stuart, and summoned them to surrender or be shot. They were thus forced to obey. The non-commissioned officers and privates were deprived of their uniforms, and all was taken from them; and thus, half naked, they were obliged to return to Carthagena. Palacios retained prisoners the two lieutenant-colonels, and some other officers, treating them ill, and as prisoners of war.

When Castillo received the news of such an uncommon treachery, his indignation was instantly excited, and he gave orders to arrest all the Caraguin officers which belonged to that corps, of whom a great many had returned into Carthagena. They were put in prison, and strong patroles were sent out in search of the remainder: those who attempted to resist were very roughly treated. Castillo gave orders to take from them every valuable article, such as watches,

money, &c., and to search them in the Spanish manner, viz. to strip them all naked, and examine scrupulously every part of their clothes, and even *their bodies!*

And who can the reader believe was charged with, and accepted, such a vile and infamous commission? It was a lieutenant-colonel of the garrison, a near relation to Castillo, whom I could expose publicly in naming him, if I had not some regard for his respectable family, who treated me with great kindness and friendship. They were used like the vilest criminals, and shut up day and night, with scanty rations, and in want of necessary food and even water.

When Palacios heard this, he set Montilla and Stuart at liberty; and, as soon as these arrived, the Caraguin officers were released, but conducted with a guard to some vessels which were about to sail, and banished to foreign countries, without any regard to their future welfare or comfort. The masters of those merchant vessels ready to depart were bound to take a certain number of them on board, and all representations against it were in vain. They were compelled both to receive and provide for them during their whole passage. Thus ended the quarrel between Bolivar and Castillo; and these facts, of which I was an eye witness, will give a convincing proof how strong the enmity was between the two parties,—to which Bolivar was the first to give the impulse, and which had the most deplorable consequences upon the welfare and independence of New Grenada. General Palacios, it is true, marched from Turbacco against the Spaniards under Morillo, and drove them from

the different posts which they occupied on the river Magdalena; but his forces were too weak, and too much in want of the necesary supplies, to be enabled to undertake any enterprise of consequence.

We will see now what was going on in Venezuela, after the departure of Bolivar. I have already given a detailed account of the manner in which he left Caracas and retreated towards Barcelona and Cumana, and with what precipitation he embarked from the latter port. The astonishingly precipitate flight of the two dictators, Bolivar and Marinno, would have lost entirely the cause of independence and liberty in Venezuela, if the Spanish leaders had acted with more moderation, good faith, and justice; but their system did not change at all. The persecutions and cruelties practised upon the unfortunate and much disappointed inhabitants of Venezuela, left them no other choice but to endure or to fly, or take arms, defend their liberty and lives, and repulse tyranny with their bayonets.

Since the 7th of July, 1814, the day of the entry of the Spanish troops into Caracas, the Marquis de San Leon was entrusted provisionally with the civil government (which the Spaniards express by the *gefe politico*) of Caracas, and the Captain-general Don Manuel Cagigal with the military department, (*gef militar.*) Both were moderate, humane, and wise, and desired the welfare of the country, *in their sense;* that is to say, they professed a blind submission to the Spanish government, and tried to do as much good or as little mischief as possible. The Marquis had only a temporary authority,

and Cagigal was not firm and courageous enough to suppress, by a vigorous act of severity, the cruelties committed in the provinces and at a distance from his head-quarters, by his subalterns. The former was one of the richest inhabitants, and had great influence among all classes of people in Venezuela. To him Caracas was at this time indebted for not being destroyed. This is shown by the following circumstance:—

When the column of Colonel Gonzales entered Caracas, on the 7th of July, the provisional government, with the archbishop at its head, came to receive them, and requested the colonel to maintain order and discipline, assuring him that nothing should be wanting for his troops. This column behaved very well. Some days afterwards a second arrived, commanded by a man of colour, named Machado, and composed of coloured and black people, freemen and slaves, enlisted by Boves in his division. The commander had been the major-domo, or house intendant, of the Count De La Grange, before the revolution. As soon as their approach was announced to the junta, its members were afraid that the well-known wild and sanguinary character of Machado might occasion the greatest mischief on entering the capital. Three of the most respectable inhabitants of Caracas offered to meet them at some distance, to compliment them on their arrival, and to assure them of being supplied with the necessary provisions, &c., so that they should not have the least pretext to commit any disorders. The former master of Machado, Count de La Grange, was one of the three deputies who met

him at a little distance from the town. Machado, on perceiving them, ordered a halt, and reproached them in very strong and hard words, "for having received and tolerated so long the insurgents and their leaders;" adding, "that he came now to punish the inhabitants of Caracas for their treachery," &c. &c. The Count de La Grange, believing himself still to have some authority over the mind of his former servant, tried to justify himself and the inhabitants; but he had not spoken two words when he and one of his companions were murdered on the spot. The third deputy escaped by the speed of his horse, to announce this dreadful news to the assembled junta. Machado came soon afterwards at the head of his troops, which he put in order of battle in the public square. He presented himself alone, with drawn sword, before the assembled junta, (in which the archbishop presided, assisted by the Marquis of San Leon and others,) and reproached them, in the same violent language, with their treachery:—"Where is that traitor Gonzales? He is a d——d scoundrel," &c. The Marquis asked him, in a firm and stern tone, "what he wanted of the colonel?" "I come to cut his throat," answered Machado, brandishing his drawn sword in a very menacing manner, so that the archbishop and the whole assembly were trembling. The former told him that Colonel Gonzales was not present at that moment; but if he would wait, he would send for him. The Marquis de Casa Leon, indignant at such behaviour, rose from his seat, and advanced close to Machado, asking him, in a calm but firm tone of voice, "for what purpose he spoke to the members of government, the representatives of his king, in a

tone which could not be suffered from any of his subjects?" He ordered him to return immediately to his troops, and assure them that their wants should be supplied immediately; but made him responsible for the least mischief which they should commit in the city. If he complied not with this order, he threatened to arrest him, and try him, as a disturber of the public tranquillity, &c. Machado, intimidated in his turn, stammered some words of excuse, promised to obey, and kept his word faithfully. Thus were the inhabitants of Caracas saved from destruction by the firmness of one man. But when General Cagigal was named commander-in-chief of the Spanish army in Venezuela, his authority was very limited—the natural consequence of his weakness and his fears. Boves and Morales, who had been witnesses of his cowardice, and his flight from Maturin to Angostura,* who, moreover, had had the greatest success when Cagigal was absent,—in the credit of which he could not therefore participate,—finding themselves at the head of a strong division of determined plunderers and vagabonds, who were entirely devoted to them, cared little or nothing about the orders of their captain-general, and acted entirely at their pleasure. Others imitated this example, so that each little subaltern, commanding a small body of armed men, committed the greatest vexations, and went unpunished! Caracas and its environs alone felt the benefit of the good intentions of General Cagigal and the Marquis de Casa Leon.

After the departure of the two dictators from Cu-

* See Chapter VI.

mana, Ribas, Villapol, Bermudes, and others, found the means to unite the remainder of the scattered patriots, and form a corps of about 2,000 men, who fortified themselves at Maturin. They sent some hundred men to Urica, not far distant from that place. Boves marched against it, and, on the 5th December, took possession of the place, after some resistance. He himself received a wound with a lance, and expired immediately. His enraged soldiers murdered every one—men, women, and children!

Don Francisco Thomas Morales now took the command-in-chief of this division, and marched directly upon Maturin, whither a great many patriots, with their families and the dispersed troops from Urica, had retired. He attacked it on the 11th of December, and took it by assault, after an obstinate defence. All were put to the sword. Ribas and Bermudes, with some officers, escaped, closely pursued by the cavalry of the enemy. General Ribas, however, was overtaken, and made prisoner, with six of his officers, on the 20th December, in the valley of Pagua. They were disarmed, bound, and delivered up to the Spanish commander, Manuel Gomez, who sent them to Morales. On the way they suffered very barbarous treatment, which was common among the Spaniards at that time. They were put in irons, and treated like the worst criminals. Soon after their arrival at Barcelona, where Morales had fixed his head-quarters, he ordered them to be shot; and the head of Ribas was cut off, and sent to Caracas, where, (horrible to relate!) the Spanish troops and the militia were assembled on the 14th March, to assist at and

witness the hanging of this same head of General Ribas, in the public square, *by the hands of the hangman!* This barbarity is, I believe, one of the most atrocious traits of ferocity among the Spanish leaders on the Main. Thus perished this young and brave man, of an ardent and elevated mind, who deserved a better fate, and who was abandoned in the manner I have related before, by his cousin, Simon Bolivar, when he saved himself with Marinno. Joseph Felix Ribas was one of the first promoters of the revolution at Caracas, and from that time had taken the most active part in the engagements, under the orders of the commander-in-chief, the Marquis del Toro, whilst Bolivar remained peaceably at San Mateo, or in the valley of Tui. He and Bolivar were, from their youth, very intimate friends and companions; and the latter was indebted entirely to Ribas and Colonel Bricenno, as I have related, for the success of his campaign, in 1813, against Monteverde. Ribas had the greatest ascendancy over the mind of Bolivar: it was he who, persuaded him to march forward, after Castillo had left him, in January 1813, with his Carthagenan auxiliary troops; it was by his skill and bravery that Bolivar gained many battles, being favoured by uncommonly fortunate circumstances, which united to give him his brilliant success. It was Ribas who was against evacuating Caracas, and who refused positively to assist at Bolivar's conferences with the archbishop of Caracas; it was he who at last represented to the dictator, in strong terms, the dreadful consequences of his flight from Cumana in 1814, and who refused positively to accompany him in that flight.

After the death of Boves, and his success at Urica and Maturin, Morales acted like a barbarian; the most dreadful cruelties were committed upon the prisoners, the inhabitants were murdered, and the city plundered and burnt. He was proclaimed commander-in-chief of all the provinces lying eastward of the capital, Caracas included; so that Barcelona, Cumana, &c. were subjected to him, whilst Maracaybo, Coro, Barinas, and all the other provinces westward of Caracas, recognized the authority of the captain-general Cagigal, who dared not oppose an innovation so dangerous for the Spanish cause.

As the division of Boves, now commanded by Morales, was composed of about 3,000 coloured and black people, collected from among freemen and slaves, who were spread over the whole country, their actions and words had the greatest influence over others of this class of people, and various dangerous conspiracies against the whites were discovered and punished.

It is useless to give a detailed account of all that happened after Bolivar's and Marinno's embarkation at Cumana; it will be sufficient to say, that Venezuela was in about the same state of anarchy, and the theatre of the same cruel and sanguinary acts, as under Monteverde in 1812, and under the dictatorships of Bolivar and Marinno. An impartial and well-informed reader will easily perceive that Bolivar's appearance in Venezuela in 1813, and his embarkation and flight from Cumana in 1814, had a very strong resemblance to his arrival at Tunja, and his campaign against Carthagena. In the former he

succeeded at first, but had neither military skill nor talent enough to drive the enemy entirely out of the country. His ambition suffered no advice, no counsel; and, entirely guided by his own will and caprice, he ruined his country. After having plunged it into the greatest misery, he left it, embarked, and placed himself in safety. In New Grenada, congress gave him the best occasion to atone for his faults committed in Venezuela; and I may here allege, that Urdaneta, or any other chief, might have done much better than Bolivar did. His task was easy and glorious; it was to subdue an open and defenceless city like that of Bogotá, with no garrison, or a very small one. Another commander would not have suffered the plundering of a part of this fine capital for forty-eight hours. Bolivar did authorize it! Another man would have complied with the strict orders of congress, marched against St. Martha without delay, and been received with open arms by its inhabitants. The well-known cowardice and tyranny of Montalvo, with his 200 men, could by no means resist such a number of soldiers as Bolivar had with him. By the occupation of Santa Martha, — Carthagena, Savanilla, Rio Hacha, and all the sea-ports of New Grenada, would have been shut against the squadron of Morillo; Carthagena would not have fallen a victim to the Spaniards.

Bolivar listened to the perfidious advices of Celedonio Pinneres, and forgot his engagements, his glory, and the welfare of a million of countrymen. And, strange to relate, but too true, " when the government of Carthagena gave him a good opportunity to

redress the faults he had committed, offering to entrust him with the command of the troops in that province, and inviting him to destroy the small number of Spaniards who had landed under Morillo, he preferred to secure his own personal safety, and embarked, pretending that he was the victim of a faction, &c.

CHAPTER XI.

Events at Carthagena—Siege of that Place by Morillo—Castillo, Bermudes, Ducoudray Holstein, Brion—Evacuation of Carthagena and Boca Chica—Causes of Bolivar's Return.—[1815.]

AFTER having shown the consequences of Bolivar's departure from Venezuela in 1814, and his embarkation at Carthagena in May 1815, we must give some account of what passed in the latter province, in the absence of General Bolivar, and how it came to pass that he returned, after staying more than eight months at Kingstown in Jamaica. For the understanding of the following events, it will be necessary to give a short account of the situation of both provinces, Venezuela and New Grenada, at the time of Bolivar's leaving the former in August 1814, and the latter in May 1815.

The situation of the patriots in Venezuela was not so desperate as the dictator Bolivar had represented it, when he embarked at Cumana in the night of the

25th August. There was not such good reason as he had stated in his memoir, for leaving the field of battle, taking shelter in New Grenada, and deserting the cause of his native land. To convince the reader fully that this was a hasty desertion by the two dictators, I will enter here into some details.

It is true, that the greater part of the eight provinces of Venezuela was in the hands of the Spaniards after the battle gained by Boves at La Puerta, (June 1814,) but they were not all subjugated, nor were their inhabitants in favour of the Spanish government. They saw, truly enough, that they had been seduced by the brilliant promises of their countryman, Bolivar; that he had not fulfilled their expectations, and that he had acted in an arbitrary and tyrannical manner; but they were, on the other hand, fully convinced that a congress, a wise and republican government, could offer them a happier existence than they could expect from the cruelties of a Monteverde and his subalterns, or of a Boves, Morales, Puy, Rosetta, and others of a similar description. The *name* alone of freedom and liberty was a powerful magnet, which had too great attraction to be abandoned hastily; the cruelties and vexations of the Spaniards, on the other hand, offered them no security, no other chance than to take arms again, and drive their oppressors out of the country, or die. If, therefore, Bolivar would have followed the sound advice of his cousin Ribas, to remain in Venezuela, and disregard the desertion of his colleague, Marinno, every one would have rallied to the standard of the only remaining dictator; they would have had a

central point, a single leader, who might have given to each of the dispersed columns a unity of action, a combined force and success.

General Bolivar, who is so fond of a central government, who professed loudly, in his last proclamations, that the military power alone can support a civil and free government, forgot, surely, on the night of the 24th of August 1814, and in May 1815, and still more, in July 1816, &c. his favourite principle; if not, he would have remained in Venezuela, united his scattered forces, and fought, or died, like a hero, in the field of battle. But General Bolivar *did not* show these brilliant qualities. Instead of Bolivar and Marinno, we see Ribas, Piar, Paez, Urdaneta, Villapol, Zarasa, Sedenno, Monagas, Roxas, and many hundred brave chiefs, remaining in their country and fighting for liberty and independence. These chieftains continued to harass the Spaniards so successfully, gaining daily more ground and force, that it is a known fact, that the Spaniards would have been at last driven out of Venezuela, without General Bolivar, if Morillo had not arrived in time to support the cause of tyranny and oppression, in its agony.

Many of these chieftains, of whom I know a great number personally, have assured me, that if the dictator Bolivar would have remained, all would have gone better; they felt the want of union, and an authority which they were already used to recognize.

Besides the eight provinces of Venezuela, the island of Margarita had preserved and supported its independence from the beginning of the revolution, and destroyed about 2,000 of Morales' best troops, who

attempted to subdue, in the beginning of 1815, this small island, inhabited by a set of brave, industrious, and determined people, who also destroyed afterwards about 3,000 of the best troops under Morillo. This alone may afford a proof that the cause in Venezuela was not so desperate as Bolivar asserts.

The inhabitants of Margarita were emulated by the well-known Llaneros, (inhabitants of the plains, in the provinces of Caracas, Cumana, Barcelona, and Barinas.) They were in continual war with the Spaniards, and fought under Paez, Zarasa, Sedenno, Roxas, and Monagas, their favourite leaders, with a bravery and zeal which did them the greatest honour.

Morillo arrived with his 10,000 men, and did great mischief. He took the pompous title of *Pacificator*, ruined the country, and caused the destruction of thousands, &c. When all was nearly lost to his cause, he embarked and left a weak chieftain, known for a great coward, as his successor, who, by his apathy, his cowardice, and jealousy of the military skill of Morales, lost the Spanish cause, and, strange to say, imitated the example of his master and benefactor, Morillo, of whom he was a great favourite, because he was docile, submitted to caprice, and knew how to flatter and pay court to him at the proper time. Dr. Miguel de La Torre embarked, after he had destroyed the cause of tyranny on the Main, and took the more safe and quiet command of the island of Porto Rico, where he found a second Angostura in its capital, St. John. No grape-shot or balls could trouble him there, and he could repose and sleep, as he had done in Porto Cabello.

Morillo divided his forces into three strong divisions, of which one was destined to act against Bogotá and the interior of New Grenada, another to besiege Carthagena, and the last to reinforce the Spanish troops in Venezuela.

At the latter end of August, 1815, the Spanish squadron arrived in sight of Carthagena and Boca Chica. General Castillo, after Bolivar's embarkation for Jamaica, and Palacios' departure from Turbacco, acted with very great haughtiness and despotism in Carthagena, and took no vigorous step to put the place in a good state of defence. From the 15th January, 1815, the day of his entry into Carthagena, at the head of a part of his army, to destroy the faction of Pinneres, he remained quiet in his large and beautiful residence, near the wallsof Carthagena, and appeared no more at the head of his troops. He occupied himself with festivals and parties, married a young and beautiful lady, with whom and her sister he remained regularly at home, was very seldom to be seen, received his subalterns in a harsh and haughty manner, arrested various commanders unjustly, (for instance, the commodore Aury and the general Florencio Palacios,) and made himself many enemies. Among these was General Ducoudray Holstein, of whom I am compelled to speak more than I should do, if what I relate were not a characteristic picture of the chieftains on the Main.

From the time that General Ducoudray had taken the temporary command of the foreigners, during the session of the legislature, General Castillo became entirely changed in his manners towards him. He

became embarrassed, cold, and stiff, from having been before very intimate and friendly. When we took a ride out, which happened almost every afternoon, he was silent and appeared sorrowful; and when I asked him the reason of it, he said, "that he had no motive at all for being so." I perceived this change, and declined riding out any more with him. I heard afterwards that he felt jealous of me, and of the ascendancy which I appeared to have over the foreigners, and that he wished to have me out of his way, being unwilling to follow my suggestions, which tended to introduce more order and discipline among the army of Carthagena, so called, though containing less than 2000 men in all.

I was appointed commander-in-chief of the four forts of Boca Chica, which I found in a deplorable situation. I arrived in the night, very unexpectedly; and when I rose at day-break, as usual, I met a handsome young man, well dressed, who approached me in a respectful manner, and welcomed my arrival, saying that the report from the commander in the forts was, that nothing had passed worthy of notice.* This young man was nothing else than the first servant of the Commandancia, who told me that the former commanders of these forts were in the habit of receiving from him, Lucas, every morning, the report from the forts. Astonished at such a disgraceful mode of service, I ordered the four com-

* I lived in a large and beautiful house there, called the Commandancia, at some distance from the forts, at the entrance of the borough called Boca Chica.

manders of these forts, the major, and the staff officers, before me, and established order and discipline, which had been very much neglected. I understood that the officers on duty left their guards under the care of a sergeant, and came, in short jackets, into the village, where they passed the whole night.

When Bolivar approached Carthagena, the question was suggested, whether I could be trusted to remain as the commander of such an important station as that of these forts, which lay as a bulwark at the entry of the port of Carthagena, twelve miles from the fortress. Some said I might be in favour of Bolivar, and give up these forts to him; but the majority were in my favour, and expressed great confidence that I would be faithful to my duty, and that I was an officer of honour and trust. Martial law was now proclaimed in Carthagena, where Castillo commanded, and in Boca Chica, where I had united the three powers. As the garrison of the four forts was very weak, and unable to do field duty, I assembled the inhabitants of the surrounding islands of Boca Chica, Baru, Passao-Caballos, &c.; represented to them, in a short and earnest speech, the situation in which General Bolivar's hostile attack placed us, and showed them the necessity of taking shelter, with their families, in the forts, and doing military duty as militia, promising, at the same time, that not one of them should be pressed (as was the common use) for the marine service, and that they should be armed and fed at the expense of government. They assented unanimously, and I had about 1,500 young and brave soldiers more, whom I organ-

ized the same day into different corps and companies. I created a company of 150 boys, from 10 to 15 years old, who rendered me great service. Drills with the musket, rifles, and guns, were regularly established in the forts, and the distribution of good rations provided for, a hospital organized, military tribunals erected, the marine, including fifteen armed vessels, systematized, the fortifications repaired, the arsenal, with workmen, forges, sailmakers, &c. established, and all was activity, zeal, and order; so that many thousand strangers, who were witnesses of what passed in Boca Chica, were surprised to see such a state of things, when at Carthagena all was in great apathy.

One Sunday, being at mass, I observed a great bustle amongst the congregation, and all the men and boys running, in the midst of divine service, out of the church. Much surprised, I sent an officer to know the reason of it, and received the report that the commandant of the Matricula (or press gang) had arrived from Carthagena, in order to press sailors in Boca Chica; and that, as soon as they heard that Colonel Marques was coming, they had fled into the mountains and surrounding forest, fearing they should be pressed. I determined immediately to show them that I was a man used to keep my word, having pledged myself to protect them against any service of that kind. I sent for Colonel Marques, and at the same time ordered the inhabitants to return and assemble, without arms, before my house; there, in their presence, I asked the colonel what kind of mission he had, and by what order he came here.

He showed me an order from Brigadier-general Eslava, and General Castillo, to press 80 sailors, of whom the marine in Carthagena was in great want. I told him I was sorry that I could not consent to assist him in the execution of such an order, having pledged my word that none of these inhabitants should be pressed during their services in the forts; and I wrote immediately to General Castillo and Juan de Dios Amador, the governor of the province, the motives of my refusal, and the necessity of being faithful in my promises, so as to inspire that confidence in me so highly necessary in civil war, &c. I dismissed Colonel Marques, who wished to make some representations, which I would not and could not hear. When he persisted, I was obliged to tell him, in a tone of authority, that if he did not embark in five minutes, I would arrest him, and send him into one of the forts. I took my watch, and gave the necessary orders to put my threat in execution. This had the desired effect, and he returned without one man. When the inhabitants saw how I protected them, they had the greatest confidence in me, and served with redoubled zeal. The following is an instance of this confidence.

The governor wrote to me a very obliging private note, approving my zeal, my good services, &c., and ended by requesting me, if I could, to procure him 220 good sailors, for an extraordinary expedition against some Spanish vessels ready to sail in a few weeks from Havana with a million and a half of dollars, which he was desirous to intercept. I answered him, that he could have 300, and more, with-

out any difficulty. The squadron, consisting of five armed vessels, came some days after, under the command of Commodore Tono, from Carthagena to Boca Chica; and the commander handed me a polite letter from the governor, in reply to my answer, full of thanks and confidence. The procuring of the necessary provisions, water, &c. took the whole day; and I had a large dinner and ball party, to which the officers of the squadron and the forts were invited. Tono's first question was, whether the sailors were ready, and whether they were chosen by me? I replied, *no!* With this he was perplexed and thunderstruck; and he was the whole evening very uneasy, and came, in the middle of the ball, at about one o'clock in the morning, with a very sorrowful face, to ask me if I had not yet given the necessary orders for the sailors, &c. I replied to him again, *I had not!* and that he should not be detained a single minute by me. At day-break, Tono and myself left the ball-room, embarked for the principal fort, and ordered the alarm gun to be fired. Soon after, every one was at his post. I ordered all the sailors from the three other forts to come down to San Fernando, where I made them acquainted that the government was in need of good sailors, to embark for about one month, and that I had pledged my word they would embark voluntarily for such a short time. They received my speech with acclamations of *viva la patria!* and said they were ready to embark. Tono and all the naval officers were astonished, and could hardly believe what they heard and saw. I told him to choose the best sailors, and they embarked cheerfully.

When General Castillo heard all that was doing in Boca Chica, he appeared jealous and uneasy. He came one day to visit me, and after having dined with me, appearing to be much pleased with his hospitable reception, he asked how many rations of fish were dealt out daily. I answered so many. He said, in a haughty manner to me, "That will not do, sir; you *must* catch more!" I showed him the absurdity of such a pretension, stating, in a sarcastic tone, that I was the commander-in-chief of the forts, but not of the fishes in the sea! and that I could not command these to be so good as to fill our nets! All the by-standers laughed heartily at my reply, but not so Castillo; he stood up in a fury; took his sword, and said to me, I should soon hear more of him. He stepped out and ordered the officer of my own guard to arrest me, that I might be tried before a court-martial, for having disobeyed his orders. I heard these words, took my uniform and sword, and, in his presence, commauded the guard to present arms. I then asked who commanded here, Castillo or I? As the general made much noise, a great many officers and privates had surrounded my house, and all cried with the guard, "*viva nuestro commandante,*" our father, our commander-in-chief, and "*muera Castillo,*" (perish Castillo.) The general turned pale, and said to me, in a faultering voice, that he hoped I would not suffer him to *be murdered.* I immediately commanded silence, and said to the enraged soldiers, that General Castillo having come on a visit, I and themselves would surely not suffer a breach of hospitality to him; and

that he, Castillo, should embark immedietely for Carthagena, from whence he came. So ended this ridiculous behaviour, and he thanked me very heartily when I handed him safely into his long-boat. But my officers, and those of Carthagena, had a long time been tired of his tyranny and haughty manners; and one night there came three of the officers of highest rank from Carthagena to Boca Chica, who asked my assistance to arrest Castillo and put myself at the head of the troops. I refused positively to accept the command of Carthagena, being fully satisfied with my station; but consented to displace Castillo, as having become unworthy, by his apathy and bad measures, to command us any longer. After the refusal of three others, the command was conferred upon Colonel Bermudes, who belonged to Bolivar's army. He arrested Castillo, and began by shooting Captain Cespedes, who commanded the guard, before the palace of General Castillo, and who tried to resist. This cruelty against a young officer, who did his duty, was unnecessary, as Bermudes had a strong guard with him, which was sufficient to make prisoners of Castillo's captain and soldiers (being only 20 men) without killing a young officer, 20 years old, the only consolation of his afflicted father.

The friends of Bermudes advised him to get himself elected dictator during the whole time of the siege. A great council of war was convoked for the 16th September, to which I received an invitation; but I sent in my place Colonel Santa y Busy, the ex-chief of the staff of Miranda's army of 1812, who served under my orders. I had the following report

from him:—"The council was solemn and numerously attended; and after various orators had urged the necessity of uniting the forces, and naming General Bermudes as a temporary dictator, the latter, already having risen from his seat to express his thanks and acknowledgments, was interrupted by a Caraguin, named Garcia de Sena, provisional secretary of the war department. He spoke with so great vehemency against such a step, that Bermudes, being confused, dared not to speak a single word more. This weakness in a commander, on an occasion where the public welfare stood in danger, made a very unfavourable impression upon the minds of the other chiefs, who had conceived a higher opinion of Bermudes. From that time, and when Morillo besieged the place, the commander of Carthagena took very insignificant measures to provide for the place, showing no energy, no activity, no talents, and occupying himself with his pleasures; and so it happened that the city was filled with sick people, who died for want of food. Some told him that the secret friends of the Spaniards, of whom Carthagena had at the time a large number, had secreted flour, rice, and other provisions: but all was in vain; he took no step to search the indicated places, being sunk into great apathy. Two hours after the entry of Morillo's troops into Carthagena, white bread, baked from this flour, was found in abundance for sale in the streets of the fortress.

In a time of civil war, the greatest precaution should have been taken to fill the public offices with virtuous and devoted subjects; whereas, it is a too noto-

rious fact, that a great many of the most important offices were filled with Spaniards, or secret enemies of the cause.

In September 1815, or during the siege of Carthagena by Morillo, there were to be found in Carthagena, 1st, a *Mareschal de Campo*, a European Spaniard, to whom the republic paid half-pay from the beginning of the revolution, and who remained quietly, during the whole siege of Morillo, in Carthagena. His name was *Don Francisco Esquiaguà;* he was born in the province of Cataluna; and, notwithstanding his being seventy-five years of age, was yet very vigorous and active, mixed in all societies, and was well acquainted with all that passed in the city. He gave every week a detailed account of the situation of the fortress to the Spaniards, to whom he was entirely devoted. This dangerous man was tolerated, whilst the widow of a Spanish colonel, an American, was expelled from Carthagena, with her two daughters, because she spoke some insignificant words against the patriot leaders in Carthagena!

The second Spaniard was Brigadier-general Antonia Angiano, commander of the engineers. The third was the Brigadier Eslava, commander of the navy. Fourth, the chief of the staff of the same department, captain of a man-of-war, J. M. Tono; (the three other captains of the same rank were also Spaniards born, and were yet in the service of the republic). Fifth, the chief of the land troops, Colonel Manuel Cortes; the same who proposed poisoning the well of La Popa, during the seige of Carthagena by Bolivar. Sixth and seventh, the commander-in-chief of the artillery,

Lieutenant-colonel Joseph Bossa, and Major Joseph Lear, with a dozen other subaltern officers. Eighth, the Treasurer-general Francisco Ferrer, and his deputy Juan de Dios Sotomayor. Thus the finances of the republic were entirely in the hands of Spaniards, and at their disposal. Ninth, the intendant of the army, Antonio Cespedes. Tenth, the director of the custom-house. Eleventh, the grand vicar, known under the name of *Father Provisor*, Dr. Bautista Sotomayor; the same who excommunicated the freemasons and others in 1814.

Besides this list of Spaniards in office in the small province of Carthagena, the richest commercial houses, and a great many private families and individuals, besides the friars, priests, monks, and nuns, were secretly devoted to the Spanish cause, and great enemies of the republican system. Bermudes took no step to watch or to change these Spanish officers, of whom a great many were known to be in favour of Spain. He never gave the least order to send away in time all the useless consumers in a place destitute, as he very well knew, of all means of subsistence. The fact is, that Bermudes was an ignorant, ambitious, and indolent man, totally unfit to command, in such critital circumstances, a place of such importance as Carthagena. When, at last, he dismissed some miserable wretches, whom he sent to me with a recommendation to provide for their subsistence, he did it much too late, since three hundred and forty persons died every day at Carthagena.

While Bermudes acted in that place with great apathy and weakness, Ducoudray was organizing

armed gun-boats, to take provisions from the magazines of the enemy, in the islands of Boca Chica and Baru. He likewise created companies of fishermen, who daily took, under the protection of these boats, a large quantity of fish: he supplied Carthagena with provisions; sent armed privateers in search of all that was wanted, and showed the first example to his troops in every kind of danger and fatigue. Thousands of foreigners, at that time in Carthagena, will confirm these well-known facts; although Burmudes, and those chiefs concerned in this statement, will try to deny it publicly, and will, in order to destroy the impression of truth, make the utmost exertions to calumniate my actions and services—as this same Bermudes, Charles Soublette, and others, have done already. I despise such attempts, and am sure that the statement of facts, dates, and names, in my history, and still more the deplorable state of affairs in Colombia, will show how miserable public affairs have been managed in that beautiful country, where nature has done every thing to give happiness and plenty to its inhabitants.

I was always ready to show the example of order and submission to discipline, and of exposure to danger. One day, for instance, I ordered a sortie of 200 men from the fort of San Fernando, to repulse some incendiaries from the village of Boca Chica, but could not find more than 20 volunteers, who would follow a certain lieutenant-colonel under my orders, in whom no one had the slightest confidence. When I heard this, I put myself at the head of the party, and was immediately followed by more than 300 men, but I

peremptorily ordered the surplus back to remain in the fort. I soon drove the enemy back, who took to flight and returned no more.

Another day, I had given orders to demolish a battery of no use, where more than 3,000 cannon balls remained piled up in the redoubt. The commander of the artillery, Colonel Taborda, represented to me that his artillerymen were too much engaged in other works, and unable to take these balls into the arsenal. I thereupon issued an order, that every individual coming to the fort of San Fernando should bring one of these balls whenever he passed the drawbridge to come in, without distinction of rank or person. I understood that this order met with general approbation, and that three staff-officers alone said they never would submit to an order so degrading to officers of their high standing. These having been named to me, I determined to subject them immediately to the order, as a measure highly necessary in the present extraordinary circumstances. I sent for them, after having instructed the captain of the guard at the drawbridge not to suffer even myself to pass without carrying a cannon ball, (and of course nobody *else*,) on coming into the arsenal of San Fernando, where I had, since the siege by Morillo, established my head-quarters. I told these three officers that I wanted their advice about some outworks, on which the Spanish prisoners were employed. Having passed the bridge with them, I pretended to have forgotten some plans, and sent two of them back to my cabinet, requesting them to ask my secretary for those papers. They were in full uniform, as well as

myself; and bearing themselves loftily, they passed the bridge and the first sentry, who presented arms. The second stopped them short, and asked them, respectfully, "if they were not acquainted with the general's order?" They answered, "yes, but such an order had nothing to do with them." The sentry told them "that they were subject to it like anybody else." They were about to force a passage, but he presented his bayonet and called for the guard. This naturally made a noise, and many hundreds assembled in a few minutes to know the cause. I came of course immediately, and asked the reason of the sentry's call. The officer of the guard told me, "that the resistance of the two colonels against the orders given, was the cause of the alarm." "Well, gentlemen," said I, very coolly, "I will go and fetch my papers myself; but as the commander of the forts has given the order that nobody should be permitted to enter San Fernando without taking one of these balls into the arsenal, the useful orders of the commander must be respected, and I obey him with pleasure, since they have been given for the welfare and safety of us all." So saying, and without giving them the least reprimand, or looking at the two officers, I took one of these rusty objects, and passed the gates before the whole guard under arms, and amid the huzzas of all the bystanders, who took each one his ball and followed me. The officers, astonished and ashamed, followed my example, and from that time nobody attempted to resist any order given. I could relate a great many other instances, but I am afraid of speaking too much of what I did. It will

suffice to state here, that I was the last officer who left the forts, after having protected the whole of the emigrants, who came under my batteries from Carthagena, in the afternoon of the 7th December.

In the mean time, Captain Louis Brion (afterwards Admiral Brion) came to Boca Chica from London, with a fine corvette of 24 guns, 14,000 stand of arms, and a great quantity of warlike stores. He fell sick, and I took him into my house, where our acquaintance was soon changed into intimacy. He spoke to me continually of General Bolivar, and regretted much to find him absent. One day an intimate friend of Bolivar's arrived from Jamaica,—a Dr. Rodriguez,—a man whose plain, unassuming manners pleased me much. He had frequent conversation with Brion. They both lived in my large government house. One evening, being in my cabinet, Captain Brion came in, and asked me if I had any pressing business, or was at leisure to hear what he had to communicate. He told me that Dr. Rodriguez had just arrived from Carthagena, where Bermudes, in consequence of his apathy and half measures, was generally despised, that they accused him of occupying himself more with his pleasures than with his duty, and that he was unworthy to command; that Carthagena was in a deplorable situation, through his fault, &c. Brion said to me, after a pause, "I know no other man, among all these chieftains, but Bolivar, able to save the place; at least, he has an acknowledged authority over them all, and you and I could assist him much; and I hope that the misfortunes he has experienced will correct his haughty and

despotical character. Dr. Rodriguez assures me that he is quite another man in Jamaica, and that he is anxious to return. The Doctor has come here on his order, and desires much to have a private conversation with you on the subject, as you alone are able to support him."

After five or six conferences between Brion, Rodriguez, and myself, the following measures were adopted, to favour General Bolivar's return. As Ducoudray possessed the entire confidence of all those under his command; as he had, moreover, many friends amongst the most powerful natives and foreigners in the city of Carthagena; he spoke to Dr. Rodriguez upon the facility of introducing Bolivar, and putting him at the head of the government of Carthagena, instead of the weak and indolent Bermudes. I requested the doctor to go again to Carthagena, and sound adroitly some persons whom I named to him, and any body else upon whom I could rely. He returned, and found my observations correct. He said further, that all those persons whom he visited during his three days' stay, assured him that Bermudes had entirely lost his confidence and activity, and that they saw him, with sorrow, associating too much with women known to be secretly attached to the Spanish cause. Brion offered to go with his fine corvette to Aux Cayes (Hayti) to get 1,000 barrels of flour, rice, and other provisions, (which might enable Carthagena and Boca Chica to support a longer siege,) and to come immediately back to Boca Chica, whilst I engaged the fast-sailing, well-armed privateer *La Popa*, which was one of the armed vessels under my

order, to go for General Bolivar, to Kingstown, in Jamaica, and to send Dr. Rodriguez in the vessel, with a letter directed to Bolivar. All was ready in a couple of days, and they sailed early in the morning, on the 11th of November, in company with three other privateers, ordered by me to search on the coast for provisions. Dr. Rodriguez received verbal instructions from me and Brion; nobody else in Carthagena or Boca Chica had the least idea of what was going on. I handed, besides, a letter to the doctor, addressed to General Bolivar, in French, of which the following is a translation:

"Dear General,—An old soldier of acknowledged republican sentiments, with whom you are personally well acquainted, and are also informed that he has served against you, invites you now to come and place yourself at the head of the government of Carthagena, where Bermudes acts with great weakness and apathy. I engage, by the influence which I have here in Boca-Chica and in Carthagena, to put in execution this change of government without the least bloodshed, and I pledge my life for all the consequences. In taking this extraordinary step, I can assure you candidly, that I have no other intention than to save the cause, which is in danger of being lost in Bermudes' weak hands. Brion is your friend, and Brion alone has interested me, by showing your character to me in a very different light from that in which I had received it from others. Dr. Rodriguez, who will hand you this letter, will explain to you every other particular concerning this plan; but lose not a minute, and come in the same vessel imme-

diately. Captain Pierrill, who commands the Popa, has orders to take you and your friends to Boca Chica.

"Respectfully yours,

"(Signed) DUCOUDRAY HOLSTEIN.

"Dated Boca Chica, November 11th, 1815."

General Bolivar was much surprised at the sudden arrival of Dr. Rodriguez, and much more at my letter, and of all the particulars communicated to him by the doctor. Bolivar was so highly pleased, that he did not remain a day longer at Kingstown, but embarked with the doctor and two aides-de-camp the same evening, to join me in Boca Chica: but, being under sail, he met with another Carthagenan privateer, the Republican, Captain Joanny, who informed him that all was lost; that Carthagena and Boca Chica were evacuated by the patriots, and that Ducoudray, and the principal patriot families, in ten armed vessels under the command of Commodore Louis Aury, were directing their course towards *Aux Cayes*, (Hayti.) General Bolivar then changed his course, and arrived ten days before our squadron at Aux Cayes; and departed from thence to the capital of Hayti, Port-au-Prince, where he was cordially received by the president, Alexander Petion.

It will undoubtedly surprise the reader, that I, who was so decidedly against General Bolivar in September, 1814, had changed so suddenly in his favour, in November, 1815: but this is not so surprising, when we consider the circumstances of my personal and delicate situation, in a land where I was a

stranger, and at the same time full of enthusiasm for the freedom of that beautiful country. On my arrival at Carthagena, I remained more than two months a quiet observer of all that was going on, before I engaged in the service of the republic, which was offered me some days after my arrival. But having at last consented to serve as *gefe de brigada* (colonel) in Castillo's staff, until my nomination as *mareschal de campo* could be confirmed by the congress of New Grenada, on its being sent to Tunja by the president Manuel Rodriguez and General Castillo, I was in honour bound to support the existing government in Carthagena, and obliged to act against the combination of the two Pinneres with Bolivar as I did, and as I have stated in another chapter.* General Bolivar besieged Carthagena; I, being commander of the forts of Boca Chica, was naturally obliged to remain faithful to the established government of Carthagena, and had I killed Bolivar in an action *(as I said afterwards to himself,)* I should have done my duty. But Brion's arrival from London, my intimacy with him, the warmth with which he represented to me the necessity of saving Carthagena in pursuance of his plan, and my full conviction that the plan was the only one to save the province, (which I alone could effect, considering my position at that time,) determined me, and I would have fulfilled my new engagement with Bolivar, at the peril of my life, if the evacuation of Carthagena had not taken place sooner than I and Brion expected. Then I was, like many others,

* See Chapter VII.

fully convinced of the total incapacity and apathy of Bermudes as commander of Carthagena. I was so fully persuaded that I had formed a wrong opinion of Bolivar's character and abilities, and moreover that this recall of Bolivar was the only way to save the republic from destruction, that I acted in conformity to my conviction, and will never deny these steps taken in favour of a man whom I found afterwards not at all to correspond with the ideas I had formed of him.

I will say briefly, in closing this chapter, that the distress was so great in Carthagena, for want of provisions, that it was resolved to evacuate it secretly in the night, without capitulating with a cruel and faithless enemy like Morillo. This was done, and Louis Aury, the commodore of the squadron, received these unfortunate people on board, forced the passage of the canal, which forms the entry of the port of Carthagena from Boca Chica, and all came to shelter themselves under the batteries of the forts which I commanded. I was, therefore, the last chief who remained; and after all the families from Boca Chica were embarked, I went, at two o'clock in the morning of the 8th December, 1815, on board the Commodore Aury, where I joined my family; and so we left that unhappy country, and sailed for the port of Aux Cayes.

CHAPTER XII.

Particulars of the Stay of General Bolivar in Aux Cayes—Characteristic Anecdotes.

THE emigrants from Carthagena, including my family, arrived on the 6th of January 1816, at Aux Cayes, after having suffered cruelly for want of water and food. Some weeks after, General Bolivar arrived from Port-au-Prince, and came to visit my family. He embraced and thanked me in the most obliging manner for my letter, and for all that I had intended to do for him, and urged me to come and breakfast with him.

It was in his room, and in presence of Brion, that I spoke to him as follows: "I hope, my dear general, that you will forget past events; that now, being private individuals in a strange land, we shall not act hostilely towards each other. I served against you, and would have certainly wounded and killed you, (or you me,) if we had met together on the field of battle; but that was my duty, and I was in honour bound to maintain the existing government of Carthagena against you, or any body else." General Bolivar got up, embraced me again, and said the most obliging things to me. He then told me, that the president of Hayti had offered him large supplies of every thing for a new expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela.

Some days after, he offered me the office of chief of his staff, and promised me my grade of *mareschal de campo* as soon as we should enter upon the territory of Venezuela,—saying, very obligingly, that I deserved it for my past services. He authorized me to choose my staff-officers, but expressed the wish to admit Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Soublette and Captain Perez. The former is at present the secretary-general of the dictator in Colombia, the latter having occupied the same office during Bolivar's campaigns in Peru.

I was charged with the organization of the staff, with forming regulations for its officers, and for the administration of the army, and proposing candidates to fill the necessary appointments. From that time I had always eight or ten young officers of the staff employed daily under my orders, in the house which I occupied during our stay in Aux Cayes. All that I proposed in my frequent conversations with Bolivar was approved and put in execution; all these measures were intended for the furtherance of our intended expedition, and for forming a good and well-instructed body of officers, of which, as I told the general frankly, we were much in need, &c.

The president Petion received Bolivar with great distinction when at Port-au-Prince; and not only granted him large supplies of arms, ammunition, &c., but gave orders to the governor of Aux Cayes, General Marion, to assist him in his enterprise.

Some friends of General Bolivar advised him to assemble all the principal patriots who had emigrated, and were then at Aux Cayes, and submit to

them his new enterprise, principally for the purpose of being recognized as the commander of the expedition. At this assembly were present all the civil and military chiefs, and the principal emigrant patriots; among them, Brion, Piar, Marinno, Mc Gregor, Bermudes, myself, the brethren Pinneres, the intendant Zea, the commodore Aury, &c. It was decided, that I should assist the patriots in Venezuela; that General Bolivar should command this expedition; that he should unite in himself the civil and military authorities until the convocation of a congress; and that the expedition should first sail to the island of Margarita, and from thence to the Main, &c.

Aury alone was opposed to giving General Bolivar unlimited power, and proposed to nominate a commission of three or five persons, which should, with General Bolivar, be invested with that authority. The latter spoke with great warmth against the proposal, and ended by declaring that he should never consent to a division of those powers. Not a dissenting voice having been heard, the articles were agreed to and passed. I must mention here, that these articles were already drawn up; that General Bolivar was seated upon an elevated large arm-chair, and the military chieftains lower, and on common chairs, on the right and left of the general: opposite to him sat the secretary of the assembly, and on his left, his right, and behind him, all the other members who had been invited to the assembly by written hand-bills, signed by General Bolivar. I must confess that this arm-chair, elevated about too feet, gave

offence to me and to many others; it had the air of a throne, and a monarchical distinction. This arrangement was prepared by Bolivar, in concurrence with Colonel Louis Durand, a native of Bogotá, who came over from London with Louis Brion, and was the principal owner of the 14,000 stand of arms bought for the government of New Grenada, which were fortunately not landed at Boca Chica, but mained on board of Brion's corvette.

General Bolivar opened the session with a long prepared speech, in which he attempted to show the necessity of having a central government, or a united power in one single person, and he therefore requested the assembly to name such a one before the expedition departed.

Brion then urged, in a few words, the necessity of this appointment, and said that General Bolivar was a suitable man for such a command; and if the majority were in his favour, as he was sure it would be, he would join with his vessels, and employ his means and his credit to fit out the necessary further number of armed vessels and transports, with provisions, &c., to assist General Bolivar, but, *nobody else!*

Brion immediately put the question to each of us, and said: "Do you consent, General Marinno, that General Bolivar, as captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, shall be our only commander—yes or no;" and he turned round, naming each of us by name; and so Bolivar was named our commander-in-chief, *uniting all the powers*, of which nothing was before mentioned in a positive and explicit manner, either by Bolivar or Brion. When the

secretary had read the articles, Bolivar requested that no one should go out before they were reduced to form, and signed by each of us. Article 3rd was put, as I have mentioned, to which Aury objected, and refused positively to sign that paper. This refusal was the cause of the first disunion among the chiefs of the expedition; and from that time Bolivar was very angry with Aury; and that resentment lasted until the death of the latter.

Among many traits of the vindictive character of Bolivar against Aury, I select the following: Before and during the siege of Carthagena, by Morillo, Aury had made the greatest exertions to supply the place with provisions; he had exposed his person and his own vessels to great danger, had received on board many hundred families at the time of their evacuation of Carthagena, and had, in short, rendered the greatest services to the republic, which owed him a great deal of money for advances made for provisions, &c. At his arrival at Aux Cayes, he claimed, as payment, the property of an armed privateer, the Constitution, and in his written demand, directed to Father Marimon, as the commissary general of the congress of New Grenada—the only competent authority which came with us to Aux Cayes, the governor of Carthagena having remained in Jamaica,—he said that if they would grant him this schooner, he would bring the three other armed vessels belonging to him, and would engage four or five other owners of privateers to join the intended expedition of General Bolivar. As soon as Bolivar was apprised that Marimon had named a commission to examine the justness of Aury's

demand, and to settle it at once, knowing that the commissary of congress was greatly in favour of Aury, he sent, the next day after his election as commander-in-chief, for Father Marimon, and the intendant Zea, one of the arbitrators, and reprimanded them very severely in my presence, and that of Commodore Brion, for having meddled in this affair, annulled the just award made in favour of Aury, and tore it in pieces, though it had been already written, signed, and approved. Not satisfied with this, he requested General Marion, the Haytien governor of Aux Cayes, to put a guard of Haytien troops on board of the Constitution, in order to drive Aury's men from the vessel, and take it for himself. Aury, greatly surprised, in vain made the fairest representations; and he said afterwards, that well knowing the tyrannical principles of Bolivar, he had opposed being under his sole order; as he could not endure that such a man should be the ruler of so many thousands of his brethren.

The reception of Aury, by Bolivar, at Savanilla, is too well known to be repeated here. The consequence of this arbitrary act was, that our expedition lost, with Commodore Aury, more than 400 good sailors, and about fifty foreign officers, with eight armed vessels, which separated from the expedition, whilst the squadron under Brion departed without them: full one half of our forces were thus lost to us.

Bermudes, a secret enemy of Bolivar, remained with Aury; so did Colonel Ducayla, Colaud, Bolivar's ex-commander of artillery, Garcia, and others. Aury, as is known, took the Mexican colours, and sailed,

separately, from Aux Cayes to the island of Amelia. All that might be said of Aury's subsequent privateering operations, has nothing to do with Bolivar's resentment at Aux Cayes; it is a convincing proof, like that of the besieging of Carthagena, how vindictive and irascible is the character of the man who rules over about two millions of Colombians at the present day, with more power and *absoluteness* than does the autocrat of Russia, or the Sultan at Constantinople over his subjects.

The inhabitants of Aux Cayes were greatly scandalized at the indecent quarrels which took place between the patriot chieftains. There was a challenge to fight from Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Montilla to General Bolivar; another from General Marinno to Commodore Brion; both were prevented. In the first, I was the second of General Bolivar, who chose me, as Brion did in that of Marinno. The particulars of the first will be related afterwards; the second did not take place, because I told an officer to go secretly to General Marion, and advise him that he should interpose his authority in detaining Marinno in his house, as such duels were not tolerated by the laws of Hayti; which he did. Brion and myself, accompanied by Bolivar, were going to the place appointed for rendezvous, when I urged Bolivar to retire, as his presence was entirely useless and indecorous; he felt the strength of my arguments, and the more so when I assured him I would never suffer Brion to be insulted or hurt. He returned to the city. Soon after, Colonel Valdes, the second of General Marinno, came to the place of rendezvous, telling me, in great perplexity,

that the latter was arrested by order of the Haytien governor, Marion; and that the whole affair was known to him. I pretended great disappointment; but was in fact very glad that General Marion had taken the hint; and so another day and place were appointed for a second meeting.

Colonel Valdes, satisfied with my consent to a second meeting, left me at a full gallop. When Brion heard from me this delay, he was disappointed, and expressed to me his sentiments, in very strong terms, against Marinno. Before our horses were put in readiness, an officer, with about twenty men of the Heytien guard, came suddenly upon us, and saying he had orders to arrest us, bade us give him our pistols and swords. The grenadiers fixed their bayonets, and all resistance would have been in vain. Luckily it happened that I was acquainted with this officer; I requested him to order away the grenadiers, and promised that I and my friend would follow him alone, upon parole, which he granted very politely. We mounted our horses, and appeared before the Haytien governor, who, after a short but polite admonition for having acted against the laws of the country, dismissed us. The affair between Marinno and Brion was settled the same evening, in the closet of General Bolivar, by the latter, in the presence of myself and Colonel Valdes.

A third challenge passed between Lieutenant-colonel Raphael Hugo and General Piar; a fourth between myself and Lieut.-colonel Charles Soublette, the same who is now general of division and secretary-general of the president Liberator. The following are the

particulars of this last curious and characteristic affair:—

During the evacuation of Carthagena by the patriots, (December, 1815,) and their retreat under the batteries of the forts of Boca Chica, I remained the last and only commander who, in virtue of the martial law proclaimed since the beginning of Morilla's siege, had been invested with dictatorial powers. Soublette came from Carthagena to Boca Chica, where he wished to meddle with business in which he was not at all concerned. Some of my officers reported it to me immediately. I came, and, reprimanding him for his intrusion, ordered him to leave the fort of San Fernando and embark. He replied not a word, and embarked on board the Constitution, where I and my family also did afterwards, it being Commodore Aury's vessel. When in sight of the island of Jamaica, the latter desired to go on shore, to procure fresh provisions and water, and requested me to take the command of the squadron in his absence. Mr. Soublette, already much incensed against me, attempted to criticise some of my orders, while I was in the cabin. My friends told me of these murmurs. I came on deck and reprimanded him again very severely, in presence of more than a hundred persons assembled, to whom I explained the propriety of my orders; and Mr. Soublette received this second reprimand without replying a single word.

Soublette being, like all cowards, of a vindictive and haughty character, could not bear this double public and well-deserved reprimand, and said to some

of his friends, that I should pay for it dearly. As soon as General Bolivar arrived from Port-au-Prince at Aux Cayes, and I had been entrusted with the organization of the staff, and the military administration, Soublette, who had never commanded four men, was raised, by the favour of General Bolivar, to the grade of lieutenant-colonel in the staff, and was a great favourite of the latter, for some reasons well known to those acquainted with the family connexions of the said Soublette, of which satisfactory proofs can be found in Colonel Hippisley's Account of his Journey to the Orinoco; ed. London, 1819. Soublette, sure now of the protection of General Bolivar, began to say to some of his companions, in my absence, "that I had tyrannized much over all the Caraguins on board the Constitution, which was, on the part of a foreigner, much the more intolerable, and should be resented by every native of the country," &c. He repeated these remarks to a great many of his countrymen, in order to inspire hatred against me in the minds of the Caraguin officers, and particularly of General Bolivar. I had heard nothing of these rumours, thus maliciously spread against me by Mr. Soublette, until one day, being alone with General Bolivar, in his chamber, he said to me, in the course of the conversation, "Apropos, my dear friend—(we always spoke French together; and in these conversations, Bolivar used the term, in speaking with me, of '*mon cher ami*,' the equivalent of which the Spaniards use much in their intimate conversation in the Spanish language, saying, '*mi amigo!*')—apropos, do you know, that Soublette has made great complaints,

against you and Aury, saying, that neither of you have well treated the Caraguin officers on board the Constitution." I remembered, immediately, that Soublette had since been very careful to avoid my presence, and recollected what had passed between him and me in Boca Chica, and on board the Constitution. I recounted all this minutely to Bolivar, who laughed much at the warmth with which I related it; but I said, at the end of my account to him, "As it is high time to finish all these calumnies of that young fellow, I will give him advice of my intentions, and that in your presence. I asked for pen, ink, and paper, and immediately wrote to Soublette, in Boliver's chamber, the following note in French, which Soublette understands passably well:—"I have just now heard from General Bolivar, that you speak and spread falsehoods against me, like a coward, in my absence. I give you notice, that if you continue to do so, I will treat you as you deserve, and mark your face with my whip wherever I can meet you: such a fellow as you deserves nothing else!" After having signed the note, and addressed it, I handed it to General Bolivar saying, "Here, sir, is my reply to such a shameful calumny; read it, if you please. Bolivar read the note over, and said I should do well to take care of Soublette's vengeance, which might bring discredit on a man of my age, and the head of a family." I laughed, and replied, "There is not the least danger for me; I know this man much better than you do. I am ready, if called upon, to give him, when and wherever he pleases hereafter, any satisfaction he may choose to take!" I called

one of the officers on duty, who happened to be Lieutenant-colonel Pedro Chypia, and handing him my folded but unsealed note, ordered him, in presence of General Bolivar, to give it *himself, in person*, to Charles Soublette; to seek him at his lodgings, or wherever he could find him out, and return to the residence of General Bolivar, where I would remain and wait his return. It was about eleven o'clock in the morning,—and an hour afterwards Colonel Chypia returned, and said to me, in Bolivar's presence, (for I remained alone with him,) that he found Soublette in the street, and that he read my note over twice, turning pale and red, and saying not a single word more than "It is good—it is well!" And so it was; as I can declare, under the most solemn oath, that the said Soublette, after having received my note, very carefully avoided meeting me in the streets, or in any house he could suspect I frequented. This was carried so far, that when Soublette was cautioned at one end of a street which I entered, he turned quickly round and passed into another, whilst my aides-de-camp, who were perfectly acquainted with the whole transaction, said to me, (who am near sighted,) "Here comes Soublette." I quickened my pace, in order to meet him, but they shortly afterwards exclaimed, "He is gone into another street; see how fast he goes!"

As I am speaking of Charles Soublette, I must give some other particulars of him, taken from the book of Colonel Hippisley, which has the following title: "A narrative of the expedition to the rivers Orinoco and Apure, in South America, London,

1819." In a note, page 322, he says, "The council had received an addition by the presence of the adjutant-general of the army, just arrived from head-quarters, the general of division, Charles Soublette. Of this man, Colonel English and the British officers, who had been at the last actions, at Villa del Cura and Ortiz, spoke most degradingly; the former officer had seen him seeking shelter behind a tree, during the action at Ortiz, and had reproached him with his cowardice. This Soublette is, however, an exception to the general conduct of the patriot officers, who certainly are not destitute of courage; and he is, I believe, the only instance of such weakness in the land-service. General Soublette is a very handsome figure of a man; about twenty-five years of age; tall, thin, and well proportioned; remarkably neat in his dress and appearance; half-cast by birth and complexion; he is about five feet ten inches in height; rather a handsome and European style of countenance; black hair and large mustachios; a smile more than prepossessing; a general lover amongst the female part of the province, by whom he is well received, and has no disappointments in affairs of gallantry to complain of; he has, however, been a martyr to his pleasures, &c."

At page 334, Colonel Hippisley expresses himself as follows: "Soublette's quarters (at the city of Angostura, in the province of Guayana,) are entensive, and in most excellent repair. They belong, as an appendage of his own sister, to his brother-in-law, who is a merchant, and keeps a large store on the ground-floor underneath. The general-in-chief,

Bolivar, is, in common with the rest of his countrymen, much attached to women; and one, two, or three, generally accompany him on his various marches. Among his favourites was Soublette's sister; and when his short season of love was expired, the lady, being not only young, but tolerably pretty, with a head of flaxen hair, upon which she could tread with her feet, became an object of chaste love to an enamoured swain, who considered it an honour to be married to the mistress of the 'supreme chief of the republic of Venezuela and New Grenada,' and the sister of the adjutant-general Soublette. And doubly was he rewarded; for, on the second visit Bolivar made to Angostura, he presented his *quondam chere amie* with this house as her marriage portion; the original owners not being in a situation ever to claim it again, as their bones still remain unburied among the heaps lying in the interior of the new and yet unfinished cathedral," &c. &c.

At page 468 the same author says: "General Soublette, the adjutant-general, I had previously to notice. He is too well known, even by the British, for his timidity and cowardice on all occasions. He is a native of Caracas; and Bolivar, when he made him a general, did him, as I have before mentioned, the additional favour of making his sister his favourite mistress; an honour of which two of the parties felt proud," &c. &c.

And such a man has been promoted to the rank of chief of the staff, general of division, vice-president of the republic of Colombia, intendant of the department of Caracas, minister of the war and navy depart-

ments, and, lately, secretary-general of the president liberator. He is, besides what Colonel Hippisley and many others say of him, a cunning flatterer of his master.

We will return to Aux Cayes, where I left Charles Soublette, avoiding me like a spectre. This anecdote is not only known by all the officers of the staff at that time, but by a great many of the principal inhabitants of Aux Cayes; and General Bolivar himself cannot deny this fact, which took place in his chamber, in the house of an English merchant established in Aux Cayes, Mr. Joseph Downie.

I will now relate the promised particulars of Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Montilla's challenging Bolivar to a duel at Aux Cayes. Montilla, a Caraguin, arrived from Jamaica at Aux Cayes in March, 1816, to offer his services to General Bolivar in his projected expedition. Some hours after his arrival, he presented himself, unexpectedly, with Commodore Brion, before General Bolivar; who had often spoken to me and others of the said Montilla, as a very dangerous, intriguing man, capable of doing *great mischief—capable de tout bouleverser*, as he expressed himself in French, in speaking of him to me. He spoke in very animated terms, and I saw clearly some old hatred was remaining against him. I afterwards heard of the following circumstances, which had provoked this hatred.

Mariano Montilla was one of the first promoters of the revolution at Caracas, as I have related elsewhere. He spoke in strong terms of Bolivar's refusal to join his cousin Ribas, and was from that time not at all on

good terms with the former. He came to Caracas during the time when Bolivar was dictator of Venezuela, but preferred to serve in the army of his rival, Marinno, the dictator of the eastern part of Venezuela. Much dissatisfied with Bolivar, and his constant refusal to establish a congress, he joined with some others, and tried to turn him out, and make a second revolution in favour of a congress and a republican government. This was prevented; and Montilla escaped and came to Carthagena, where he joined Castillo, the rival and enemy of Bolivar, when the latter was besieging that fortress. Here he was the counsellor and friend of General Castillo; against whom he afterwards turned, and greatly assisted Aury and others to displace him and elect Bermudes. Montilla evacuated Carthagena with the other patriots, but separated himself from them, remaining at a little port of Jamaica, Savana La Mar, where we stopped two days. From thence he proceeded to Kingston, and arrived some days after the departure of Bolivar for Boca Chica and Aux Cayes. As soon as he heard of a new expedition against the Main, and that his friend and protector, Louis Brion, would have the command of it, he came to Aux Cayes and offered, as I have said, his services to General Bolivar, who, much surprised at his unexpected visit, had, nevertheless, self-command enough to receive him with that politeness which characterises him. Bolivar had some officers with him, so that Montilla could only speak on indifferent topics; he remained a quarter of an hour, and, in taking leave, he told Bolivar, lowering his voice, that he wished much to have a private conversation

with him, and requested he would appoint him an hour when he might have the pleasure to wait on him and meet him alone. Bolivar, astonished, fixed nevertheless the hour of seven o'clock in the evening, and so they separated. This passed in the morning at eleven o'clock.

I was the whole of that day absent from town, and when I came at about six o'clock in the afternoon, as usual, to visit the general, I found him at dinner. I declined dining, but drank a glass of wine with Mr. Downie and General Bolivar. I found the latter uneasy and thoughtful, and asked him if he was not well: "Oh yes, yes, my dear friend, I am very well—very well!" which words were spoken in French, and with a distracted air and tone. After a while he asked me how late it was; I answered, on looking at my watch, (he having left his in his bed-chamber,) it wanted ten minutes to seven. He jumped up, and bidding me follow him, took his hat and ran down the steps from the dining-room into the yard with such haste that I could not follow him in the darkness. As soon as I had descended, I said to him, jesting, that he was surely very anxious to meet some fine girl. He took me by the arm, and only saying, "*don't talk*," quickened his pace, passed the yard-door, and walked with me very rapidly to the large square, during which he turned round three or four times, like a man who is afraid that somebody might follow him. Two of his aides-de-camp, Paez and Chamberlain, followed at a good distance after us. I was, I must confess, very much surprised at such unusual walking and behaviour, but was silent, and quickened my step with him

whilst he kept my arm fast. When we were about the middle of the square, he at last appeared to respire more easily, and stopped, asking his aides-de-camp, who joined us, if they had not seen Montilla pass; they answered in the negative. "What!" exclaimed I in astonishment, "Montilla, Montilla!" "Oh, don't speak so loud!" replied Bolivar; "I must tell you that Montilla has arrived from Jamaica. He came this morning, and requested me to fix an hour to see me, *entre quatre yeux*. I was a little perplexed, and appointed the hour of seven this evening. But I shall not, I will not, see that man again; you must know that he is a very dangerous, intriguing man, able to do great mischief. In order not to meet him, I quickened my steps—you know he lives with Brion.* But let us go to our Signorita's;" (this was the house of the Lieutenant-colonel Juan Valdes, whom Bolivar appointed, during his dictatorship, governor of Laguaira, in recompense of certain connections with his handsome wife.) That individual must not be confounded with Colonel Manuel Valdes, devoted entirely to Marinno, and no relation to the former.

Here we met with the regular coterie, to wit, the intendant Zea, some aides-de-camp of Bolivar, and the family of Valdes. Valdes seldom received any company, and Bolivar did not like a great assembly

* The house of Commodore Brion was situate in the public square, close to the new coffee-house, so that Montillo was obliged to pass a part of the same way by which we came, and Bolivar was afraid that he would see and follow us. Therefore he ran down the steps so fast and quickened his pace, imposing silence on me.

when he was there. He introduced me as a friend, and I came two or three times a week, when he was there every day. As soon as he had arrived, he took aside Captain Chamberlain, his aide-de-camp, and spoke a few words to him; the latter took his hat and went out. Bolivar was sitting in a hammock, and had a very distracted air, looking constantly towards the door. Zea took me aside, and asked what was the matter with Bolivar. He remarked that he was not as usual; and so in fact it was. Chamberlain came with a captain having large mustachios, named Jose Maria Hernandez, who saluted us, and was crossing the room with Chamberlain, to go into the adjoining piazza. Bolivar jumped from his hammock and joined them. I stood with Zea and some of the ladies of the family in the other corner of the rather large piazza, and heard Bolivar speaking to Hernandez in a low quick voice, and gesticulating much, which is his custom when he is talking of some very interesting matter; the captain appeared to reply; but, at last, he left the general, and went out with Chamberlain without wishing any of us good night. Chamberlain came alone, after a full half-hour's absence, to join us at the house of Valdes, but without the captain: he spoke a few words in the ear of Bolivar in a very low tone, who appeared much pleased, and was afterwards more at his ease. We retired, General Bolivar, intendant Zea, myself, and the two aides-de-camp, together. The general took us, Zea and myself, each, by the arm, and said, in a jesting manner, that he was now well escorted, in case Montilla should attempt any thing against him. We left him

at the gate of Mr. Joseph Downie's house, and retired.

At seven o'clock the next morning, Captain Demarquet, another aide-de-camp of Bolivar, came to my house in a great hurry, and requested me, in the name of his general, to come immediately, as he had something of importance to communicate to me. I hastened to meet him, and found him sitting in his bed, and dressing himself. He sprang from it, and said to me, greatly agitated, but smiling, "My dear friend, I am in need of your advice; be so good as to read this letter, and tell me the meaning of it, as I do not understand French well enough to know what the writer says." It was a note addressed to General Bolivar; and signed by Charles La Veaux, a French gentleman with whom I was very well acquainted, as he had been a long time established in Carthagena, where he was the representative of the French nation, as Mr. Baxter was of the German and Swiss, and Mr. Hyslop of the English. The contents were as follow:—

"M. le General,—Having been chosen by Lieutenant-colonel Mariano Montilla, my friend, to enclose you the following printed pasquinade against the said colonel, signed Jose Maria Hernandez, which has been posted up at the corner of the public square, and was brought to him early this morning; I am directed by him to tell you, with reluctance, that he, Colonel Montilla, considers this injurious paper *as coming from you*, and not from a man of whose existence he had never heard before. Certain past transactions between you and my friend, made him more than

suspect that nobody but yourself could be the author of this handbill, and therefore I am authorized to demand for the colonel the usual satisfaction between gentlemen and officers; please to acquaint me with the day, the hour, and the place, where your meeting can be settled; but as the stay of Colonel Montilla admits of no delay, I request you to fix it in the course of to-day, or at least to-morrow. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) Charles La Veaux, Aux Cayes, March 8th, 1816."

The paper inclosed was printed in the Spanish language, to the following purport: "To the Venezuelan officers at present residing in the city of Aux Cayes: Citizens and countrymen—You are advised that Commandant Mariano Montilla has arrived in this town, and applied to have the honour of being admitted among us. All those who know well the intriguing and dangerous character of this man, will, I hope, join me in opposing his admission into the army, &c. (Signed) T. M. Hernandez, captain of the body-guard of his excellency the captain-general of the armies of Venezuela and New Granada, and commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army," &c. &c.

While I sat down to read these papers, Bolivar was pacing his bed-chamber up and down, like a man profoundly occupied, and stopping before me three or four times, he asked me, at last, what I thought of M. La Veaux's letter. "I think it is a formal challenge from Montilla." "What," said he, greatly agitated, "do you think so, my dear friend?" "Yes, to be sure," I replied. "But how came you to

receive such a curious challenge; what can be the reason of Montilla's attributing to you such an infamous paper? He should have directed the challenge to Hernandez! Well, general, be quiet and easy; I will arrange the whole singular business, and will see La Veaux; and never will I suffer that you shall be molested by any of your subalterns, on such a ridiculous accusation!" He embraced me, highly pleased with the warmth of my actions, and called me his best friend.

I went for La Veaux, but could not find him; I went to Montilla, and found these two gentlemen, with the lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, Rafael Zugo, in a conversation, which appeared to me to be very animated.

M. La Veaux acknowledged that he was the author of the letter written to General Bolivar, which the latter left with me, and that it was at the particular request of Colonel Montilla that he wrote it. I turned to Montilla, and asked him the reason of such a procedure against a man who was my commander-in-chief, and unable to act in such a base manner against him. "Oh," said he, "you know not this man, as I have done for many years; he is positively the author of this paper, and nobody else." These were the words of Montilla. After a long conversation, I told the two gentlemen, M. La Veaux and Montilla, that I would never acknowledge M. La Veaux's letter to be a challenge; and if they would absolutely challenge General Bolivar, I declared to them they should fight with me and kill me first, before I would suffer his life to be hazarded,

upon which the safety of so many thousands of us depended entirely, &c. But being, at the time, fully convinced of the innocence of General Bolivar, I offered Montilla a written declaration that the general would be ready to give him an honourable testimony, enabling him to show it to whoever he pleased. Montilla desired that it should be stated expressly in that letter, that Bolivar disavowed any participation in the said pasquinade. This I positively refused, as degrading to the character of the general; but engaged to urge him to furnish it from Hernandez, as a just satisfaction to him, Montilla. M. La Veaux interfered, and said to Montilla, that my proposals were honourable and sufficient; and added, it would suffice to bring Hernandez before him, La Veaux, at his lodgings, to acknowledge that he was sorry for having made such a pasquinade against Montilla. To this the latter consented; and I pledged my word to see both measures punctually fulfilled; and the hour of four o'clock in the afternoon was fixed, when I engaged to bring Captain Hernandez with me to M. La Veaux's.

I returned to Bolivar's house, where I found him in his bed-chamber alone, walking to and fro, and looking very dejected and pale. I related to him minutely my whole conversation, which gave him great satisfaction; but when I came to the last point, the intended apology of Hernandez, he jumped from his chair and asked me abruptly—"What! have you consented that I shall punish Hernandez, and send him to La Veaux's at four o'clock?" To be sure I have; it is absolutely necessary, to save

your own honour, which is deeply compromised by the formal accusation of Montilla, who appears sincerely to think that you, and not Hernandez, are the author of this pasquinade; and therefore it is necessary that not the least shadow of suspicion against you should remain in his mind." He replied, "You are correct, my dear friend; it is true—it must be done."

He requested me to make out a letter in French to M. La Veaux, in reply to his note, in which I gave an honourable testimony in favour of Colonel Montilla, but without mentioning either the challenge or Captain Hernandez's pasquinade.

Bolivar said to me, in making this request, that he did not write French well, and that his mind was vexed with so disagreeable a business. After having perused my draft, Bolivar appeared highly pleased with it, and sat down to copy, sign, and seal it.

Montilla and La Veaux were both satisfied, and so was I. When I came back to the general, he said to me in a jesting tone, that my engagement to fetch Hernandez to M. La Veaux, was a *pretty hard task;* but nevertheless, added he, "you are in the right; it will, it must, it shall be done." These last words were spoken in a passionate manner, as he walked up and down his chamber. "Well, colonel! (no more *mon cher ami*) you will be here at four o'clock; I must go and prepare Hernandez; he shall be here and go with you."

I arrived a little before four o'clock; my hand was on the knocker of the general's door, which led from the saloon through a large piazza to his bed-chamber,

(as I was accustomed to go freely out and in, without being announced,) when Colonel Paez, the aide-de-camp on duty, told me in a low voice not to enter, as the general desired me to wait some minutes, having to speak with Captain Hernandez. This private conversation in a matter in which I had undoubtedly some claims to be present, struck my mind, and some suspicions arose in regard to the truth of Colonel Montilla's accusation; but I had then too great and exalted an idea of General Bolivar's character, to suffer the least impression to remain; and entering the saloon, conversed with some officers present. After a while, the general called me into the piazza, his face being highly flushed, and showed me Hernandez coming out of the chamber with a very harsh look, and his eyes fixed to the ground, as a man who was contemplating something that was profoundly engraved on his mind. Bolivar whispered me in French, in going through the piazza into his chamber, "*Ne faites aucun reproche à Hernandez, je l'ai deja fait,*" (make no reproaches to Hernandez, I have done so already.) Hernandez was in full uniform, but without his sword, and had his hat in his hand. Bolivar and myself were in a civil dress. The general said to me, that Hernandez was ready to follow me, when the latter stepped hastily forward, put his hat over his face, and said, *vamos, vamos!* (let us go.) I followed, a little surprised at his behaviour; and when I was in the street with him, he walked extremely fast. "Captain," said I, "go not so fast; I cannot follow you, it is too warm." "Oh, yes, yes, it is true; I beg pardon;" answered he, slackening his

pace; "but you would excuse me if you knew all that has happened. No, no, you are a good man, too good a man; but it must be done." He grasped my hand, and some tears fell from his cheeks. "But, Captain Hernandez, what is the matter with you—are you ill? what can have happened to you?" Until then I had treated him with great severity, firmly convinced of his being the author of the paper; but now I felt again new doubts, and, in this uncertainty, I spoke to him with a milder tone, and entreated him to open his mind, and to fear nothing in doing so. "Oh no, oh no! I cannot, I cannot! I know you are the father of your aides-de-camp, (they expressed themselves so to their companions in arms.) You are good, but—no, no, I cannot speak—I dare not speak;" and so we arrived at M. La Veaux's room. I told the latter, in French, to be satisfied with any apology he should make; I pitied Hernandez, who proffered some broken and unintelligible words, with which M. La Veaux professed himself satisfied, and Hernandez was dismissed. I now told M. La Veaux, (who had always been my good friend, and had served with distinction in the French army,) of the strange behaviour of Hernandez. "Oh, (said he to me), Montilla is in the right; you know not all; but as you are engaged, and can run a brilliant career with your new friend, I will not say any thing else to you. You acted in a frank and honourable way; and if Bolivar is not an ungrateful man, he must undoubtedly be your friend," &c.

The Lieutenant-colonel Montilla embarked two days afterwards, with M. Papageau, a French mer-

chant, established at the time at Kingston, Jamaica, under the firm of Hardy, Moose, and Co. He is acquainted with M. La Veaux, who is now in Martinique. They will undoubtedly confirm this statement, which, of course, will be denied by Bolivar and Montilla, who are at present very good friends.

Now I must give the key to Montilla's suspicion of Bolivar's, Hernandez's, and La Veaux's actions and words, which the following circumstances will put in a proper light. After the action of Ocumare, whence Bolivar fled, and, a second time, took shelter at Jacquemel and Port-au-Prince, Captain Chamberlain, one of his aides-de-camp, came to Aux Cayes, where I then resided, to see me. After dinner, when he had drunk pretty freely, and we were talking together of past times, I asked him if he could not give me some account of the challenge sent by Montilla, and of the strange suspicions of the latter as to General Bolivar's being the author of the pasquinade, and not Hernandez. "To be sure," said he, "I can;" and he told me the following facts: "After Montilla's first visit in the morning to General Bolivar, he called Chamberlain, and said to him, he wished to get rid of Montilla, who was a very dangerous intriguer; and the thought occurred to him, to find some of the officers who would sign a paper against Montilla, and have it immediately printed. Chamberlain proposed Hermandez as the fittest for this purpose; and the general sending for him, was very much disappointed to hear he was out, and would not return that evening. So Bolivar and Chamberlain spoke secretly in the piazza of Colonel Valde's house, and then went to Mr. Baillot, the printer, (engaged by Bolivar to follow us),

to sign the pasquinade already prepared, which was printed during the night, and fixed on the different corners of the streets of the city. When Montilla complained to General Marinno, the Haytien governor, with one of the printed bills in his hand, the general immediately ordered the only printer in the city, Mr. Baillot, to be arrested, who declared that he had received the written pasquinade by an aide-de-camp of General Bolivar's, with the order to print it secretly, and not make known to any one that it came from him. This aide-de-camp was Chamberlain, in whom Bolivar had always the greatest confidence; he was a native of the island of Jamaica, and had served in the British army. Thus it happened that Colonel Montilla and M. La Veaux, highly offended at Bolivar's conduct, agreed to challenge him, and to accuse him of what was the truth, namely, his being the author of the pasquinade."

I have entered into all these minute circumstances, in order to show the true character of Bolivar. I vouch for the truth of this anecdote, having been myself one of his dupes, and one of the actors in the whole transaction.

Captain Hermandez was eight days afterwards promoted to the rank of major; and in Margarita, two months later, I received the order to deliver him a brevet as lieutenant-colonel; by which means the mouth of this officer was closed.

CHAPTER XIII.

Sailing of the Expeditionary Army, under command of General Bolivar, from Aux Cayes to Margarita—Naval Action on the 2d of May, and General Bolivar's behaviour in it—Events in the Island of Margarita—Arrival of the Expedition at Carupano—Characteristic Anecdotes of General Bolivar—The Author takes final leave of the Service—What happened between General Bolivar and him at Aux Cayes and at Port-au-Prince.—[Year 1816.]

THE Haytien government made great advances to General Bolivar, in ammunition, provisions, and money. President Petion and his friend General Boyer were very favourable to his expedition, whilst the corrupt and cunning Inginac, secretary of state, was, as I was assured, secretly an enemy to all whites who had not money enough to gain him over. This despicable man, who is a white, as has been said, had done more harm to the whites than all the coloured and black people of Hayti. He is too well-known to many thousands, and unworthy to be further mentioned.

Louis Brion, promoted to the rank of post-captain, did more than any of us to fit out the squadron in a proper way. He was named commander of the navy, and employed his great credit and the remainder of his large fortune, to enable us to depart from Aux Cayes on the 10th April, 1816.

But scarcely had we arrived at the island of San Beata, when the whole squadron was detained by—a

woman! it was no other than *Miss Pepa M—*, (the Spanish name of Josephine,) the dear mistress of General Bolivar. She alone, by her secret virtues, had the power to detain the whole squadron, and about a thousand men, during more than forty-eight hours, at anchor!

The following particulars will explain this curious and notorious fact. General Bolivar is, like all his countrymen the Caraguins, greatly attached to the fair sex, and has usually with him one, two, or more mistresses in his retinue, besides those whom he takes a fancy to in passing from one place to another. These amours last ordinarily four-and-twenty hours, or a week; but Miss Pepa made a rare exception to the general's customary habits. He had known her since 1813, during his dictatorship, at which time she had much influence over him, as I have already mentioned. When Bolivar arrived from Aux Cayes at Port-au-Prince, he found, unexpectedly, the two sisters, Helen and Isabella Soublette, sisters of the famous General Charles Soublette, whom our readers know already; and in Aux Cayes he met Madame Valdes and her two daughters, with whom he regularly passed the greater part of his time. As soon as he was named commander-in-chief, by the assembly held at Aux Cayes, he wrote to Miss Pepa, who resided with her mother and sister at St. Thomas's, to come and join him without delay. He expected them daily with great anxiety, and deferred the departure of our expedition from one day to another, during more than six days. At last Commodore Brion, grown impatient, declared to him frankly that it was high

time to embark, and that he would not and could not wait any longer. Bolivar, therefore, was obliged to sail without his mistress, and we departed. Before we arrived at the island of La Beata, some leagues from Aux Cayes, a fast-sailing pilot-boat brought the lucky tidings to General Bolivar, that his dear Miss Pepa, with her mother and sister, had arrived at Aux Cayes, from St. Thomas's. This letter caused a bustle on board the whole squadron. Bolivar immediately took Commodore Brion, (on board whose vessel he, General Florencio Palacios his cousin, intendant Zea, and myself, with the officers of the staff, had embarked,) down into the cabin, where they remained a long time talking together. Brion was strongly opposed to waiting the arrival of Miss Pepa, with whom he had been already well acquainted at Caracas; but the entreaties of General Bolivar prevailed at last, and he consented to wait. The complaisant Paez,* Anzoatiqui, and Soublette, made a formal toilette, put themselves in uniform, and sailed back to Aux Cayes, in the fast-sailing armed schooner, the Constitution, in search of Miss Pepa. They were rewarded for their readiness to comply with the desires of their master; Anzoatiqui was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, commander of the body-guard of General Bolivar, and Soublette, adjutant-general colonel, attached to the staff. When I and others of the foreigners heard this curious news, we were greatly mortified at such a proceeding, and

* This Paez, who was an aide-de-camp of General Bolivar, must not be confounded with General Paez, of the Llaneros. They are not at all related or connected.

declared loudly that we would leave a commander who compromised the welfare of so many thousands for such a motive. When Brion heard this determination, he urged me in very strong terms to remain, and said, that if I were to leave the expedition, all the other foreigners would, undoubtedly, follow my example; and he should be greatly disappointed at it. His entreaties were so urgent, that I at last yielded, and promised him to stay; I persuaded the others to do the same, and not a single foreign officer disembarked. But General Palacios, the cousin of Bolivar, with some other Caraguins, would not remain any longer, (notwithstanding the entreaties of Bolivar himself,) and were put on shore not far distant from the Haytien port of Jacquemel. The majority of the officers composing this *expeditionary army* were very much dissatisfied with being under the controul of such circumstances, when activity and bravery alone could save the country. From that time Bolivar sunk very much in my opinion, and that of others.

The composition of that *expeditionary army*, which took afterwards the title of *liberating army*, was as follows: There were six generals, nine colonels, forty-seven lieutenant-colonels, a chief of the staff, three adjutant-general colonels, and eighteen officers of the staff; one commandant of the artillery, one intendant-general, one secretary general of the intendancy, and several for the administration of the army; one commandant-general of the cavalry; without taking into the account that each general had his aides-de-camp, a secretary, servants, and many their mistresses or wives; that each adjutant-general, and each colonel,

had his adjutant; that the number of majors, captains, and lieutenants, amounted to about 500. Each lady had either her mother, sisters, or some other friend, male or female servants, and a good deal of baggage; which embarrassed greatly the manœuvring of the vessels. There were besides, a number of families, emigrants from Venezuela, that embarked at Aux Cayes in spite of the entreaties of Commodore Brion, who was against the admittance of any female on board the squadron. When Miss Pepa arrived, she was never suffered to come on board the commodore's vessel, where General Bolivar, Zea, and myself, with the staff officers, except Charles Soublette, remained. This man, before we departed from Aux Cayes, had asked, as a favour from General Bolivar, that he should not embark in the same vessel where I was; he was ordered on board the Constitution, and remained with Miss Pepa; he never came on board our vessel during our whole passage, in the course of which we had the visits of a number of other officers from the squadron. Miss Pepa arrived at last, on the third day, from Aux Cayes, where the Constitution was obliged to remain a whole day; this belle not being prepared to embark. Bolivar made his toilette in a superb style, and left our vessel to pay his visit on board the Constitution, where he remained the whole day and night, and came the next morning on board the Commodore, who was, as well as myself, and the other officers, highly displeased at having lost about four days at anchor.

When we passed the city of St. Domingo, at that time belonging to the Spaniards, the whole place was in

alarm, believing we should attack them: we saw, from our deck, their bustle, and laughed heartily at their fears.

On the morning of the 2nd of May, the squadron, being not far distant from the three elevated rocks, known by the name of the Three Monks *(Los Tres Frailes)* not far from the island of Margarita, two Spanish men of war, a large brig and a schooner, were signalled. As our squadron had no colours at all, Brion ordered the Spanish flag to be hoisted on board each of our vessels, so that the enemy, believing it was his own long-expected squadron, took in sail and waited for us; but as soon as they perceived their mistake, the captain of the schooner, which was a fine and fast-sailing vessel, pressed sail and left his commander, whose brig did not sail so well. Both tried to escape, but too late. Brion changed his colours and fired upon them. The brig was soon overtaken by our brig, a fine large vessel, armed with eight carronades and a brass 24-pound swivel. Three fast-sailing schooners were detached from the squadron in chase of the Spanish schooner, which was taken some hours afterwards. It was the Spanish royal schooner *Rita*, with two carronades, 24-pounders, six 8-pounders, and one 18-pound swivel; commanded by the Captain Don Mateo Ocampo, who was mortally wounded in the combat. The royal brig was the *Intrepido*, with fourteen 8-pounders and 150 men, sailors and troops, commanded by the brigadier *Don Rafael Iglesias*, who was wounded and then killed by our men, who took the vessel by boarding. They entered the cabin with drawn swords

while the surgeon was dressing his wound, and killed him; the surgeon attempted to appease them, and was murdered too. Such was the horrid character of this barbarous war. Commodore Brion, who fought bravely, received a wound which was, fortunately, of no dangerous consequence, and was promoted, after the action, to the rank of admiral of the republic of Venezuela.

But how did General Bolivar behave in this pretty hot and close action, which lasted more than four hours? As soon as he heard that Brion had ordered the necessary preparations for attack, he took me aside and spoke as follows: "But, my friend, do you not think that the Spaniards will resist, and fight to the last?" "To be sure they will," replied I, laughing. "Well, but do you think that our schooner is strong enough to fight alone against those two powerful vessels, (at the same time looking at them through a glass,) we are too distant, and too far in advance, which renders it impossible for the remainder of our squadron to support us in the action." "That is true, (said I,) but we will take them by boarding, which is the customary way to force Spanish vessels." "What? by boarding? do you think of such folly?" (*y pensez vous mon cher ami? c'est une folie!*) These were the very expressions of General Bolivar. "But what is the best for me to do?" he continued. "Do you not think, that if I were wounded, or killed, our expedition would be totally lost, and Brion, the poor Brion, would have expended in vain all his fortune!" I looked up, astonished; it first occurred to me, that he might be jesting; but when I saw that these

strange questions were put to me in *earnest*, I understood him, called Brion, and said: "General Bolivar has made to me a just observation concerning you; he said, that, he being wounded or killed in the action, you would lose all your advances, as then the expedition would, of course, be disbanded." "Well, general," said Brion, turning to Bolivar, "you will be safely placed with the intendant, Zea, to whom I have assigned a place in our cabin, (in which Bolivar, Brion, Zea, and myself slept,) at the entry of the powder magazine, to hand the necessary cartridges. As Brion said these words in an angry manner, Bolivar asked: "But, my dear Brion, do you not think that Ducoudray's observation is just? do you not think so?" "Oh yes, yes," said Brion, and turned round. I was giving the necessary orders to our officers to arm with muskets and cartridges, when Bolivar came hastily and took me by the arm, saying, "Now I have found an excellent place, better than to be down in the cabin with old Zea," (who looked, in fact, much older than he was, and was the same man who died as minister of Colombia in England.) He showed me the long-boat, which, in armed vessels, is generally fixed over the cabin windows. He jumped in, called Garcia, (his intendant,) ordered his pistols and sword, and told him to load two balls in each pistol, which Garcia did in my presence, looking at me and laughing. This position, which Bolivar chose for himself, was surely the safest place in the vessel; then, in sitting as he did in the long-boat, his head and whole body were safely protected by the thickness and strength of the beam which supports the

rudder of the vessel. He sat down in the boat, and requested me to take command of the officers, whom I provided with arms and ammunition; and Brion entrusted me with the command of the volunteers, so that I had to survey the whole infantry of about 160 armed men. A strange contrast was afforded by M. Ballot, a respectable French gentleman of 64 years of age, who, together with his young son of 16 years old, put themselves voluntarily under my orders, in spite of Brion's and my representations that they should go down into the cabin, and assist Mr. Zea. Both, full of ardour and courage, refused positively, and said that this was a post of honour; and that they would not have any other assigned to them. In comparing the behaviour of Ballot, father and son, who exposed their lives, voluntarily, for the welfare of a country in which they were not born, and to which they did not come in order to fight, with that of a military chieftain, already famous, who now, placed at the head of an expedition, withdrew himself in such a curious manner, when he should have taken the command of us all, we have surely a very characteristic trait of what I have already said of Bolivar, and of what I must repeat in the course of these memoirs of him, for the sake of *truth*. Both the Ballots fought with great courage and coolness.

We suffered much during the action, from the musket fire of about a hundred men of the Spanish regiment La Corono, who fired from the rigging into our vessel, and wounded and killed about fifty of our officers and men. We stood more than an hour at

half pistol shot from the brig, before we could fix the grapples for boarding. When the crew saw about a dozen of us on their deck, the battle began to be renewed with more fury; but when our number increased, and their brave commander felt himself mortally wounded, they lost all hopes; and about thirty of them stripped off their clothes and jumped overboard, in hopes to save their lives by swimming to the Three Rocks, which lay a gun-shot distance from us.

At this moment, General Bolivar, having all this time been sitting very safe in the long-boat behind his beam, perceived these naked unfortunate men swimming at a very short distance from him; he took his pistol and killed one of them—took the second, and fired at (but missed) another!

When all was over, and the brig was taken, he jumped out of his boat, came with a radiant face to me and said, "My dear friend, you fought bravely, but I too have not been inactive; I killed my man; but unfortunately missed the second!" I, who had passed several times from one side of the vessel to the other, always seeing my commander leaning his head close to the beam, was surprised, and asked him how he could kill a man in his boat? "Ah, said he, laughing, with my pistol, in the water!"

Such was Bolivar, in the action of the 2nd May, 1816. I was there; I saw him, he spoke to me, and I commanded, in his place, our corps of officers and volunteers, who will testify to the truth of my plain statement, if they are now living, and not interested, and out of his reach.

On the 3rd of May, the squadron entered the port of Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, with her two prizes. General Bolivar fearing, not without some reason, that General Arismendy might not receive him or recognize his authority, after what had passed between Arismendy and the two dictators, Bolivar and Marinno, in August, 1814,* requested the new admiral, Louis Brion, (who, being wounded, was put immediately on shore,) and the chief of the naval staff, a Frenchman, named M. Villarette, to speak with General Arismendy. Villarette, who was formerly acquainted with Arismendy, after a couple of hours' absence, returned on board, and said to Bolivar that the governor of Margarita, highly pleased with the success of our engagement at sea, expecting soon to see the cause of liberty re-established on the Main, and filled with joy and hope, was reconciled with General Bolivar, and assured him of his respect and friendship.

One hour afterwards, Arismendy arrived on board to compliment the commander-in-chief on his safe arrival on the shores of liberty and independence, and on his naval victory. Bolivar embraced Arismendy with that kind of frankness and cordiality which appeared so natural in him, took him by the arm, after having presented me and the intendant, and invited him down into the cabin, where they remained alone more than an hour. They appeared, in mounting on deck, very well satisfied with each other, and Arismendy invited us,

* See Chapter VII.

Bolivar, Zea, Marinno, Piar and myself, to come on shore in the afternoon, where horses would be in readiness to convey us to the Villa del Norte, the head-quarters of Arismendy, at a distance of three leagues from the sea-port of Juan Griego. The governor himself received us at the latter port, with a numerous retinue; and on arriving in the public square at his head-quarters, the troops received us under arms, and with military music. After a splendid dinner, the ball began, which lasted the whole night. But not a single word passed which had any connexion with business; Bolivar was so totally engaged in dancing, of which he was passionately fond, that he thought of nothing else but that. I was in a very melancholy humour, recapitulating, in my mind, all that had happened from our sailing from Aux Cayes, and declined to dance, forming a firm resolution to quit a man whom I could by no means love or respect. I walked up and down in the public square, and was soon joined by General Arismendy, who was full of attention and kindness to me. I was astonished to find in him a frank and good man, who spoke of military matters and politics with much more knowledge and sense than I had ever heard General Bolivar. The latter, during about a month of our being in the same vessel, and very intimate, never asked me a single question on military tactics, or any thing concerning our art. His great employment was to play at backgammon with me, or with Brion, or Zea, to walk up and down the deck and talk on very common topics with one or another of his officers, or to sleep. I saw him three

times reading in a book in about a month's time; and when he did, it was the first one he had found in our cabin; and this not half an hour at a time. His favourite topics were, when with me and Brion, to speak of his stay in Paris, and to give us detailed particulars of his good fortune in this capital; and sometimes he asked me many questions about Napoleon, the dresses of the ladies and gentlemen at court, and what kind of ceremonies were necessary, in order to be presented, &c.; another time, his talk was about his mustachios, and those of the officers, the modes of dress and uniforms in the French and English armies; but never could I speak a single word about military tactics, drills, &c. He stopped me immediately, saying, "Oh yes, yes, *mon cher ami*, I know that;" or, "I know that book is very well written, but tell me"—and then he asked me some very insignificant question on any indifferent trifle, which gave another turn to our conversation.

One day I saw him walking, with a quick step, to and fro on deck, absorbed in thought, and melancholy. I came up and observed that he continued so a good while, without seeing or hearing any thing that passed around us. It was some days previous to our naval engagement. I at last accosted him, and said, with my usual frankness and familiarity, "What is the matter with you, my dear general; are you unwell, or has something happened?" "Oh no," replied he, "but we are approaching the island of Margarita, where Arismendy commands, and I fear this man and his character; he is obstinate and cruel." At that time I was totally unacquainted

with what had happened between these two chieftains in August, 1814, and therefore I made some inquiries about Arismendy, his manner of acting, and character. "Oh, *mon cher ami*, Arismendy is a very dangerous, ambitious man, who governs the island of Margarita with great despotism; he is an absolute brute, without any education or knowledge, and of low extraction." (I must mention here, that Bolivar thinks much of birth and good family.) I was, therefore, much prejudiced against General Arismendy; but when I found in him a plain man, and one much better instructed in military matters than Bolivar himself, I was quite surprised. I had afterwards long conversations with him, which pleased me; and when, some days later, General Bolivar made the inspection of what Arismendy had done against the Spaniards, I was highly pleased, and observed that when Bolivar asked me, in an ironical style, what I thought of this or that fortification, or battery, or redoubt, and I approved of them, and expressed the reasons of the construction of these works, our commander-in-chief was not at all satisfied with my observations. Arismendy, who did not understand French, but asked me afterwards to explain to him in Spanish my observations, was satisfied, and took me more and more into his favour.

But as General Bolivar had deserted Venezuela in August, 1814, and New Grenada, in May, 1815, it was necessary that his authority should be re-established in his native land, by a formal and solemn acknowledgment of what the general assembly in Aux Cayes had stipulated in his favour. Arismendy

was easily gained over by various secret conversations which Bolivar had with him on the matter, in which the former received the formal promise, that Bolivar would establish a National Congress at Venezuela, as soon as he should be master of the country. This formal promise was given to him, as he had given it to us before his departure from Aux Cayes, and Arismendy hesitated not a moment to call a general assembly, or junta, in the cathedral of La Villa del Norte, to which all the officers of our squadron were invited by an order emanating from Arismendy and Bolivar. The principal inhabitants of the island were assembled, and the clergy, in their sacerdotal dresses, were kneeling before the altar, reciting prayers in a low voice for the welfare of the republic. The mass then began, and afterwards the numerous clergy remained kneeling before the altar in silence and prayer. These religious ceremonies, mixed with politics, were generally used by the Spanish leaders; and their juntas and great assemblies were always held in churches. The patriots have continued this custom. When the mass was over, General Arismendy delivered a long speech, in which he recommended our union, and the necessity of having one single chieftain, and related what had happened in Aux Cayes, and the election made of General Bolivar, whom he now recommended his army to recognize and obey, as he himself did. He then approached General Bolivar, and delivered him the wand of commander-in-chief, (a small reed with a golden head,) proclaiming him, solemnly, commander-in-chief of the republics of Venezuela and New Grenada, which were

to be re-established. Bolivar then delivered a speech, in which he declared his acceptance of the wand of commander. He concluded by promoting a great many of the natives to be officers in the land troops; but not a single foreigner belonging to this army was promoted, notwithstanding that a good many had distinguised themselves, particularly in the action of the 2nd of May.

By particular and urgent request of the newly-promoted and wounded admiral Brion, some few promotions were made among the foreigners belonging to the navy. I was highly displeased at not being promoted, when I could say with truth that I had distinguished myself in the combat of the 2nd of May, having taken Bolivar's place and the command of our officers, while he himself sat in his long-boat, out of all danger. Many of my friends, among them Brion and Zea, were astonished at not seeing me at the head of these promotions, having beheld me at the head of the officers and volunteers, and mounting among them the enemy's vessel. Chypia, Martinez, and Anzoatigui, who were in the action under my orders, (one of whom withdrew himself for fear of the balls,) were promoted. Charles Soublette, being a mile distant from the battle, on board the Constitution with Miss Pepa, was, notwithstanding, promoted to the rank of adjutant-general-colonel in the staff. But these four were natives, and the most servile flatterers of General Bolivar.

After these promotions, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung in honour of the battle of the 2nd of May, and on the present occasion under artillery salutes, &c.

This behaviour of General Arismendy was very honourable to him, as it was easy to take General Bolivar's place at a time when he alone was four times as strong as Bolivar, and when, as is generally known, he had much more energy and patiotism, much more knowledge and personal bravery, than ever Bolivar had possessed. Arismendy was well informed that Bolivar had treated him in his manifesto, published in Carthagena in September 1814,* as an intriguer and an ambitious man, who had contrived to take his place; he knew perfectly well the character of Bolivar, his ambition, jealousy, and despotism as dictator, having been a long time governor of the city of Caracas. But Bolivar, since his first interview with Arismendy on board the Commodore, had captivated the simple and plain mind of the governor of Margarita, who saw his ancient master surrounded with vessels and power, and heard his brilliant and former promises to assemble a congress as soon as matters were a little settled on the Main, and who yielded to his promises, as Brion and many others of us had done before.

I was, I must confess, highly displeased with all these events; and, sleeping in the same room with General Bolivar, (which I did from the beginning of our arrival at La Villa del Norte, in the house of a Mr. Galindo,) I reproached him with good reason for not having kept his promises, so solemnly given to me in Aux Cayes, to give me my rank of general as soon as we should arrive in a district of his own that was free and independent. He jumped out of

* See Chapter VIII.

his hammock, and coming near my field-bed said, while he took my hand, that it was not his fault, for that he dared not promote any of us foreigners for fear Arismendy and other chieftains might be jealous of our promotion—that his authority was not yet sufficiently established to dare to take such a step; that, nevertheless, he would do so as soon as he should arrive on the Main; at which time no consideration should prevent him from rendering me justice, &c.

I reproached him with the promotion of Soublette, declaring, that after what had passed in Aux Cayes with that person, I could never admit him to be employed in my offices of the staff, which were, as usual, established in a room opposite to our chamber on the same floor; and I added, that Soublette, in the action of the 2nd May, was a mile from the battle, on board the Constitution, and had not smelt the powder of our guns, and still less that of the enemy's. He gave me a singular reply for a commander-in-chief: "I could not pass Soublette in the general promotion published this afternoon in the church; he belongs to one of the best families in Caracas, and as I promoted Chypia and Martinez to the rank of adjutant-general-colonels in the staff, who were younger lieutenant-colonels than Soublette, I was obliged, of course, to promote him."

I saw clearly by this conversation, the weakness of such a commander, but appeared satisfied, and having embarked with him I took patience and remained.

On the day of his being received as commander-

in-chief of the armies of Venezuela and Caracas, in the Island of Margarita, he published a proclamation, in which he said, "he had not arrived to conquer, but to protect the country, and that he invited the inhabitants of Venezuela to unite and join him, if they would be considered by their *liberators* as pure and good patriots. I have not arrived," continues he, "to dictate laws to you, but I advise you to hear my voice, I recommend to you union in the government, and *absolute liberty* for all classes, in order that you may not commit any more *absurdities* and *crimes!* But you cannot be *freemen and slaves at the same time.* If you form no more than *one single mass* of the whole population; if you choose a *central government*—(Simon Bolivar!) if you join us, you may rely upon a sure victory." This proclamation is signed by Bolivar, and dated, "Villa del Norte, Island of Margarita, May 3rd, 1816." It affords a new instance of the pompous style of Bolivar's proclamations, who repeated his illusory promises as he did in 1813, and as he has not ceased to do from that time to the present day. "*Liberators, liberating army, central government, advices,*" &c. &c. resounded from one end to the other, in all his proclamations. We shall soon see whether the inhabitants of Venezuela could rely upon a sure victory, and whether he acted as he promised.

When the Spaniards were apprised of our arrival in the Villa del Norte, they evacuated, on the same night, the capital, Villa del Assumption; and the famous Spanish coward, Mr. Miguel de La Torre, retired precipitately into the forts of Pompatar.

On our landing at the port of Juan Griego, Arismendy, Bolivar, and I, were talking, when I heard suddenly the discharge of musketry. I turned round to see what caused this firing. Bolivar told me, smiling, "it is nothing, my dear friend, (speaking with me always in French:) General Arismendy has ordered some Spanish prisoners, landed from our squadron, to be shot." These unfortunate men were, on landing, tied together, while others dug a large hole, before which they kneeled down, and were shot in the back, so that they fell into their grave, which was immediately filled with earth.

When Admiral Brion, detained in bed by his wound, heard of this, he gave the formal order to suffer no more Spanish prisoners to be landed, and saved the lives of about fifty Spaniards, who were humanely treated and put to useful employments. Thus should General Bolivar have acted, instead of Brion. It would have cost the former no more than a representation to Arismendy to save them; but he only smiled at the horrors which I expressed for a barbarous act committed in cold blood.

The next day after his installation as commander-in-chief, Bolivar, in his proclamations, and in his official transactions, took the following titles: "Simon Bolivar, general-in-chief, captain-general of the *liberating* armies of Venezuela and New Grenada, *supreme chief* of the republic of Venezuela, commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces," &c. &c. &c. without having had conferred upon him the right to name himself supreme chief, which made a very bad impression on all the foreigners who came with us from Aux Cayes.

As I had promised to Brion to remain, I made my best exertions to quell and appease these officers, and succeeded. We were absolutely destitute of every thing; the small and rocky island of Margarita was unable to furnish us the necessary provisions; the vessels were in want of rations for the crew, so that each officer and private had a scanty ration, consisting of a little cake of Indian meal, not weighing two ounces, called *arepa*, and two small salted fishes, with nothing else! We general and staff-officers dined with General Arismendy, but our table was surrounded by at least fifty hungry officers not belonging to the staff, who took from our table what they could reach, so that many of the company rose without being able to satisfy their own hunger. There was no money, no clothes, nor any thing but great confusion and misery!

On the 25th May, the squadron departed from Margarita, (Brion having recovered from his wound,) and arrived the 31st before the large borough of Carupano, the port of which was protected by a fort called Santa Rosa, upon which the Spanish colours were displayed. I have related, in chapter first, how it was taken. The patriots found a fine merchant brig and schooner, belonging to the Spaniards, with a rich cargo in each. The greater part of the inhabitants having fled, left their stores filled with provisions and dry goods, which were plundered, and disappeared in 24 hours. The confusion and disorder were very great, and no precaution was taken to distribute any of the provisions in a regular way, but each one took what he pleased, and destroyed or left

the remainder. I offered to make magazines, and station guards and sentries, in order to save them, and to distribute regular rations; but Bolivar told me, laughing, "that these guards themselves would give the first example of taking what they chose; and that all would be useless." I was highly disgusted, and had already, in Margarita, asked my absolute discharge from such a service, but remained against my will, Bolivar declaring to me, in a friendly but positive manner, that it was impossible for him to grant me my request. After some days' stay at Carupano, I repeated my wish, but was again refused.

The consequences of this disorder were, that after some days we had no provisions, and that the ordinary filthiness of this people, joined to the want of sufficient and wholesome food, introduced a great many diseases of which many died. It would have been an easy task for Bolivar to deliver his country in a short time, if he would have followed my advice; for, at that time the Spaniards, struck with panic terror at our sudden arrival, retired in great haste towards Valencia, and evacuated the whole of the extensive territory from Carupano to Cariaco and Guiria, so that the communication with Maturin by land, and through the gulf of Trieste, was entirely left free. I will relate here some particulars that passed between General Bolivar and me, which will give still further illustration of his talents and character.

At my first interview with him at Aux Cayes, he promised to give me my rank as general, which was due to me, having sent my commission, through the regular channel of the president and general-in-chief,

of the republic of Carthagena, to the congress of New Grenada, as I have already stated. We arrived at Margarita, where other officers were promoted, and I was passed over, as I have mentioned. We arrived at Carupano, a place lying on the Main, declared free and independent by our presence and that of Bolivar. After having reminded him of his promise already given, and after having said that I cared not much about a piece of paper, (meaning my commission,) which gave me not a cent of pay, nor any solid advantages; I added, that it was just I should not be degraded by the title of a colonel, when I had deserved my ancient rank, by my services at Carthagena, Boca Chica, Aux Cayes, in the action of the 2nd May, and since at Margarita, and here on the Main; and, moreover, when I saw that Soublette, whom he himself knew to be a coward, ranked with me, who was a veteran, not only covered with wounds, but having claims, on account of the services I had rendered, to my former rank, &c. &c. I spoke very warmly and strongly, and Bolivar, taking me by the hand, gave me again his formal promise, that after the next action, when he could promote others, I should be the first named. He added so many obliging and friendly promises, that I was again foolish enough to rely upon his word and remain.

In my frequent and long conversations with General Bolivar, I spoke to him often of the necessity of instructing the officers, (who were in general very ignorant in the elementary principles of the military art,) and proposed to him to establish schools for instruction in the theory and practice of forming de-

pôts and for drilling recruits; a commission to examine the foreign officers who wished to enter the service, and to judge of the merits and talent of the officers in general, and of their behaviour in action, in order to recommend them for promotion, &c. I told him frankly, that nothing was more degrading for an officer of honour, than to depend upon favour, flattery, and protection, or the caprice of one single man, by which talent and modesty were often put aside, while intriguers and flatterers, cowards and ignoramuses, were advanced and put at the head of men who knew a thousand times better how to command. "And now see," pursued I, growing warm, "that General Mar—what can he know, how will he command fifty men? is he able to do it?" "Oh, *mon cher ami*," interrupted General Bolivar, laughing, "you are perfectly correct, he cannot even command *four men*." After various conversations upon these and other military matters, he named a kind of special council of war, whilst at Aux Cayes, in which the military and administrative operations were freely debated. It was composed of Brion, Marinno, M'Gregor, and myself,—Bolivar presiding. A commission was also established, to examine the pretensions of the foreign officers, composed of Generals Piar and M'Gregor; and in this I presided. At the first session held in my house, some foreign officers made objections to showing their commissions, but I stopped them; saying that we were assembled by special command of General Bolivar, and that I would begin by obeying his orders. I immediately took from a drawer before me, my commission from

the government of Carthagena, and ordered it to be passed round. So did Piar and M'Gregor, and nobody afterwards made the least difficulty; but as soon as we had arrived at the island of Margarita, every thing was forgotten, and Bolivar alone acted as he pleased.

When at Carupano, where we stayed much longer than I expected, I again urged Bolivar to establish a school for the instruction of the officers in theory and practice, which he at last consented to. I proposed for instructor, a lieutenant-colonel Schmidt, who had served under my orders at Barcelona, when I was the commander of the head quarters of the marshall M'Donald, duke of Tarentum, governor of the citadel, &c. He was an able officer, and highly pleased with my proposition. General Bolivar authorized me to put on the order of the day, "that every officer of infantry should assemble at such a place, hour, and day fixed in my orders, to receive the necessary instructions from Colonel Schmidt;—that those who should not comply with the present order, without a well-grounded reason, would expose themselves to be arrested and sent for 24 hours to the fort of Santa Rosa. During several days this school was well attended by the officers, of whom a great many distinguished themselves by their zeal to learn. I must state here once for all, that the majority of these young officers were amiable, and willing to obey, as soon as they were well treated and commanded, and that I never had to complain of, or to punish any of them. It would not have been the case at all, if some invidious, vile individuals, had not tried to make dll

my actions, my words, and my orders, ridiculous and suspected—not in my presence, but always in my absence. One day Colonel Schmidt came to complain that the officers began to be very neglectful of their duties, and that a great many did not come at all. I mentioned this to General Bolivar, who authorized me to renew and enforce the order; but by and by the same neglect was complained of by Schmidt. I said now to Bolivar, that it was high time to punish, if we would not lose all authority and discipline. He approved, and authorized me to act in accordance to the existing order. I entered the next day into the large room where the officers were drilled, accompanied by some of my officers, and saw a small number of them assembled in comparison of other days, when I had come to assist at their drills. I asked for the roll; on calling over which, I found that among about 100, 36 were absent, of whom 15 had no excuse at all. I ordered the adjutants immediately to arrest and put them for 24 hours in the fort; and I sent a written order to Colonel Landæta, who commanded at Santa Rosa, to give them leave to walk in the fort wherever they pleased, but to allow none to go out until the hour of the arrest was expired. Enclosed were the names of the officers. I reported all to General Bolivar, who approved it highly, notwithstanding his own nephew, Captain Manuel Palacios, son of his sister, was among the arrested officers. Bolivar was very well satisfied, and laughed, as he sat in his hammock, when I told him that it was necessary to commence with his nephew's punishment, as giving to others a proof of his impartiality. He finished by approving

highly my remarks and orders, and I left him well satisfied. This was about eleven o'clock in the morning. The same day, at six in the afternoon, Gen. Bolivar arrived, with six or eight officers, at my house, and after having saluted me as usual, he took me by the arm in my upper piazzi, where we were alone, and said to me: "You will never find out, *mon cher ami*, from whence I am come just now. I have received a doleful note from my nephew Palacios, (which he handed to me for my perusal,) who is in the fort, and who urged me for his, and his companions' sake, to come and see him: I did. I am now come from Santa Rosa, and can tell you that these poor devils (*les pauvres diables*) have requested me, in a very urgent manner, to pardon them, and to set them at liberty; and have promised that they will never more fail in their duty. I told them *that I had not sent them to the fort*, but YOU! and that I would promise to go and make interest with you for them, and ask you to relieve them from their arrest." "What, general," said I, extremely surprised and shocked to hear him say these words: "it appears as if *I* was the only cause of their arrest, and as if *I* was the author of their punishment! How could you say that it is not *you* who have sent them to the fort, but *I*? Have you then not approved highly the daily orders for the army, published by me in *your name*? And should you not have said that their punishment was the natural consequence of their disobeying *your* orders? Well, then, I see that I have nothing more to do here; I am of no use, when you cannot or will not support the authority given me, without my request or my intriguing for it; I can no longer remain in a

service where I cannot be of use." I was warm, and spoke with full determination to quit for ever such a disgusting service. But Bolivar again entreated me so urgently to remain with him, told me that I should be always his good friend, that I was very useful to him, &c. that I embraced him and remained. The prisoners were released by a written order, sent by one of my aides-de-camp to Colonel Landæta, and Bolivar departed, after a full hour's stay at my house, very well satisfied. I must confess, I was not much satisfied, and took the firm resolution to punish nobody, to complain of nobody, and act, for a little while, in a very passive way, to see if at last there would be any alteration in our curiously organized, or rather our totally unorganized *liberating* army, which did not amount to 800 men!

One day at Carupano I found Bolivar lying in his hammock alone, looking melancholy and dejected. His face was unusually pale and his eyes sunken. I asked him if he was ill; "Oh no, no, *mon cher ami*, (which was always his favourite term,) not at all, but Marinno teazes me to go with Piar and twenty officers to Guiria to recruit some more men; he wants me to give him 2,000 stand of arms, ammunition and some flecheras, (large armed barges,) to convoy him along the coast. But you know what we have to fear from these two generals. I am convinced they will try again to render themselves independent of me, which would renew the scenes of 1813 and 1814.*

* The reader will remember that Marinno, at that time, was dictator of the east, and Bolivar of the west, of Venezuela, and that the first acted quite independently of the latter. We have seen the dreadful consequences of this rivalship. See Chapters VI. and VII.

I know not, indeed, how to act or what to do." "If I were in your place," said I, "I would refuse their request under various pretences, of which you have so many, and never would I consent to let them be absent from me; then, after what has passed in Aux Cayes,* you have certainly to fear that Marinno, once detached from you, would try another time to shake the yoke from his shoulders." Brion, who came in, heard my last arguments, and not only confirmed what I had said, but spoke in much stronger and more contemptuous expressions against Marinno and Piar. Bolivar, fully convinced and satisfied, promised to follow our advice.

Admiral Brion had never esteemed Marinno, and said many times, that he and Piar were dangerous enemies to Bolivar. Marinno indeed never had been, nor could he be, dangerous to the latter, for want of talents and character, as I shall fully show at the trial of Pair; but united with Piar, who was a man of colour, a native of the island of Curaçao, and with Brion, he has done great mischief to Bolivar. Piar was an able partisan officer, brave, active, and a secret enemy of Bolivar, who, like Brion, hated, in general, the men of colour.

* San Jago Marinno charged a creole captain, named Sobie, to find him 300 men of colour, who should form the germ of his body-guard, and who should be attached entirely to his service. Sobie, who had served under my orders at Boca Chica, and who was a brave and able officer, very much attached to me, came immediately to acquaint me with this strange commission. When I communicated to Bolivar the secret orders of Marinno given to Sobie, he was alarmed, and requested me to counteract this plan. I told Sobie to ask from Marinno 300 doubloons, which was the ordinary engagement for 300 men; Marinno had no money, and so the affair dropped.

Piar was the soul of Marinno, and both were inseparable friends, therefore much the more dangerous to Bolivar,—as Piar, the avowed friend of the constitution of the first congress in Venezuela, in 1811, by which the coloured people enjoyed the same rights as the whites, had often and loudly declared, that he did not wish to see Bolivar uniting, in himself alone, the three powers, but to have a congress and good laws. Piar, who had fought various brilliant actions against the Spaniards, had a great many partisans, and was friendly and sociable with those who belonged to his family, and with officers of foreign countries, and coloured people, who all liked to serve with him in preference to Bolivar, who was haughty and imperious. The insinuating and polite manners of General Marinno rendered him very popular, and he gained a great many partisans among the simple and uncultivated people, particularly in the provinces of Cumana and Barcelona. Both knew perfectly well that Bolivar hated them, but that he dissembled this hatred; it was, therefore, very impolitic, and even dangerous, to suffer the union of the two commanders, and their absence, in the position in which Bolivar was placed.

Recently arrived at Carupano, Bolivar was too confident that the inhabitants of Venezuela would rise in his favour, as they had done in 1813; but instead of it, they left their property and houses, and after a fortnight's stay, he could not count fifty recruits who came voluntarily to serve under his orders. His behaviour as dictator, his flight, his abandoning them in the way he did in embarking at Cumana, had lost him their confidence, and many resolved and

good patriots chose to keep at a distance from him, or to emigrate. Bolivar, knowing all these circumstances, and still more, the great influence of Piar, with the weak and ignorant Marinno, should, at least, have retained Piar by giving him some honourable occupation; and he was well aware, as I told him, that Marinno, without Piar, would have never been, by any means, dangerous.

Brion and myself were highly astonished to hear that these two chieftains had, at last, persuaded Bolivar to consent to their departure, to give them arms, ammunition, officers, barges, &c. They took with them the colonel-adjutant-general Chypia, the best engineer officer, and about twenty officers more. When I asked Bolivar how he could have granted this permission, he said that Marinno urged him very much, and had promised him to send a numerous body of men, and particularly a very good battalion of coloured people from the island of Guadaloupe, (about 400 men strong,) who had, three years before, fought in the eastern provinces of Venezuela with great success, and were known in that country under the name of *battalion of Guiria*, &c. &c. But as soon as Marinno had arrived at Guiria, he proclaimed himself general-in-chief, organized *his* army, *his* staff, named as chief of his staff Colonel Chypia, and did not send a single man to General Bolivar, who was daily urging him in vain to join him, or, at least, to send this battalion of Guiria. Bolivar, in short, was no more joined by Marinno nor by Piar.

I have said that we had a great many officers, and a very small number of soldiers. Then, the 300 men

who had embarked from Margarita with us for Carupano, had their officers, all natives, from that island. I one day proposed to Bolivar to give employment to these officers, and form a separate corps, which should be organized in companies, drilled, armed, &c. and employed as a guard of our head-quarters. I proposed to form of them, at first, no more than one battalion of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry. Both proposals were highly approved of by General Bolivar. Three days afterwards, I was surprised to receive the reports of the commanders of the out-posts established around our head-quarters, to the effect, that the commandant N. N. had passed with passports of the supreme chief, with such a number of officers, to go to such a place. The result of these different reports informed me, that five commandants, or chiefs of a battalion, had absented themselves, with their respective officers, in search of recruits. I called immediately on the general with these written reports, and asked him if this was done by his order? He replied to me in a very cold and unusually dry manner, that, having well reflected on the nature of my proposal, he found it *at present* inadmissible, and had thought proper to send these officers in search of recruits, and to have more forces. I objected to him that this measure might perhaps endanger the safety of these isolated officers, knowing well that the Spaniards had approached us as far as San Jose, a small village at two leagues distance from our head-quarters. He said there was no danger to be feared, and the officers went off! This change of mind in General Bolivar was caused, as I heard some days afterwards,

by a conversation held at his evening assemblies in Miss Pepa's house, (where Bolivar was ordinarily surrounded by his minions and flatterers, Soublette, Pedro Leon Torres, Ferdinand Galindo, and others of the same description,) in which were criticised the actions, orders, and innovations, which I desired to introduce into their army. Soublette, a secret enemy of mine, (the reader is instructed already for what reasons,) distinguished himself more than any one of the rest, and was supported by Bolivar's mistress, Miss Pepa, and her mother, who could not endure me at all, because I had never visited them in Margarita, nor in Carupano. Bolivar himself told me frequently, in his ordinary jesting and laughing manner, that he frequently took up my defence against these ladies! They represented to the general that I was of a despotic character; that this stranger would introduce ridiculous innovations, to which they would never submit; that he (Bolivar) was very good to submit any longer to such counsel, and to the influence which it appeared I had gained over him, &c. The others joined in chorus; and thus it happened, that Bolivar, at eleven o'clock at night, gave the order to these commandants to depart with their respective officers. They committed so many disorders, that they were obliged to come back without any recruits at all, and so the same disorder remained, and nothing was done.

While we were in the island of Margarita, Bolivar observed to me that the foreign officers in our service did not appear satisfied to be with him. I told him frankly that they had no reason to be so, seeing they

had no pay, no food, no means of subsistence; but, added I, the worst of all is, to be commanded by young and inexperienced officers, who are generals, colonels, and lieutenant-colonels, and who, by their great inexperience, expose them to lose, not only the battle, but their lives, without their being allowed to make any dispositions, or to give salutary advice, &c. As I was by office, age, and services, the most elevated, and the most in General Bolivar's intimacy, these officers came frequently to see me, and to ask my advice on different occasions; and so I was well acquainted with their various claims and dissatisfactions. Among them were a great many officers, French, English, Germans, Poles, who had served with distinction in Europe, and some during 20 and 25 years, and who knew twenty times as much as these officers born in the country.

The just observations of the officers inspired me with the idea of making their services useful *in their own way*, viz. by creating a corps of foreign troops, commanded by foreign officers, under the name of the *legion of Venezuela*. Shortly after our arrival at Carupano, I one day found Bolivar in good spirits and alone. We talked a great deal on indifferent topics, and after a while I introduced my plan of the creation of a foreign legion, with the necessary amendments and organization, adapted to our kind of war, to the country, and the resources which we could reasonably expect. I said to him frankly, that our army, so called, was nothing more than a collection of men, very ill organized, clothed, drilled, instructed, and not paid at all, &c. I entered, with my

usual warmth and frankness, into all the great advantages of having a corps of men already acquainted with war, and able to beat all the Spaniards, who recruited two-thirds of their soldiers among the natives; and I finished by proposing to him to make an essay with 1,500 men, of which 1,000 should form two battalions, one of riflemen or chasseurs, and the other of grenadiers, and 500 should be divided into two squadrons of light cavalry, and two companies of light artillery of 100 horse each. These 1,500 men might, after a while, be increased by mixing natives among them, to a full third, half, or more, giving to each company so many more natives, but all commanded by experienced commissioned and non-commissioned *foreign* officers. "I am certain," added I, "that were these troops well commanded and treated, we should have in one year 3,000 of them: since each of them would write to his unfortunate countrymen how well they were among us, and so we should be able to finish the war in a very short time. But there should be the express condition that nobody else than you, General Bolivar, should have the right to interfere with them."

General Bolivar heard my demonstration with unfeigned pleasure, jumped from his hammock, shook hands with me, and said that my plan was so excellent, that we would continue to talk together over a good bottle of Bourdeax wine, a present from one of the merchant vessels arrived from St. Thomas's. He called Garcia, his intendant, and ordered him to bring the wine into his chamber, and to say to his aides-de-camp that he would not be interrupted by

any one. After having drank my health, he sat down next to our small table, and said, smiling, *Mon cher ami*, your plan is good, but one trifle is wanting." "What?" said I. "The money: we have not a cent; we are as poor as Job." I said to him that the battalion of Guiria having arrived, (which deserted Marinno, and taking by force some flecheras came over to us,) the same battalion of more than 400 coloured men, from Guadaloupe, which had been already used to our manner of carrying on the war in this country for more than two years, and of which I have spoken before—we might have, by adding the officers of different nations present, about 500 men already assembled here,—that I had had different conversations with Colonels Bidot and Boe, of whom the former had assured me, that with eight or ten dollars for each man engaged, and his passage paid, he would find easily, between Martinique, Guadaloupe, St. Thomas's, St. Bartholomews', &c., more than 500 men; and that another 500 would be procured, by sending to the United States of America. In regard to expenses, Brion, with his credit, would be of great use; he had also a good quantity of merchandize, found in the two captured Spanish vessels, and in the stores left by their owners; the two merchant vessels might be sold; all of which would afford more than sufficient means to raise, by exchange, the necessary money, without reckoning a good cargo of mules, asses, cocoa, tobacco, and other produce of the country, which could be collected and shipped. There were to be named honest agents, and able men, with the necessary knowledge of the country to

which they were to be sent, in order to collect resources and recruits. Bolivar said I was perfectly correct, and the more he heard me, the more he was convinced of the practicability of my plan. I proposed to send for Admiral Brion, who came soon after. I had already talked much with Brion upon the usefulness of the plan, but he always expressed his fears that General Bolivar would be opposed to it, knowing too well his suspicious character, and his general aversion to foreigners. He was, therefore, much surprised to hear Bolivar so full of praise in regard to this plan, and offered immediately a number of his vessels, with his credit, for the execution of the plan. We drank another bottle and separated, after having undertaken each of us a part in the execution of the plan. Brion was charged with the vessels and thei cargoes; Bolivar with the appointment of the officers; and I with the organization of each corps, and the general instructions to the agents and recruiting officers; and so we separated, very well satisfied, at a late hour. But, in the warmth of my zeal for the prosperity of our enterprise, I committed a great blunder in saying to General Bolivar, that if I were not the chief of his staff, I would have desired to be the commander of that legion. These words appeared to me to have made a bad impression on the suspicious mind of General Bolivar, who treated me afterwards much more coolly.

I sat down the same night and drew up the outline of my plan, which I presented the next morning to General Bolivar at the usual hour of my daily reports. As I entered his chamber familiarly, and without be-

ing announced, I found him lying in his hammock, as usual, and occupied in reading. When he saw me, he hastily placed his book under his pillow and jumped out of the hammock to shake hands with me, but with a little more coolness than usual. Surprised to see Bolivar occupied in reading, which was unusual, and desirous to know with what book he was occupying himself, I came nearer to the hammock and took the book out from under his pillow, asking him, "what he was reading?" He looked a little confused, and answered, "he read it to recreate his mind a little!" It was the New Heloise, by Jean Jacques Rousseau.

We spoke now of the usual military concerns during the last twenty-four hours, and I handed him my plan of the legion. Without ever looking at it, he folded it and put it under his pillow, saying, "Well, well, leave it with me, I will look it over in the course of to-day or to-morrow, as soon as my time will permit." These words, pronounced in a cold and dry manner, gave me a new conviction of Bolivar's very limited talents, and of his not being at all the man able to command for the welfare of others. I immediately took leave of him without saying a single word more.

What, in fact, can be thought of a *supreme chief*, upon whose activity and skill depended the welfare of so many thousands, passing his time in his hammock, reading the *Nouvelle Heloise*, or talking with his flatterers on trifling topics, or occupying his time in the house of Miss Pepa—a commander who *had no time* to examine a plan on which depended so greatly the success of his enterprise, while Brion and myself were

busily engaged in preparing every thing which had been fixed the evening before?

I saw the general in the evening, the next morning and afternoon, and heard not a word of the plan. Meanwhile came Brion and all the foreign officers to my house to enquire if there was any news; and being myself anxious to finish the business, I determined to speak with the general definitively. I found him in his hammock alone and half asleep, and after some indifferent words, I asked him abruptly; "*apropos*, general, have you examined the plan for the creation of that legion?" He answered me in a furious manner, and jumping from his hammock like a madman: "Foreign legion! foreign legion! How, *mon cher ami*, can you think of it? do you know the consequences of it? no, no, no—no legion. These foreigners would then impose laws on me, and control me!" While making this reply, he walked the room to and fro, evidently in a great passion. I was highly shocked and displeased with such an unexpected scene, and approaching towards him, I took him by the arm, and exclaimed in a firm and animated voice, having an upright conscience, "What means this, Mr. General? You forget, undoubtedly, that you are speaking to a foreigner. And do you think that with my white hairs, and at my age, I would suffer any man to betray you? or do you suppose, what I can hardly believe, that I myself should think of betraying you?" He interrupted me here, and said in a much more moderate and friendly tone, "Ah, *mon cher ami*, you certainly are not a stranger among us; you are one of our good citizens, and a man of honour; you belong to

the republic by your services, which are and have been distinguished, and by your marriage with a South American lady. I have never thought of, nor meant *you*, my dear friend. Yet," added he, in a more passionate tone, "there exist some other ambitious foreigners who are desirous of supplanting me, and who might do it." This was in allusion to General Piar, who had separated himself with Marinno from Bolivar; and the latter, chagrined to see that all his orders were disregarded by these two chieftains, who neither returned nor sent any recruits, imagined that Piar might take his place. I represented to him in the strongest terms, that there was not the least danger to him in consenting to the creation of such a legion; that it would, on the contrary, be highly useful to him and the cause, &c. All was in vain, and Bolivar would never more hear of the forming of such a plan. Admiral Brion tried also to change his mind, but could not succeed; so the whole plan was given up.

One day while we were at Carupano, the enemy surprised an advanced guard of 40 of the cavalry, some of whom came wounded, at two o'clock in the morning, to our head-quarters, giving the alarm of the approach of the enemy. Bolivar, immediately struck with a panic terror, dressed himself hastily, mounted his horse, and rode at full speed to the arsenal, which lay close by the port and the fort of Santa Rosa, so that, at the first notice of the enemy's approach, he could have the chance of embarking in a few minutes, or shutting himself up in the fort. All his trunks and baggage were immediately car-

ried from his house to the arsenal, where I saw them collected. During this time I took with me the few disposable cavalry and some officers, and directed my course towards the place where this guard had been surprised, to reconnoitre the enemy, and ascertain the nature of the danger. I ordered the troops in head-quarters to take arms and be ready to march at the first signal, to repel the enemy in case of an attack. I saw no one at all, and all my reconnoitering parties having joined me, I returned with the usual precautions to the head-quarters. Approaching the house of General Bolivar, in order to make my report to him, I was surprised to find it empty and dark. I heard from a dragoon, detached by General Bolivar in search of me, that the commander-in-chief was at the arsenal, with all his retinue, his household, trunks, &c. I found him lying in his hammock, surrounded by his flatterers, who lay half-asleep, half awake, on trunks, tables, benches, and boards. As soon as I saw among them Charles Soublette stretched out on a bench, I could not refrain from giving him, in presence of Bolivar and more than twenty officers, a very harsh reprimand, because he, being nominated by the general-in-chief commandant of the head-quarters, was not at his post, at the head of the troops, as he should have been, instead of lying on a bench, when the enemy was attempting to surprise us. Soublette, as usual, said not a single word. I now assured General Bolivar that there was nothing more to be feared, as I had doubled the guards at the out-posts, and ordered all the troops to be ready at the first signal given. I

escorted General Bolivar, with my dragoons, to his old quarters, whither trunks, baggage and papers were again ordered, and retired to my own house, feeling more and more the strange behaviour of the supreme chief, in every case of danger.

This was an authentic proof of Bolivar's incapacity to save us in the event of danger, or to put himself at the head of a body of troops to attack the enemy in person, in the last critical moment—which he never did, nor ever will do, as all those who have been in any action with him, in Venezuela, in New Grenada, or in Peru, will readily attest,—(I would be understood to speak of those persons who are no longer in the service of Colombia, and who are not dependent upon him by their connexion with that, so called, republic, and who have nothing to hope or to fear from the president liberator of Colombia.) True enough, the bulletins and proclamations, drawn up all by himself, or under his immediate inspection, display him as a hero at the head of his troops; but none of these bulletins can inspire any confidence among those who know the character of Bolivar, and the composition of his (so called) liberating army.

I have already given the authentic facts in respect to three or four of his bulletins and proclamations, and shown how deceptive they are to distant people. On examining them closely, the clouds which surround them, and must naturally exalt the imagination of persons not well acquainted with all the circumstances, will disappear, and show, in his *true* light, the president liberator, his actions, and his military skill.

General Bolivar is the same man at the present day

that he was in 1816, with the difference that he is much more vain, ambitious, and bold. But then he has the bayonets in his favour, which accounts for many things.

I was now perfectly convinced that my longer remaining with such a commander would be of no avail. I saw clearly that all plans and advice tending to establish order, instruction, drills, and organization, in a word, any thing like an army, were powerfully counteracted by most of those who surrounded the general, and who were interested *to leave every thing in statu quo*, as being much more consonant to their wishes. My intimacy with Bolivar, with whom I was always frank, as a man of character and a freeman should be, excited the greatest jealousy in all of the greater part of these natives. I was not only a foreigner, but I reprimanded, corrected, and punished those who did wrong, and Bolivar himself threw all the blame on me, as I have already shown. Sarcasm and ridicule have always had a great influence upon Bolivar, as they have in general upon half-cultivated and limited minds. Soublette, together with Miss Pepa, her mother and sister, who detested me cordially, for some words spoken publicly against them, and who always called me the *maldito Frances;* Pedro Leon Torres, whom I punished once, when he was lieutenant-colonel and commander of the fort of San Jose, in Boca Chica; Major Fernando Galindo, whom I treated once in Aux Cayes as he deserved; Lieutenant-colonel Anzoatigui, whom I reprimanded one day at Carupano, and who commanded the body-guard of the supreme chief,—and others, now made a

combination, and tried by degrees to create suspicions against me, in the too jealous and weak mind of General Bolivar.

It appeared to me, that from the day I had mentioned the wish to command the foreign legion, Bolivar was no more the same man towards me; his manners were changed; he did not speak to me with the same confidence, with the same frankness,—if he is at all capable of frankness, of which I have great doubts, as I said before. All these reasons, and moreover my impaired health, injured by privations and great exertions of mind, determined me at last to leave a service, in which (I declare it here frankly) no man who has feelings of self-respect and personal independence, can consent to remain. I chose, therefore, to write him an official letter, in which I formally requested him to grant me my final discharge from the army, that I might join my family, whom I had left at Aux Cayes, and restore my impaired health. I ordered one of my aides-de-camp to deliver it into Bolivar's own hands, and when he came back with the assurance that he had obeyed this my last order, I felt at my ease and cheerful.

Four days passed before I received any answer, during which the general sent me various persons, as Admiral Brion, the intendant Zea, his aide-de-camp Chamberlain, who was always greatly attached to me, &c., to make strong representations, and to persuade me to remain, and revoke my letter. Adjutant-general Jose Martinez, my officers of the staff, and my aides-de-camp, besides a great many foreigners, tried in vain to persuade me; I remained firm, and an-

swered, that my state of health too much required a change of air, and rest. When Bolivar saw that nothing could detain me, he sent, at last, my absolute discharge, in very honourable and flattering terms. He had written it with his own hand, and said, among other things, that he granted me my request with great regret, (*con dolor,*) and saw me departing with reluctance, but that my health having declined, he could not urge me any longer to stay, &c. &c.

Charles Soublette was named to be my successor; and as he dared not to avenge himself upon me, he had the baseness to do so upon my two adjutants, Manuel Flores and Joseph Martinez. These two promising young officers refused positively to serve any longer in the staff under Soublette's orders, and had requested the general-in-chief to be placed in their respective ranks, in one of the battalions of infantry. This request was represented by Soublette to General Bolivar in a false and malicious way, and so he consented that these officers should be arrested, and put, for a couple of days, into the fort of Santa Rosa;—Soublette knowing very well that I was attached to them. As soon as I heard what had happened, being now no more in the army, I wrote to General Bolivar a very strong letter against the misrepresentations of Soublette, and urged him to set these young officers at liberty; with which he complied, he himself returning me a very obliging answer.

I inquired in vain for a passage for St. Thomas's, or Aux Cayes, and was obliged to remain in Carupano. Two days afterwards, Bolivar seeing that his position was very critical, as I had told him beforehand, gave

orders to evacuate Carupano, and to embark the same night. I came in the evening to pay a visit to Admiral Brion; General Bolivar entered some time after me. I stood up from my seat and came to shake hands with him as usual; but Bolivar withdrew his hand like a madman, and said in a furious tone to me, "that he would not give his hand to a man who deserved to be shot instantly!" I never saw in my life, among the houses of madmen in Charenton and Bedlam, a figure like our *supreme chief* at this moment; and was doubting if it were General Bolivar, or one of these madmen who was before me. As I have never feared any man, and as my conscience was very clear and quiet, I looked at him some moments, and demanded in a firm and strong tone an explanation of these strange and unintelligible words, declaring to him positively that he should explain himself, and that I feared nothing. He said not a single word more to me, abruptly left the room, jumped upon his horse, and rode away. Brion, in reply to my inquiries, told me I need not care about what he said, as I was no longer in his service; and added, that Bolivar had been the whole day in a very bad temper, having been very much disappointed through the desertion of Marinno and Piar, who had left him in a very disagreeable position, and made it necessary for him now to evacuate this place, where the Spaniards threatened to attack him. And then, added Brion, he is very angry with you for having insisted on leaving him.

I sought Bolivar every where, but could not find him; and Brion said to me, that it would be more

prudent to avoid his presence, at a moment when his passion was excited; and so he conducted me, who was of course enraged at such treatment, on board one of his own vessels, the Diana, where the captain and officers treated me with the greatest kindness. Not having been able to see General Bolivar, I wrote a strong and laconic letter to him, in which I asked an explanation of this strange behaviour to me, and stated, that notwithstanding I was no longer under his command, I would submit to be tried before a court-martial, and hear what were the charges against me, and who was my vile accuser!—that I would remain on board the Diana, and not go to St. Thomas's until the sharpest inquiry, from the beginning to the end of my distinguished service, should be made; and that I never could have expected to receive such indecorous and ridiculous treatment. I gave this letter, directed "to General Bolivar, supreme chief," to Mr. Ballot the next morning, to deliver it into the hands of the former, telling him that I waited for an answer. Mr. Ballot gave him the letter, but he answered me not a single word.

Some months afterwards, I found myself at Port-au-Prince, where General Bolivar arrived as a fugitive, in September 1816, as I will relate in the next chapter. As soon as I heard of his arrival, I said to my landlord, Mr. Wustenfield, a German and a rich merchant, and to Mr. Southerland, the English agent, that I was very glad of General Bolivar's arrival in a country where he did not command, and where I could address him on equal terms. I related what

had happened at Carupano, to these two gentlemen, and they approved my resolution; but after a while, Mr. Southerland, who feared the consequences of a meeting, took me aside and observed to me, as General Bolivar was lodged at his house, he urged me, in very obliging terms, to desist from challenging him; adding that the General was very much dejected and melancholy, and that it would not be generous on my part to pursue a man, who was already unfortunate enough, under such circumstances. I yielded, at last, to his representations, but refused peremptorily to avoid Bolivar, as both gentlemen urged me to do; and insisted on having an explanation, before one of them, with General Bolivar, whom I feared not, and had never feared. It was then settled that Mr. Southerland should first see General Bolivar, and make him acquainted with my intended visit, and hear what he said to it; but if he should refuse, I promised to both, that I would meet with General Bolivar wherever I could, except in the houses of these two gentlemen, Wustenfield and Southerland.

The next morning Mr. Southerland told me that General Bolivar would be *very happy* to see me, (his very expression.) I must confess that I was greatly astonished to hear such an unexpected answer, and told them, laughing, that he would not have sent me such a polite message at the head of his troops; and so I related to them his conduct in the naval action of the 2nd of May, of the same year. Mr. Southerland then told me, that when General Bolivar heard from him of my being here, he changed colour, and was much surprised to hear this news, and told him

hastily he would not see me by any means; but after Mr. Southerland had assured him, that in spite of my being much irritated against him, I had at last yielded to his (Mr. Southerland's) representations, to cause no scene in his house, and to consider the general's situation, &c., but that I had insisted, peremptorily, on having an explanation with him, in regard to the scene that took place at Carupano, but without intending to insult or provoke him, &c.—Bolivar, who was now fully re-assured, said to Mr. Southerland, that he would receive me with great pleasure. I went immediately, and found him walking with his aide-de-camp, Dr. Perez, (at that time lieutenant-colonel, and now general, and his secretary-general in Peru,) in the large piazza in Mr. Southerland's house. As soon as I came up the steps, he left Perez and came hastily towards me, embracing me with all the demonstrations of an unfeigned satisfaction, and the usual exclamation, "*Ah, vous voilà, mon cher ami*, (ah, there you are, my dear friend,) I am extremely happy to see you." He took my arm, and I sat with him on the sofa. Mr. Perez, after having saluted me, retired. I was, I must confess, more confused than General Bolivar, at such a singular reception, and could hardly know if Bolivar in Carupano and Bolivar in Port-au-Prince were the same man. My confusion resulted from a painful conviction of the duplicity of a man of such high standing, who had forgotten himself twice; in Carupano, by insulting me when *he was in power*, and without giving me any reasons; and in Port-au-Prince, in receiving me with this apparent satisfaction, *when he was unfortunate and*

isolated, and well aware that I was a man who would have called him to account wherever I could find him. "I insisted on seeing you," said I to him very earnestly, "to have a definite explanation with you for your strange behaviour to me at Carupano. What induced you to ask, in such an indecorous manner?" &c. He saw clearly that, in speaking, I was growing a little warm. He took my hand again, and said, "that Brion had reported to him; that I had the intention to displace him, Bolivar, and to give the command to Admiral Brion!" I jumped up and said, in a contemptuous manner, that I could never believe that Brion, who had always been very friendly towards me, could have reported such a ridiculous calumny; that my friendship and the frank and plain manner with which I had constantly treated *him,* (Bolivar,) my letter written from Boca Chica, my sending for him at the risk of my life, my interfering in Aux Cayes when Montilla challenged him, and my zeal for his welfare, should have convinced him of the folly of such an accusation, which could have never come from Brion, but perhaps *from somebody else!* "But supposing it should have come from Brion, could you not," said I, "have confronted me privately with the admiral, who was present, and in whose house we were together? which would have been the shortest way. And how could I have acted so foolishly as to take my absolute discharge first, so as to lose voluntarily my authority, if I had such a plan; and then act as a madman, to effect such a conspiracy against you at the time of my total isolation, and my illness." I spoke much more, and with warmth; so that he at

last, fully convinced of the absurdity of such an accusation, avowed to me that it did not come from Brion, but from somebody else! But he would never mention the name. "It is very true," said he afterwards, "that you have always given me proofs of being a sincere friend; that you spoke to me with frankness; that you acted in your service like an old soldier, and a man of honour; it is true, it is true, I should have considered all this before; but, *mon cher ami*, (our whole conversation passed in French, as usual,) you must think no more of it, you know we are not perfect,"—and in saying these words, he gave me his hand in sign of reconciliation. This explanation does honour to General Bolivar, (if, as I suppose, it came from his heart,) and was satisfactory to me, as I declared to him. He asked me now a great many questions concerning my private concerns, useless to repeat here; and so we departed good friends, I for Aux Cayes, and he, some months later, to the Main.

I have entered into these minute details of the principal facts that happened to me, in order to show the true character of a man who has acquired such a colossal reputation, little corresponding with what he really is, in regard to heroism, bravery, military skill, firmness of character, and talent. I will close this chapter with another trait, which will show how he always takes care to preserve his own baggage, and all that belongs to him. I have already proved how he fears being wounded or killed, and takes care to have his sacred person perfectly secured.

When at Margarita, where we slept in the same

room, in which he had established his office, (and mine was opposite to his on the same floor,) he came one day into my office, to tell me to give the order to all the officers belonging to our army, from the general down to the second lieutenant, to take with them no more than a few changes of dress, and to leave behind their trunks and baggage. "I myself," said he, "take no more than six changes of clothes, &c." In conformity to this order, every one of us left our trunks in a kind of block-house, in the Villa del Norte. I had three, full of valuable articles, and as the glass of my gold repeater was broken, Bolivar told me to leave it in one of my trunks, as I could send for them when I should be definitely settled. I left also all my papers, certificates of services from Europe, correspondence, and other very valuable documents, &c. We embarked, and being one day at Carupano, on board the admiral's ship, I was astonished to see on deck more than twenty trunks, pretty large and heavy. I asked to whom they belonged, and was surprised to hear from Garcia, the intendant of General Bolivar, that they were his master's baggage! I learned from him that the General had given him orders to hire mules, and to transport all his baggage from Villa del Norte to the port of Juan Griego, where we should embark, and that he did it the night previous to our embarking.

When I expressed my surprise to General Bolivar some days afterwards, on seeing all these trunks in his house, he answered me dryly, "that Garcia had embarked them *by mistake!*"

I have related how General Bolivar carried his

trunks into the arsenal, where he took shelter, when our cavalry guard had been surprised by the enemy at Carupano. This station was safe for himself and his baggage; then, from the arsenal he could in five minutes embark, or take shelter in the fort of Santa Rosa.

These are facts of which I was an eye witness. And so it came to pass, that after the defeat of Soublette at Ocumare, all our baggage was plundered, the trunks broken open, and all was irretrievably lost; because General Arismendy, hearing that Bolivar had fled, judged we were all taken or slain, and our baggage was distributed among the troops of Margarita. I regretted the loss of my watch and my papers; wrote twice to General Arismendy, but received no answer. These were irreparable losses, which I regret to the present time.

END OF VOL. I.

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